Opinion
No. 03-CV-2312 (JBW).
July 6, 2004
MEMORANDUM, ORDER JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Arthur Kill Correctional Facility. He has brought suit against Carl Okin, the Deputy Superintendent for Administrative Services, Glenn Goord, J. Anderson, Joseph Smith, and Thomas Ricks under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. At a hearing, the court dismissed defendants Goord, Anderson, Smith and Ricks pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Okin moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on March 30, 2004. Plaintiff was then granted ample time to respond. See Docket entries of Apr. 15 27, 2004. The case is ready for decision.
No hearing is required. The motion is granted for reasons stated below.
II. Facts
The evidence supports the following statement of facts:
On April 30, 2000, while in the visiting room at Sing Sing, plaintiff was observed ingesting what appeared to be currency. He was detained on suspicion that he possessed contraband, searched and placed in an observation unit. While plaintiff was detained, his cell was searched and a correction officer recovered the following items: a bag of money containing $120 and a "hard brown substance"; a red balloon filled with a "green leafy substance"; and ten sugar packets and a clear packet containing a "green leafy substance." The "green leafy" and "hard brown" substances tested positive for marijuana.
On May 1, 2000, plaintiff was served with a copy of an inmate misbehavior report, charging him with the following disciplinary violations: (1) § 113.16 "Inmates shall not be in possession of stamps in excess of $20.00, money, credit cards, checks or unauthorized valuables or property;" (2) § 113.23 "Inmates shall not be in possession of any contraband items not listed in Rules 113.10 through 113.22. Contraband is any article that is not authorized by the superintendent or designee;" and (3) § 113.25 "Inmates shall not make, possess, sell or exchange any narcotic, narcotic paraphernalia, or controlled substance."
Defendant Okin was named as hearing officer for plaintiff's disciplinary hearing. The hearing commenced on May 6, 2000. After being informed of his rights and confirming receipt of the misbehavior report, plaintiff pleaded not guilty. Plaintiff agreed to an adjournment of the hearing to retrieve paperwork regarding the disciplinary charges. Before adjourning, in response to a question, plaintiff stated that he intended to call his hearing assistant as a witness.
The hearing reconvened on May 17, 2000. At the onset of the hearing, defendant noted that plaintiff had received a time extension to complete the disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff argued at this hearing that he was not aware of how the contraband came to be found in his cell. He also stated four objections to the hearing: (1) he was not provided meaningful assistance; (2) he did not receive requested documents from his hearing assistant; (3) he was not afforded the opportunity to be present during his cell search; and (4) he objected to the testing of the contraband found in his cell. The objections were noted for the record. The hearing was adjourned to call plaintiff's hearing assistant as a witness and to ensure the prison law library was open and accessible to plaintiff. Defendant applied and for and received an extension for completion of the disciplinary hearing from May 17 to May 22, 2000. Plaintiff refused to sign the acknowledgment slip of the extension request.
Plaintiff called his hearing assistant to testify on May 22, 2000. He testified that he assisted plaintiff, and that the law library was accessible at all times. A second witness called by plaintiff, an inmate, refused to testify because he had no knowledge of plaintiff's case. The hearing was adjourned so that plaintiff could receive some requested documents. The request for extension was acknowledged by plaintiff.
The hearing reconvened on May 31, 2000. Defendant asked plaintiff whether he had anything else pertinent to the case to offer. Plaintiff objected to the time extensions of the hearing, that he was not provided with the requested documents, that defendant Okin was biased, and that the misbehavior report failed to adequately specify plaintiff's violations. Defendant Okin found plaintiff guilty of the possession of unauthorized property, contraband and drug possession. The penalties against plaintiff included twelve months Special Housing Unit (SHU) confinement with loss of recreation, packages, commissary, and phone privileges for twelve months. Defendant also recommended a loss of six months "good time."
Plaintiff appealed. The disposition was affirmed.
III. Law
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment should be granted only where there is "no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Inferences will be drawn in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 at 323. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the non-moving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
B. Prisoner's Due Process Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A prisoner asserting a denial of due process in connection with a prison disciplinary hearing that resulted in segregative confinement or loss of privileges, "must make a threshold showing that the deprivation of which he complains imposed an `atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). In determining whether a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in freedom from disciplinary confinement, a court must examine the "specific circumstances of the punishment." Sims, 230 F.3d at 22 (citation omitted). In particular, a court must examine the extent to which the conditions of the disciplinary segregation differ from other routine prison conditions and the duration of the disciplinary segregation imposed. See Wright v. Coughlin 132 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1999). In this Circuit, a prisoner's confinement is deemed "atypical" and "a severe hardship" within the meaning of Sandin, when the segregative confinement falls within the range of 101 and 305 days. See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 232 (2d. Cir. 2000).
