The nonexistence of a cause of action when the suit was begun cannot be cured by an amendment to cover the subsequently accruing right." See also Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 164, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893; Annotation 125 A.L.R. 619; Chapman v. Griffith-Consumers Co., 71 App.D.C. 64, 107 F.2d 263, 267; Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C.Mich., 18 F.2d 968, 970; Cf. Illinois Surety Co. v. U.S. to Use of Peeler, 240 U.S. 214, 222, 36 S.Ct. 321, 60 L.Ed. 609; Fleischmann Const. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 349, 359, 46 S.Ct. 284, 70 L.Ed. 624; In re Brown, 7 Cir., 124 F.2d 701, 703. Finally, the over-all purpose of Section 9(h) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h), as phrased in the Dant Case, 344 U.S. 375 at page 382, 73 S.Ct. 375, at page 379, "is that the benefits of the Act may not flow to a labor organization unless the non-Communist affidavits are on file."
We cannot agree that it relates to the original declaration, but think it essentially independent thereof. We reach this conclusion upon the authority of United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co., v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 164, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893; American Bonding Trust Co., v. Gibson County, 6 Cir., 145 F. 871, 874, 7 Ann.Cas. 522; and, Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968, 969. Additional authorities on this point are: Simerson v. St. Louis S.F.R. Co., 8 Cir., 173 F. 612, 614; City of Trinidad v. Hokasona, 8 Cir., 178 F. 438, 440; United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., v. Thaggard, 130 Ga. 701, 61 S.E. 726; Hollingsworth v. Flint, 101 U.S. 591, 596, 25 L.Ed. 1028; Young v. Peoples Bank, 163 S.C. 57, 161 S.E. 324, 329; Dempsey v. Langton, 266 Mich. 47, 253 N.W. 210, 212; Veginan v. Morse, 160 Mass. 143, 35 N.E. 451.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, therefore, have not effected any change with regard to the requirement that facts constituting a cause of action must exist at the time suit is commenced. Mellor v. Smither, 5 Cir., 114 F. 116; Kryptok Co. v. Haussmann Co., D.C.E.D.Pa., 216 F. 267; Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C.E.D.Mich., 18 F.2d 968. Plaintiff's own evidence shows that one essential fact necessary to its cause of action did not exist at the commencement of the action.
The defect cannot be cured by amendment. American Bonding Trust Co. v. Gibson County, 6 Cir., 145 F. 871, 7 Ann.Cas. 522; Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968. The motion of the defendants to dismiss is granted.
" (Citing cases.) And see Lennox v. Vandalia Coal Co., 158 Mo. 473, 493-495, 59 S.W. 242; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ridge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S.W. 1043, 1045; Herbig v. Herbig, Mo.App., 245 S.W.2d 455, 456(3, 4); Wocet v. Seacat, Mo.App., 212 S.W.2d 449, 453; Huffman v. Meriwether, Mo.App., 201 S.W.2d 469, 473(2); Lindsay v. Evans, Mo.App., 174 S.W.2d 390, 395(1, 2). And see Berssenbrugge v. Luce Mfg. Co., D.C., 30 F. Supp. 101; and Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968, 969. Respondents also insist that "the second amended petition fails to state a cause of action that existed at the time of the commencement of the suit," to wit, on August 16, 1956; that "the record shows that the alleged cause of action on which plaintiff now seeks to recover accrued after the commencement of the suit"; and that recovery can only be had on a cause of action existing at the time the action was first instituted. Respondents also cite Weinwick v. Bender, 33 Mo. 80; Heard v. Ritchey, 112 Mo. 516, 20 S.W. 799; Finley v. Babb, 144 Mo. 403, 46 S.W. 165; and Payne v. School District, 87 Mo.App. 415, 419.
We cannot agree that it relates to the original declaration, but think it essentially independent thereof. We reach this conclusion upon the authority of United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 164, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893; American Bonding Trust Co. v. Gibson County, 6 Cir., 145 F. 871, 874, 7 Ann.Cas. 522; and, Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co., D.C., 18 F.2d 968, 969."
S.H. Young was substituted as Receiver for the Bank of Timmonsville. From the judgment, J. Ed. Anderson and others appeal. Messrs. Philip H. Arrowsmith, R.E. Whiting and Baker Baker, for appellants, cite: Action premature: 3 Strob. L., 190; 14 S.C. 426; 30 S.C. 503; 32 S.C. 66; 37 S.C. 444; 18 F.2d 968; 145 Fed., 871; 59 L.Ed., 893; 1 R.C.L., 340; 1 C.J., 1151; 7 Ann. Cas., 524; 131 S.C. 344; 127 S.E., 436. If complaint states no cause of actionsupplementary pleading improper: 107 S.C. 393; 93 S.E., 141; 21 R.C.L., 503; 14 S.C. 434. Messrs. Willcox Hardee, for respondent, cite: Objectionto testimony must be made to be considered on appeal: 59 S.C. 232; 98 S.C. 209. Relevancy of testimony is forthe trial Court: 98 S.C. 123; 101 S.C. 404. Presumptionthat opinion was founded on competent testimony: 92 S.C. 501; 75 S.E., 889; 94 S.C. 62; 77 S.E., 735; 95 S.C. 44; 79 S.E., 717; 98 S.C. 8; 81 S.E., 1027; 102 S.C. 434; 86 S.E., 815; 109 S.C. 160; 95 S.E., 337. Mattersoccurring subsequent to commencement of action cannot beset up as counterclaim: 24 R.C.L., 835; 19 A.L.R., 194; 67 Me., 570; 3 McC., 249; 30 S.C. 126; 6 Rich. L., 275; 13 Rich. L., 161; 4 Rich. L., 178; 2 Rich. L., 547; 10 Rich. L., 532; 45 S.C. 575. Notice of protest unnecessary: 140 S.C. 505; 126 S.C. 219. Court of equity
16 Enc. of Pl. Pr. 875; Loomis v. Donovan, 17 Ind. 198; Duryee v. Turner, 20 Mo. App. 34; Green v. Demoss, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 371, 377." Eveland v. Detroit Machine Tool Co. (D.C.) 18 F.2d 968. In a note to the American Bonding Trust Co. case in 7 Ann Cas., at page 524, it is said: