Opinion
1:21-cv-263
04-01-2022
MARQUICE EVANS, Plaintiff v. RICHARD LORAH, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is recommended that Plaintiff Marquice Evans' claims against Defendants Tom Robie, Erin Connelly, Jack Daneri, John Trucilla, and John Mead be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
IL Report
A. Background
Plaintiff, an inmate confined at SCI-Albion, commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following individuals: Police Chief Richard Lorah, Detective Sean Bogart, former Magisterial District Judge Tom Robie, former District Attorneys Jack Daneri and Erin Connelly, and Erie County Court of Common Pleas Judges John Trucilla and Jamie Mead. ECF No. 1-2 at 2-3. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on March 30, 2022. ECF No. 6.
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. According to Plaintiff, Captain Lorah and Detective Bogart filed a criminal complaint against him on August 19, 2015, without an affidavit of probable cause. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Magisterial District Judge Robie “signed [the] defective criminal complaint verifying it properly sworn.” Id. Connelly was assigned as the District Attorney to prosecute the case. Id. Judge Trucilla was “informed of the lack of a filed affidavit of probable cause via time stamped right to know right request.” Id. Judge Mead “was informed of the unfiled affidavit of probable cause via amended PCRA Petition” but nevertheless “denied Plaintiffs Petition as meritless.” Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned his conviction on appeal on March 8, 2021. Id. at 2. According to Plaintiff, the Superior Court “determined the record demonstrated, August 19, 2015, a criminal complaint was filed, a request made for arrest warrant, arrest warrant does not appear on record and based on the information, Plaintiff is not arrested for the crime he is serving life in prison for.” Id. at 4.
Construed extremely liberally, Plaintiff appears to be asserting claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff also makes passing references to due process, equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to confront witnesses. Id. at 3. He seeks $30,000,000.00 in damages. Id. at 4.
B. Standard for review
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see ECF No. 4, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
C. Analysis
Applying the principles above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against Robie, Daneri, Connelly, Judge Trucilla, and Judge Mead are subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915. The Court will address the overlapping legal basis for these dismissals below.
1. Personal involvement
First, Plaintiffs complaint contains no substantive allegations with respect to several Defendants. It is axiomatic that a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[fly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). Despite this requirement, the complaint alleges no facts at all concerning Daneri and Connelly, aside from identifying Connelly as the District Attorney assigned to Plaintiffs case. Similarly, the only mention of Judge Trucilla is that he “was notified” of the allegedly defective criminal complaint. Aside from receiving this “notification, ” none of these individuals is alleged to have engaged in any misconduct with respect to Plaintiffs criminal arrest or conviction. Each should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
2. Statute of limitations
To the extent Plaintiff is raising claims that accrued at the time of his arraignment, such as false arrest and false imprisonment, those claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying two-year statute of limitation to § 1983 claims); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90, 397 (2007) (holding that false arrest and false imprisonment charges accrue at the time of arraignment). Plaintiffs publicly available state court docket indicates that he was arraigned on November 6, 2015. See Commonwealth v. Evans, No. CP-25-CR-2901-2015. Because Plaintiff did not file his complaint until 2021, the limitations period on such claims has long expired.
In contrast, malicious prosecution claims do not accrue until charges are dismissed. Ginter v. Skahill, 298 Fed.Appx. 161, 163 (3d Cir. 2008).
The same is true of Plaintiff s miscellaneous constitutional claims. As noted above, Plaintiff raises conclusory allegations concerning his right to due process and equal protection, to confront witnesses, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. While it is not entirely clear, these claims appear to target Plaintiffs arrest and subsequent conviction. As such, his pleading clearly reveals that each of these alleged constitutional violations occurred over two years before he initiated this action. Such claims must be dismissed.
3. Absolute prosecutorial immunity
Plaintiffs claims against Connelly and Daneri, to the extent they can be discerned, are barred by the immunity afforded to prosecutors from liability related to their official acts. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-20 (1976). “More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the right not to stand trial.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for money damages under § 1983 for acts “within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410. “Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state's ‘advocate' while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993)).
Plaintiffs claims against Connelly and Daneri appear to be based on their decision to initiate a prosecution using a defective criminal complaint. Courts have consistently held that the initiation of a criminal prosecution falls within the scope of a prosecutor's duties. See Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[P]rosecutors are immune from claims arising from their conduct in beginning a prosecution, including soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings, presenting a state's case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present evidence.”) (internal quotations and quoting sources omitted); Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1221-22 (3d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted) (“[A] prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity ‘while performing his official duties' as a officer of the court, even if, in the performance of those duties, he is motivated by a corrupt or illegal intention.”); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (“acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial” enjoy absolute immunity). As such, Connelly and Daneri are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
4. Judicial immunity
Plaintiffs claims against Judge Trucilla, Judge Mead, and Magisterial District Judge Robie (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”) are similarly barred by the immunity afforded to the states by the Eleventh Amendment. It is axiomatic that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978). Each of the Judicial Defendants is considered to be an arm of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to any claims against them in their official capacity. Van Tassel v. Lawrence Co. Domestic Relations Section, 659 F.Supp.2d 672, 676-82 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff'd, 390 Fed.Appx. 201 (2010) (recognizing that Pennsylvania common pleas judges are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to official capacity claims).
Although a state may expressly waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, “Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court.” See Toth v. California Univ, of Pennsylvania, 844 F.Supp.2d 611, 648 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b)). Nor did Congress intend to abrogate the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to the states by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 648.
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a monetary claim against the Judicial Defendants in their individual capacities, “[i]t is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally immune from a suit for money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Such immunity can only be overcome if the judge's actions are “nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Van Tassel, 659 F.Supp.2d at 695 (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiffs allegations concern actions taken by the Judicial Defendants while presiding over criminal and PCRA actions in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, and each of the alleged actions - such as signing a criminal complaint and denying a PCRA motion - is a fundamental judicial act that falls squarely within the jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania common pleas or magisterial district judge. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a) (“the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas”); Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the act of ordering a person to prison is a “paradigm judicial act”); Muhammad v. Cappellini, 2013 WL 1249029, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) (judicial acts include issuing orders, making rulings, and conducting hearings). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the Judicial Defendants in their individual capacities must also be dismissed.
5. Assorted constitutional claims
Finally, Plaintiffs complaint invokes his rights to due process, equal protection, to confront witnesses, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. To the extent that any of these claims is not barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiff has made no attempt to plead any of the elements of these claims. Each must be dismissed. .
6. Summary
In short, each of Plaintiff s claims, with one exception, is subject to dismissal. Specifically: (1) Plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of Daneri, Connelly, and Judge Trucilla; (2) his false arrest and false imprisonment claims against Lorah and Bogart, as well as his due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment claims, are time-barred; (3) his claims against Daneri and Connelly are barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity; and (4) his claims against Judge Trucilla, Judge Mead, and Magisterial District Judge Robie are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. Each of these claims should be dismissed, with prejudice, and the Clerk should be directed to terminate Daneri, Connelly, Trucilla, Mead, and Robie from this action.
Should this Report and Recommendation be adopted, the lone remaining claims in this action will be Plaintiffs malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims against Lorah and Bogart.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the following claims be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e): (1) any claims for false arrest and false imprisonment; (2) any claims based on alleged due process, equal protection, right to confront witnesses, or Eighth Amendment violations; and (3) any other claims against Daneri, Connelly, Trucilla, Mead, and Robie.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).