The transcript from the hearing of the motions was attached to the order. In its oral ruling, the trial court considered the decision in Evans v.Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) and applied its rule to the Release signed by the parties. The trial court concluded that the plain language of the Release clearly provided for the release of all claims against any potential defendants and was not limited to claims against the Med. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's ruling.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in a case factually similar to the case at bar, has considered the effect of mutual mistake by parties to a release on the liability of unnamed joint tortfeasors who did not provide consideration for the release. Evans v. Tillett Brothers Construction Company, 545 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn.App.), cert. denied, (Tenn. 1976). In Evans the plaintiff sued a construction company and a bridge company for negligent construction of a highway which allegedly caused the death of his minor daughter.
Also, the scope and extent of a release depends on the intent of the party as expressed in the terms of the agreement. Evans v. Tillett Brothers Construction Co., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn.App. 1976). However, any release procured by false or fraudulent representations is voidable, id., as is a release that was negotiated based on a mutual mistake of a material fact.
We first address the trial court's decision to allow parol evidence concerning the changes to the Rental Agreement. Under Tennessee law, the parol evidence rule "'applies only between the parties to the written contract and strangers cannot raise the question of the admissibility of parol evidence to vary a written contract.'" Consumers Ins. USA v. Smith, No. E2002-00724-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31863300, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2002) (quoting Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., 545 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976)). As such, Tennessee courts have consistently disallowed use of the parol evidence rule by an entity or individual that was not a party to the written contract at issue.
In interpreting a release to determine whether a particular claim has been discharged, the primary rule of construction is that the intention of the parties shall govern and this intention is to be determined with a consideration of what was within the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed, which in turn is to be resolved in the light of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted.Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). Because the interpretation of a contract is a question of law, "[t]his court must review the document ourselves and make our own determination regarding its meaning and legal import."
1974). In Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), the Court explained how the scope of a release should be determined:The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances.
Under this system, a settling defendant could, in essence, buy its right to seek contribution from other tortfeasors by including those other tortfeasors in the release. See Evans v. Tillett Bros. Const. Co., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11-12 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1976); Ballinger v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 829 F.2d 38, No. 86-5755, 1987 WL 44451, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 1987) (no petition for cert. filed). By contrast, under modified comparative negligence, a defendant is "liable only for the percentage of a plaintiff's damages occasioned by that defendant's negligence."
Cross v. Earls, 517 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tenn. 1974); Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn.App. 1976). Where a release has been executed in writing without fraud, misrepresentation or duress and with every reasonable opportunity for consideration of its terms, it will be binding. Evans, 545 S.W.2d at 11.
It is an established principle of Tennessee law that "the scope and extent of a release depends on the intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument" and that "[a] general release covers all claims between the parties which are in existence and within their contemplation; . . . ." Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn. App. 1976) (citing Cross v. Earls, 517 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1974)).
Peatross v. Shelby Cnty., No. W200802385COAR3CV, 2009 WL 2922797, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2009) (quoting Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976)).