” Id.; see also Schuver v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 154 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir.1998); Santos v. Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters, 619 F.2d 963, 968–69 (2d Cir.1980). “The statute of limitations begins running when the employee ‘should reasonably have known of the union's alleged breach.’ ” Scott v. UAW Local 879, 242 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Evans v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir.1994)). Becker certainly knew of the Union's alleged breach on December 9, 2008, when he filed the NLRB charge. 2.
"The statute of limitations begins running when the employee 'should reasonably have known of the union's alleged breach.'" Scott v. UAW Local 879, 242 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Evans v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1994)). Becker certainly knew of the Union's alleged breach on December 9, 2008, when he filed the NLRB charge.
DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983). The six-month limitations period for § 301 claims commences when the employee "'should reasonably have known of the union's alleged breach [of its duty of fair representation].'" Scott v. UAW Local 879, 242 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Evans v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1994)); see alsoSkyberg v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 5 F.3d 297, 301 (8th Cir. 1993); Schuver v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 154 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 1998). An employee acquires actual or constructive knowledge of a claim when the CBA's time limits for filing or further pursuit of a grievance expire.
The statute of limitations for bringing a breach of the duty of fair representation claim is six months from the time the employee knows or reasonably should have known of the union's alleged breach. Scott, 242 F.3d at 839 (citing Evans v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir.1994)). The cell phone incident occurred on August 7, 2008.
The six-month period begins once an employee should reasonably have known of the unions alleged breach. Evans v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1994). Here again, Plaintiffs assert a continuing violations theory.
RLA preemption, however, has an exception: the RLA does not preempt "hybrid actions," which are suits that allege both a breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the employer and a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Evans v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 439 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1994). The Plaintiffs argued that this exception applies.
RLA preemption, however, has an exception: the RLA does not preempt "hybrid actions," which are suits that allege both a breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the employer and a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Evans v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 439 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1994). The Plaintiffs argued that this exception applies.
Id. at 169-70, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281. The statute of limitations begins running when the employee "should reasonably have known of the union's alleged breach." Evans v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1994). The class cannot maintain an action against UAW for breach of the duty of fair representation because the action was not filed within the six-month statute of limitations.
In the present case the district court accepted the United States Magistrate's report and recommendation that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the union had failed to properly pursue her grievance causing her to forfeit her claim against her employer on the date that the district court dismissed the initial action. We find the similar facts and reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Evans v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 1994) persuasive. In Evans the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the appellant's argument that the statute of limitations ran from a date after the plaintiff exhausted his appeal against the company because he was or should have been aware that the union provided him with improper assistance at the time that the employer filed a motion to dismiss.
' Scott v. UAW Local 879, 242 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Evans v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 29 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1994)). “An employee acquires actual or constructive knowledge of a claim when the CBA's time limits for filing or further pursuit of a grievance expire.”