The right to counsel is a personal right which the accused may knowingly and intelligently waive either at the pretrial stage or at trial. Burton v. State, 260 Ark. 688, 543 S.W.2d 760 (1976); Evans v. State, 251 Ark. 151, 471 S.W.2d 346 (1971); Barger v. State, 249 Ark. 878, 462 S.W.2d 216 (1971); and Slaughter v. State, 240 Ark. 471, 400 S.W.2d 267 (1966). Here it clearly appears that the trial court was solicitous of appellant's constitutional rights and thoroughly advised him of them.
Both signed statements reflecting their understanding of the fact that they were to be provided counsel if they so desired at any time during the proceedings. In Evans v. State, 251 Ark. 151, 471 S.W.2d 346 (1971), the court said: It is a firmly established rule of law that a defendant can intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel.
Such evidence is considered as an extension of the record. See Clark v. State, Fla., 256 So.2d 551 (1972); Bennett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 463 S.W.2d 331 (1971); Smith v. Director, Patuxent Institution, Md. App., 280 A.2d 910 (1971); Evans v. State, Ark., 471 S.W.2d 346 (1971); Grass v. State, Me., 263 A.2d 63 (1970); State v. Elledge, 81 N.M. 18, 462 P.2d 152 (1969); Hall v. State, 45 ALa.App. 252, 228 So.2d 863 (1969). We find no theory in Boykin that criminal convictions are built upon a piece of paper that must be inked simultaneously with the plea.