Even if the plaintiff can demonstrate a protected property interest in freedom from disciplinary proceeding, the complaint may still be dismissed because the disciplinary proceeding did not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional right of due process. See, e.g., Santana v. Keane, 1996 WL 465751 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1996) (noting that once a plaintiff has demonstrated a protected liberty interest, the question of whether the plaintiff's due process rights were violated still must be determined). Moreover, where the court can determine the due process issue without first finding a protected liberty interest, it is advisable to do so. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Coughlin, 1996 WL 622626 at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1996) ("[W]here the record provides an alternative basis for determining the due process issue, the court should generally decline to address the question of whether a particular disciplinary penalty implicates a protected liberty interest."); see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F. Supp.2d 404, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[I]t is useful to minimize the burden of a litigation by resolving it on a theory requiring the least expense and consumption of time even though another theory could be established by the available proof.").
The due process accorded an inmate at a disciplinary hearing requires that (1) the inmate receive written notice of the disciplinary charges, "fact findings supporting the disposition and reasons for the disciplinary action taken;" (2) the inmate is permitted to call witnesses and present evidence; (3) the inmate be judged by a fair and impartial hearing officer; and (4) the disciplinary conviction be supported by "some evidence." Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999).
III. Application of Law to Facts
The inmate misbehavior report was written on April 30, 2000 — including factual findings — and plaintiff received written notice of the charges on May 1, 2000. See Agocha Dec. at Ex. B. Plaintiff acknowledged receiving copies of the relevant documents and results of the narcotics test. Id. He called two witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, one, a fellow inmate, refused to testify. Id. at Ex. I. Plaintiff's right to call witnesses and present evidence was not abridged. Evidence against the plaintiff was overwhelming, including the physical evidence taken from his cell. Plaintiff's contention that the contraband was planted in his cell was not supported by any evidence.
Plaintiff stated at his disciplinary hearing and in his complaint to this court that defendant Okin was not impartial. There is no evidence in the record that supports the claim that defendant was biased or less than fair. On his own accord, defendant investigated plaintiff's claim that he was not allowed access to the prison law library. Id. at Ex. I at 75-76. The allegation proved to be false. Defendant also adjourned the hearing to ensure that plaintiff's witnesses were available to testify witness could testify. Id. at Ex. H at 70.
Defendant accommodated plaintiff several times by adjourning the hearing to allow plaintiff time to retrieve and review documents. See, e.g., Id. at Ex. I at 92 Ex. J. at 96-98. Plaintiff now claims that the adjournments violated his due process rights because the hearing was not conducted within fourteen days of the filing of disciplinary charges. See 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 251-5.1(b). The law states that "[w]here a delay is authorized, the record of the hearing should reflect the reasons for any delay or adjournment, and an inmate should ordinarily be made aware of these reasons. . . ." Id. The extensions were authorized and properly granted. The record demonstrates that plaintiff was aware of the reasons for the adjournments and, moreover, requested more time. In any event, the time limitations are "construed as only directory and not as mandatory in nature." Matter of Borras v. Scully, 149 A.D.2d 508 (2d Dept. 1989).
Defendant recommended the loss of six months of "good time" as part of plaintiff's penalty. There is no evidence that plaintiff lost his credit for good behavior. The Supreme Court has stated that "where success in a prisoner's § 1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence." Muhammad v. Close, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). The Court has extended that rule to "administrative action taken against plaintiff [that] could affect credit toward release based on good-time served." Id. Since there is no finding that plaintiff was docked "good time," Heck exhaustion is not required. Finding that plaintiff's 1983 action is without merit and has no likelihood of success on the merits, this court issues this memorandum without requiring that plaintiff exhaust his habeas avenues pursuant to Heck. Dismissing this complaint for lack of exhaustion, rather than on its merits, would constitute a waste of judicial resources.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. The case is dismissed. No costs or disbursements.
SO ORDERED.