Id. at 951, 499 N.E.2d at 539. The Illinois Appellate Court revisited the issue in Evanston Hospital v. Crane, 254 Ill.App.3d 435, 193 Ill.Dec. 870, 627 N.E.2d 29 (1993). In Evanston, the plaintiff hospital commenced an action to collect on a medical bill for services it had rendered for the defendant.

See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 32-38, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) (Connecticut Uniform Trade Practices Act [CUTPA] applies to "conduct of any trade or commerce"; touchstone for legally sufficient CUTPA claim against health care provider is allegation that entrepreneurial or business aspect of provision of services is implicated, aside from medical competence or malpractice; to hold otherwise "would transform every claim for medical malpractice into a CUTPA claim"); Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 254 Ill. App. 3d 435, 443-44, 627 N.E.2d 29 (1993) (Illinois Consumer Fraud Act applies to "conduct of any trade or commerce"; Consumer Fraud Act not available as additional remedy to redress patient's damages arising from alleged medical malpractice where patient alleged hospital's patient guide was deceptive in stating that hospital was committed to high-quality care when patient did not receive such care); Nelson v. Ho, 222 Mich. App. 74, 84,564 N.W.2d 482 (1997) ("Only when physicians are engaging in the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspect of the practice of medicine are they engaged in 'trade or commerce' within the purview of the [Michigan CPA]."). The "trade or commerce" language contained in many states' consumer protection laws appears to be the source of the entrepreneurial test.

ess, e.g., id. at 1354; Stamatakis Industries, Inc. v. King, 520 N.E.2d 770, 772-73 (Ill.App. 1987) (and think only of the difficulty that courts have had in defining "pattern" under the RICO statute), and rejected in most states, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917 (Cal. 1997); Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3, 9 (Ala. 1997); 2 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 7.10, p. 477 n. 19 (2d ed. 1986), the Illinois rule yet makes sense in a case like this, if only as a filter against efforts to use the legal process to stifle competition. Consider in this connection the characterization by Speakers' own chairman of ProServ's promise to Rodriguez as "pure fantasy and gross exaggeration" — in other words, as puffing. Puffing in the usual sense signifies meaningless superlatives that no reasonable person would take seriously, and so it is not actionable as fraud. Noll v. Peterson, 170 N.E. 756, 761 (Ill. 1930); Evanston Hospital v. Crane, 627 N.E.2d 29, 36 (Ill.App. 1993); All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., No. 98-2634, 1999 WL 188251 at *4 (7th Cir. April 7, 1999). Rodriguez thus could not have sued ProServ (and has not attempted to) in respect of the promise of $2-$4 million in endorsements. If Rodriguez thus was not wronged, we do not understand on what theory Speakers can complain that ProServ competed with it unfairly.

It is true that the term "high-quality" in most cases will fall into the category of puffing. See Avery, 35 N.E.2d at 846 (citing Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 627 N.E.2d 29, 33, 36 (Ill. App. 1993) ("high-quality" patient care)). But in this case, Plaintiff's allegation is that the term "high-quality" is used not generically in reference to the quality of the Product but specifically to identify the supposed type or category of an ingredient in the Product.

General assertions of quality are also puffery because "quality" is a vague, subjective concept. Am. Italian Pasta Co., 371 F.3d at 393; see also Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 627 N.E.2d 29 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993) (holding that statements that hospital would provide "high quality" care to patients were expressions of opinion or "puffing"); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding statements of product superiority and that product was "industry approved" were puffery). Such statements cannot serve as the basis for a consumer fraud action because they are too general and non-specific to support a claim and because "quality" is too subjective to be evaluated. The Court notes that the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act does contain a reference to quality, stating that it is a violation of that statute for one to "represent[] that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another."

General assertions of quality are also puffery because "quality" is a vague, subjective concept. Am. Italian Pasta Co., 371 F.3d at 393; see also Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 627 N.E.2d 29 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993) (holding that statements that hospital would provide "high quality" care to patients were expressions of opinion or "puffing"); Porous Media Corp., 173 F.3d 1109 (holding statements of product superiority and that product was "industry approved" were puffery). The contrast between puffing statements and statements constituting fraud can be seen in Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2004).

