Indeed, both Lathlean and Lavin testified that they notified the police because, in Lavin's words, the "situation was starting to get out of control," given the defendant's anger and his threat to get a gun.6 To this end, I find instructive the decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Evans v. State , 241 Ga. App. 32, 32–33, 525 S.E.2d 780 (1999), which rejected a sufficiency challenge to a disorderly conduct conviction on the basis of fighting words rooted in similar threats to shoot an amusement park security officer, who, like a water company employee or store manager, is expected to interact professionally with members of the public who may be behaving very badly. In Evans , while at Six Flags, a major amusement park, the defendant, Evans, responded to the officer's "questions about ... [stolen] cotton candy by repeatedly saying, ‘[Fuck] that, that does not have [shit] to do with us,’ " and most significantly, that " ‘he was going to go to his vehicle, get his "pop," while pointing his hand at [the officer] like a pistol [and saying] "pop, pop, pop" .... That's when [Evans] started walking [toward] his vehicle.’
See Turner, 274 Ga. App. at 733 (1) (a); see also Delaney, 267 Ga. App. at 378-379. Compare with Evans v. State, 241 Ga. App. 32, 33-34 (3) ( 525 SE2d 780) (1999) (physical precedent only) (defendant made several profanitylaced remarks to a police officer before threatening to get his gun from his car and shoot the officer); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 807, 809 (1) ( 499 SE2d 717) (1998) (defendant called sheriff a "no-good son of a b[___]" and threatened to kick his "ass"), abrogated on other grounds by Golden Peanut Co. v. Bass, 249 Ga. App. 224 ( 547 SE2d 637) (2001). 2.
Given appellants' failure to show due diligence, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. See Evans v. State, 241 Ga. App. 32 (2) ( 525 SE2d 780) (1999) (motion for new trial properly denied when the defendant failed to exercise diligence in obtaining the additional evidence). For the same reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. See Huntley, 244 Ga. App. at 214 (2).
Id. at 427. Compare Evans v. State, 241 Ga. App. 32, 33 (3) ( 525 SE2d 780) (1999) (defendant responded to security officer's questions about stealing cotton candy by saying, "F____ that, that does not have s____ to do with us"); Tucker v. State, 233 Ga. App. 314, 317 (2) ( 504 SE2d 250) (1998) (defendant loudly called women in the bar "f____ing c____ts" and used phrase "f____ you" several times); Anderson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 807, 809 (1) ( 499 SE2d 717) (1998) (defendant called sheriff a "no-good son of a bitch" and threatened to kick his "ass"); Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704, 705 ( 305 SE2d 436) (1983) (defendant gestured at police officer and yelled to a crowd of 150 to 200 people that "(t)his man here is a dog"); Bolden v. State, 148 Ga.App. 315, 316 (4) ( 251 SE2d 165) (1978) (woman called officer "son of a bitch," "motherfucker," "bastard," "motherfucking pig," and "pig").Tucker, supra.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Evans v. State, 241 Ga. App. 32 (1) ( 525 S.E.2d 780) (1999). The threat to kill alleged in the indictment did not impact on either of the two requirements outlined above in establishing the elements of the indicted offense under OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2).