Summary
In Evans v. Mayberry, 198 Tenn. 187, 278 S.W.2d 691 (1955), plaintiff sought treble damages under statute for defendant's alleged inducement of the seller's breach of an oral contract for the sale of realty.
Summary of this case from Campbell v. MatlockOpinion
William W. Bell, Joseph L. Lackey, Nashville, for plaintiff in error.
Tyree B. Harris, III, E. D. Jackson, Nashville, for defendants in error.
TOMLINSON, Justice.
Mr. Evans' second petition to rehear does not go beyond a reargument on points already considered and determined. In so doing, he inadvertently overlooks, we think, the well established rule that: 'The office of a petition to rehear is to call the attention of the court to matters overlooked, not to those things which the counsel supposes were improperly decided after full consideration.' Louisvilles&sN. Railroad Co. v. United States Fidelitys&sGuaranty Co., 125 Tenn. 658, 691, 148 S.W. 671, 680.
It is asserted in this petition to rehear that the Court's opinion is based on a now overruled Texas case reported in 84 A.L.R. 49. The assertion is a mistaken view of this Court's opinion.
In the original opinion in which this Court referred to the Texas case [Davidson v. Oakes, 60 Tex.Civ.App. 269, 128 S.W. 944], and the very logical basis upon which it is rested, it is said that this Court's investigation lead it to believe that 'the clear weight of authority, as reflected by' the cases from other jurisdictions supports the position of petitioner in this case. However, our opinion then refers to a decision of our own Court in Watts v. Warner, 151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 913, and concludes with the statement that 'Watts v. Warner is conclusive here in support of the judgment of the Circuit Court.' In response to the first petition to rehear we repeated the holding that 'Watts v. Warner rules the instant case'.
Properly analyzed, the position of petitioner is that this Court should overrule Watts v. Warner; thus, bring this State within what appears to be the majority rule.
'The importance of abiding by and adhering to adjudicated cases, as precedents, is everywhere recognized'. Lafferty v. Turley, 35 Tenn. 157, 171. "Chancellor Kent says: 'If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor of its correctness, and the community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult them, and the people in general can venture to buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of prosperity."' Wilkins v. Chicago, St. L.s&sN. O. R. Co., 110 Tenn. 422, 458-459, 75 S.W. 1026, 1035.
There are, of course, exceptions to the generally recognized rule above quoted. But the case at bar is not an exception. Public policy of the State on the subject matter of this suit was declared many years ago in our code section 7811. More than thirty years ago, Watts v. Warner [151 Tenn. 421, 269 S.W. 914] held that 'interference with an unenforceable repudiated contract' did not fall within this public policy declaration statute. Through the many years that have passed since Watts v. Warner the legislature has not elected, as it of course could have, to so amend its declaration of public policy on the question at hand by declaring that the legislative intention is for such a contract to fall within this public policy declaration. In the light of the judicial and legislative history of the matter, it would, in our opinion, amount to no less than an encroachment by us upon a legislative function to now reverse Watts v. Warner by holding that the instant case falls within code section 7811.
While we respect the earnestness and sincerity, and admire the ability, with which this petitioner has presented his cause, we feel compelled, as we have from the beginning, to disagree with him, and, on the other hand, to agree with the holding of the Circuit Court.
The petition to rehear will be denied.