Again, as a matter of hornbook law it is true that mere expressions of opinion, or "puffing," are not actionable under the ICFA. In re Estate of Albergo, 275 Ill. App.3d 439, 211 Ill.Dec. 905, 656 N.E.2d 97, 107 (1995) (citing Sohaey v. Van Cura, 240 Ill. App.3d 266, 180 Ill.Dec. 359, 607 N.E.2d 253, 272 (1992)); Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 254 Ill. App.3d 435, 193 Ill. Dec. 870, 627 N.E.2d 29, 36 (1993). But "[a] statement that would otherwise be an opinion can constitute a statement of fact if it is made in such a way that the consumer could reasonably treat it as a statement of fact."

See Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990) (hospital regulations do not establish standard of medical care but serve as directives to physicians); Roberts v. Cox, 669 So.2d 633, 641 (La.Ct.App. 1996) (trial court appropriately excluded policies of two local hospitals because plaintiffs failed to establish that these policies reflected the standard of medical practice in the community); Evanston Hospital v. Crane, 254 Ill. App.3d 435, 193 Ill. Dec. 870, 875-76, 627 N.E.2d 29, 34-35 (Ct. 1993) (hospital licensing regulations, accreditation standards, and bylaws do not determine the standard of care but are admissible as evidence); Hicks v. Canessa, 825 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex.Ct.App. 1992) ("Hospital rules do not reflect the community standard of medical care. A particular institution might maintain a higher standard of care in its operations than the prevailing community standard."); Bell v. Maricopa Medical Center, 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1988) (jury must first determine that hospital regulations are synonymous with applicable medical standard of care before finding that a violation of a regulation constitutes negligence); Keir v. United States, 853 F.2d 398, 413-14 (6th Cir. 1988) (physician's failure to refer his patient to an ophthalmologist as required by the hospital's standard operating procedure was evidence of a violation of the standard of medical care under New Jersey law); Mele v. Sherman Hospital, 838 F.2d 923, 925-26 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[t]he standard of

Such statements include subjective descriptions relating to quality. See, e.g., Evanston Hospital v. Crane, 254 Ill. App.3d 435, 439, 444, 193 Ill.Dec. 870, 627 N.E.2d 29 (1993) ("high-quality"); Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, Inc., 246 Ill.App.3d 810, 823, 186 Ill.Dec. 425, 616 N.E.2d 615 (1993) ("expert workmanship," "custom quality," "perfect"); Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App.3d 154, 163, 109 Ill.Dec. 541, 510 N.E.2d 409 (1986) ("magnificent," "comfortable"); Spiegel v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 125 Ill.App.3d 897, 902, 81 Ill.Dec. 238, 466 N.E.2d 1040 (1984) ("picture perfect"); see also State v. American TV &Appliance of Madison, Inc., 146 Wis.2d 292, 302, 430 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1988) ("A general statement that one's products are best is not actionable as a misrepresentation of fact"). Describing a product as "quality" or as having "high performance criteria" are the types of subjective characterizations that Illinois courts have repeatedly held to be mere puffing.

Such statements include subjective descriptions relating to quality. See, e.g., Evanston Hospital v. Crane, 254 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439, 444 (1993) ("high-quality"); Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 810, 823 (1993) ("expert workmanship," "custom quality," "perfect"); Zimmerman u. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 163 (1986) ("magnificent," "comfortable"); Spiegel u. Sharp Electronics Corp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902 (1984) ("picture perfect"); see also State v. American TV Appliance of Madison, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 292, 302, 430 N.W.2d 709, 712 (1988) ("A general statement that one's products are best is not actionable as a misrepresentation of fact"). Describing a product as "quality" or as having "high performance criteria" are the types of subjective characterizations that Illinois courts have repeatedly held to be mere puffing.