As seen, the element of possession which was in the Levin decision is absent here. Possession, however, is merely one feature of ownership and even without it the Levin opinion must be held to establish the New Jersey rule against the appellant. The later case of Evans v. London Assurance Corporation, Err. App., 107 N.J.L. 183, 151 A. 613 does not conflict with this view. There a fire insurance policy was upheld in favor of the insured where the premises were to be conveyed by implied terms of an agreement which had to do with different property.
In addition, the thirty-day termination clause, while only providing for a brief notice period did not render the contract illusory. Cf. LinanFaye Construction Co., Inc. v. Housing Authority of the City of Camden, 49 F.3d 915, 924 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing illusory nature of termination provisions in government contracts); cf. also Evans v. London Assur. Corp., 107 N.J.L. 183, 186, 151 A. 613 (1930) (discussing the requirement of mutuality of obligations in real property contracts). Considering these terms in context with the entire renegotiation transaction, however, I conclude that I cannot resolve this claim on a motion for summary judgment because disputed issues of material fact remain.
In cases where a forfeiture is declared by reason of change of title or interest, it is usually found that the insured has a diminished interest in the protection of the property against fire, but in this case, the defendant William C. Evans had possibly a greater interest in the property, as I have already said, than before it was conveyed to W.C. Evans Company. The entire loss would fall upon him, he being the owner of all the stock in the company. This reasoning is illustrated I feel in the opinion of Judge Jess, affirmed by the court of errors and appeals, in Evans v. London Assurance Corp.,107 N.J. Law 183. In view of the ownership by William C. Evans of all the stock in the W.C. Evans Company, it is clear that by that ownership he had the beneficial ownership of the real estate which he had conveyed to it; he was the substantial beneficial owner of this real estate.
The entire loss would fall upon him, he being the owner of all the stock in the company. This reasoning is illustrated I feel in the opinion of Judge Jess, affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, in Evans v. London Assurance Corporation, 107 N. J. Law, 183, 151 A. 613. In view of the ownership by William C. Evans of all the stock in the W. C. Evans Company, it is clear that by that ownership he had the beneficial ownership of the real estate which he had conveyed to it; he was the substantial beneficial owner of this real estate.