Id. at *4. In support of this holding, the Austin court cited In re J.D.H., 661 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1983, no writ), and Evans v. Tarrant Cty. Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1977, no writ). In Evans, we quoted the following to support our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing the child welfare unit as managing conservator when it denied termination of the mother's parental rights,

We agree with the Department that its pleading, referring to the court's duty to name a managing conservator and asking that the Department be so appointed, was sufficient to give T.L. notice of its intent to seek PMC in the event that the jury decided not to terminate her rights. See Evans v. Tarrant Cnty. Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1977, no writ) ("We find the refusal to terminate not to be a dismissal of the case, as contended by mother, particularly in view of the alternate pleading of Welfare."). The fact that the Department did not reference sections 153.131 or 263.404 did not waive the Department's ability to seek to be named PMC.

Section 161.205 contemplates that such denials might occur, stating, “If the court does not order termination of the parent-child relationship, the court shall: (1) deny the petition; or (2) render any order in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.205 (West 2014); see alsoEvans v. Tarrant Cnty. Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1977, no writ) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss Department's petition for termination and naming Department as managing conservator of minor children even though trial court denied Department's petition for termination).Consequently, proving the validity of the affidavit of relinquishment is merely one step towards termination of a party's parental rights.

Later cases that refer to Erwin cite it as support for the proposition that the trial judge in custody cases is given broad discretion to determine the best interests of the child. See Evans v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ). But even in custody cases, a complete failure to follow the rules of pleading and practice cannot be ignored.

Accordingly, evidence regarding the conduct and abilities of a step-parent can be relevant and admissible in a suit seeking modification of conservatorship. Wallace, 533 S.W.2d at 167-68; accord Barron, 601 S.W.2d at 214-15; T.A.B., 598 S.W.2d at 939-40; Colbert v. Stokes, 581 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1979, no writ); Evans v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144, 145-46 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ). Such evidence can be relevant to the issues of whether awarding sole managing conservatorship of the child to the spouse of that step-parent would be a positive improvement for the child or whether such a change of conservatorship would be in the best interest of the child.

" (Citations omitted.) Since Leonard, the Texas courts have expanded the list to include all aspects of a child's physical, mental, emotional and moral well-being to be considered: moral and religious training, see T.A.B. v. W.L.B., 598 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1980) writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1980); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 122, 70 L.Ed. 104 (1981); remarriage of a parent, along with other accompanying facts affecting the welfare of the child, see Evans v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ); Dohrmann v. Chandler, 435 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1968, no writ); changing jobs frequently, see In Re Y, 516 S.W.2d 199, 203-04 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and emotional health of the child, see L.P.W. v. S.O., 669 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1984, no writ); Jeffers v. Wallace, 615 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1981, no writ). In the present case, the evidence showed that both parties had remarried at the time of trial.

The unrebutted evidence establishes that at the time the decree was entered, appellant did not know her present husband, Gene Kimbrell. After the divorce decree was entered, appellant met, lived with and later married Gene Kimbrell. This, we believe is a material change of circumstances. See Evans v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ); Wallace v. Fitch, 533 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Leonard v. Leonard, 218 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1949, no writ). Point of error two is overruled. Of course a material change such as remarriage, standing alone, is not sufficient to warrant a change of custody. It is, however, the threshold question to be determined before the inquiry of the best interest of the children is reached.

But, if any question remains relating to this point of error, the rule to be followed in child custody cases is that technical rules of civil procedure, as to practice and pleading, are not of controlling importance, since the controlling factor is the best interests of the child. Poulter v. Poulter, 565 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1978, no writ); Evans v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit, 550 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1977, no writ); Ex parte Gallop, 486 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It is because of our profound concern for the best interests of the child in issue that we have addressed this point of error, for we are not technically required to do so under TEX.R.CIV.P. 90 because appellant failed to preserve the alleged error by objection. Murray v. O A Express, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 633, 636-637 (Tex. 1982); Sherman v. Provident American Insurance Company, 421 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. 1967); Rose v. Burton, 614 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).