Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. National Labor Bd. v. Atlanta Metallic Casket

    205 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1953)   Cited 6 times

    The nonexistence of a cause of action when the suit was begun cannot be cured by an amendment to cover the subsequently accruing right." See also Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 164, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893; Annotation 125 A.L.R. 619; Chapman v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 71 App.D.C. 64, 107 F.2d 263, 267; Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C.Mich., 18 F.2d 968, 970; Cf. Illinois Surety Co. v. U.S. to Use of Peeler, 240 U.S. 214, 222, 36 S.Ct. 321, 60 L.Ed. 609; Fleischmann Const. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 349, 359, 46 S.Ct. 284, 70 L.Ed. 624; In re Brown, 7 Cir., 124 F.2d 701, 703. Finally, the over-all purpose of Section 9(h) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h), as phrased in the Dant Case, 344 U.S. 375 at page 382, 73 S.Ct. 375, at page 379, "is that the benefits of the Act may not flow to a labor organization unless the non-Communist affidavits are on file."

  2. Chapman v. Griffith-Consumers Co.

    107 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1939)   Cited 12 times
    In Chapman v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 71 App.D.C. 64, 68, 107 F.2d 263, 267, the court affirmed the action of the trial court in striking an amended declaration which set forth as an essential averment a fact which occurred after the filing of the original declaration.

    We cannot agree that it relates to the original declaration, but think it essentially independent thereof. We reach this conclusion upon the authority of United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co., v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 164, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893; American Bonding Trust Co., v. Gibson County, 6 Cir., 145 F. 871, 874, 7 Ann.Cas. 522; and, Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968, 969. Additional authorities on this point are: Simerson v. St. Louis S.F.R. Co., 8 Cir., 173 F. 612, 614; City of Trinidad v. Hokasona, 8 Cir., 178 F. 438, 440; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., v. Thaggard, 130 Ga. 701, 61 S.E. 726; Hollingsworth v. Flint, 101 U.S. 591, 596, 25 L.Ed. 1028; Young v. Peoples Bank, 163 S.C. 57, 161 S.E. 324, 329; Dempsey v. Langton, 266 Mich. 47, 253 N.W. 210, 212; Veginan v. Morse, 160 Mass. 143, 35 N.E. 451.

  3. Bowles v. Senderowitz

    65 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Pa. 1946)   Cited 11 times

    The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, therefore, have not effected any change with regard to the requirement that facts constituting a cause of action must exist at the time suit is commenced. Mellor v. Smither, 5 Cir., 114 F. 116; Kryptok Co. v. Haussmann Co., D.C.E.D.Pa., 216 F. 267; Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C.E.D.Mich., 18 F.2d 968. Plaintiff's own evidence shows that one essential fact necessary to its cause of action did not exist at the commencement of the action.

  4. Mike Levine, v. Baer

    32 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)   Cited 5 times

    The defect cannot be cured by amendment. American Bonding Trust Co. v. Gibson County, 6 Cir., 145 F. 871, 7 Ann.Cas. 522; Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968. The motion of the defendants to dismiss is granted.

  5. Bailey v. Williams

    326 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. 1959)   Cited 18 times

    " (Citing cases.) And see Lennox v. Vandalia Coal Co., 158 Mo. 473, 493-495, 59 S.W. 242; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ridge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S.W. 1043, 1045; Herbig v. Herbig, Mo.App., 245 S.W.2d 455, 456(3, 4); Wocet v. Seacat, Mo.App., 212 S.W.2d 449, 453; Huffman v. Meriwether, Mo.App., 201 S.W.2d 469, 473(2); Lindsay v. Evans, Mo.App., 174 S.W.2d 390, 395(1, 2). And see Berssenbrugge v. Luce Mfg. Co., D.C., 30 F. Supp. 101; and Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968, 969. Respondents also insist that "the second amended petition fails to state a cause of action that existed at the time of the commencement of the suit," to wit, on August 16, 1956; that "the record shows that the alleged cause of action on which plaintiff now seeks to recover accrued after the commencement of the suit"; and that recovery can only be had on a cause of action existing at the time the action was first instituted. Respondents also cite Weinwick v. Bender, 33 Mo. 80; Heard v. Ritchey, 112 Mo. 516, 20 S.W. 799; Finley v. Babb, 144 Mo. 403, 46 S.W. 165; and Payne v. School District, 87 Mo.App. 415, 419.

  6. Dewey v. Clark

    61 A.2d 475 (D.C. 1948)   Cited 6 times

    We cannot agree that it relates to the original declaration, but think it essentially independent thereof. We reach this conclusion upon the authority of United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 164, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893; American Bonding Trust Co. v. Gibson County, 6 Cir., 145 F. 871, 874, 7 Ann.Cas. 522; and, Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968, 969."

  7. Young, Receiver, v. Peoples Bank et al

    163 S.C. 57 (S.C. 1931)   Cited 9 times
    In Young, suit was brought against the directors of a bank on their liability as endorsers of a note on which the bank was the principal obligee.

    S.H. Young was substituted as Receiver for the Bank of Timmonsville. From the judgment, J. Ed. Anderson and others appeal. Messrs. Philip H. Arrowsmith, R.E. Whiting and Baker Baker, for appellants, cite: Action premature: 3 Strob. L., 190; 14 S.C. 426; 30 S.C. 503; 32 S.C. 66; 37 S.C. 444; 18 F.2d 968; 145 Fed., 871; 59 L.Ed., 893; 1 R.C.L., 340; 1 C.J., 1151; 7 Ann. Cas., 524; 131 S.C. 344; 127 S.E., 436. If complaint states no cause of actionsupplementary pleading improper: 107 S.C. 393; 93 S.E., 141; 21 R.C.L., 503; 14 S.C. 434. Messrs. Willcox Hardee, for respondent, cite: Objectionto testimony must be made to be considered on appeal: 59 S.C. 232; 98 S.C. 209. Relevancy of testimony is forthe trial Court: 98 S.C. 123; 101 S.C. 404. Presumptionthat opinion was founded on competent testimony: 92 S.C. 501; 75 S.E., 889; 94 S.C. 62; 77 S.E., 735; 95 S.C. 44; 79 S.E., 717; 98 S.C. 8; 81 S.E., 1027; 102 S.C. 434; 86 S.E., 815; 109 S.C. 160; 95 S.E., 337. Mattersoccurring subsequent to commencement of action cannot beset up as counterclaim: 24 R.C.L., 835; 19 A.L.R., 194; 67 Me., 570; 3 McC., 249; 30 S.C. 126; 6 Rich. L., 275; 13 Rich. L., 161; 4 Rich. L., 178; 2 Rich. L., 547; 10 Rich. L., 532; 45 S.C. 575. Notice of protest unnecessary: 140 S.C. 505; 126 S.C. 219. Court of equity

  8. Lilly v. O'Brien

    224 Ky. 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928)   Cited 20 times
    In Lilly v. O'Brien, 6 S.W.2d 715, decided March 6, 1928, the canvassing board certified in triplicate the result of the election, but the certificates were left in the form book and retained in the control of the board until November 18, when O'Brien filed his expense account, and thereupon a certificate of election was given to him and the other two certificates were lodged with the clerk, one to be retained there and the other forwarded to the secretary of state at the seat of government as directed by the statute.

    16 Enc. of Pl. Pr. 875; Loomis v. Donovan, 17 Ind. 198; Duryee v. Turner, 20 Mo. App. 34; Green v. Demoss, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 371, 377." Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co. (D.C.) 18 F.2d 968. In a note to the American Bonding Trust Co. case in 7 Ann Cas., at page 524, it is said: