Evans v. Dist. Ct.

17 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. Williams

    443 P.3d 56 (Colo. 2019)   Cited 11 times

    ยถ11 The DOC asserts that the statutory warrant requirement is jurisdictional and that noncompliance deprives the court of the authority to act on the petition. To support its position, the DOC relies on Evans v. District Court , 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977). Evans is the fourth case in a line of cases discussing the warrant requirement.

  2. Fetzer v. Exec. Dir. of the Colo. Dep't of Corr.

    399 P.3d 742 (Colo. App. 2016)

    In People v. Watson, (Colo. No. 15SA139, Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished order), the DOC raised two arguments: (1) Watson's petition had become moot because Watson became eligible for parole under DOC's calculation of parole during the appeal and (2) in the alternative, DOC properly calculated Watson's parole eligibility date using the governing sentence method. In Anderson v. Raemisch, (Colo. No. 2015SA32, Sept. 24, 2015) (unpublished order), the DOC raised two arguments: (1) the district court properly dismissed Anderson's petition for habeas corpus because the rule in Nowak v. Suthers, 2014 CO 14, 320 P.3d 340, does not apply to concurrent sentences and (2) Anderson failed to attach a mittimus to his petition and therefore the district court properly dismissed the petition pursuant to Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Therefore, the supreme court could have affirmed for either of the two reasons in both cases and we may not speculate which reason or reasons the supreme court found to be persuasive.

  3. O'Neal v. State

    290 Neb. 943 (Neb. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    In O'Neal v. State, 290 Neb. 943, 951, 863 N.W.2d 162, 169 (2015), we held that "failure to attach a copy of the relevant commitment order to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over that petition."

    Moreover, most states with statutory requirements similar to ยง 29โ€“2801 do not treat compliance with such requirements as jurisdictional. See, Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 651 S.E.2d 681 (2007), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Crawford, 289 Ga. 722, 715 S.E.2d 132 (2011); State ex rel. v. Adult Parole, 80 Ohio St.3d 639, 687 N.E.2d 761 (1998); People ex rel. Negron v. Herold, 33 A.D.2d 1076, 307 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1970); State ex rel. Hansen v. Utecht, 230 Minn. 579, 40 N.W.2d 441 (1950); State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111 (1930); In the Matter of Beard, 4 Ark. 9 (1842); In re Spates, No. 14โ€“14โ€“00524โ€“CV, 2014 WL 3051311 (Tex.App. July 3, 2014) (unpublished). But see Evans v. Dist. Ct., 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Consequently, we conclude that the failure to attach a copy of the relevant commitment order to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over that petition.

  4. Hagan v. Farmers Ins. Exch.

    2015 CO 6 (Colo. 2015)

    ยถ54 "[C]onsistent with specific venue provisions, courts should attempt to accommodate the litigants and their witnesses to the greatest extent possible." Evans v. Dist. Court, 194 Colo. 299, 303, 572 P.2d 811, 814 (1977). Still, courts must do so within established parameters.

  5. Hagan v. Farmers Ins. Exch.

    342 P.3d 427 (Colo. 2015)   Cited 5 times
    Exercising original jurisdiction to review trial court orders relating to venue

    ยถ 54 โ€œ[C]onsistent with specific venue provisions, courts should attempt to accommodate the litigants and their witnesses to the greatest extent possible.โ€ Evans v. Dist. Court, 194 Colo. 299, 303, 572 P.2d 811, 814 (1977). Still, courts must do so within established parameters.

  6. Dreismeier v. Clements

    Civil Action No. 12-cv-00131-BNB (D. Colo. Jun. 15, 2012)

    In Colorado, filing the mittimus is jurisdictional. Evans v. Dist. Court, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (Colo. 1977). An improperly filed postconviction motion does not toll the limitations period.

  7. People v. Torkelson

    971 P.2d 660 (Colo. App. 1999)   Cited 11 times
    Remanding to district court to determine whether the county court judge was assigned "pursuant to constitution, statute, or chief justice directive"

    Nor can a court confer jurisdiction upon itself when it has none. See Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Jurisdictional defects may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.

  8. Butler v. Zavaras

    924 P.2d 1060 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    First, the court held that since a copy of the petitioner's warrant of commitment was not attached to the petition, as required by section 13-45-101(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987), the petition would be dismissed. Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (if petition for writ of habeas corpus is not accompanied by warrant of commitment as mandated by section 13-45-101(1), petition should be summarily denied since warrant is jurisdictional requirement). This defect in and of itself is sufficient to uphold the district court's dismissal of the petition.

  9. People v. Wiedemer

    852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 139 times
    Holding that statute's time limitations did "not violate the constitutional prohibition against suspending the right to the writ of habeas corpus"

    Furthermore, we have recognized that the legislature can prescribe the procedural mechanisms for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the constitutional habeas corpus provision and that it may also impose reasonable procedural requirements as conditions to the availability of habeas corpus relief. See Zaborski v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 812 P.2d 236, 237-38 (Colo. 1991) (recognizing need for compliance with provisions of Habeas Corpus Act in order to obtain habeas corpus remedy); Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (same); Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 86-88, 385 P.2d 677, 688-89 (1963) (recognizing that statutes can impose procedural requirements on applications for habeas corpus); Wyse, 180 Colo. at 92, 503 P.2d at 156 ("Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, the procedural mechanism for its exercise may change.").

  10. People v. Mueller

    851 P.2d 211 (Colo. App. 1992)   Cited 7 times
    In People v. Mueller, 851 P.2d 211 (Colo.App. 1992), a division of this court construed ยง 16-14-104(1) in accordance with its plain language and held that when the defendant's request pursuant to this section for trial within ninety days was not granted and the ninety-day requirement was not waived, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render its judgment of conviction.

    1982). See Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) ("A jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived; the . . . court cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself."). In summary, we conclude that the defendant's demand for final disposition of the detainers began the running of the statutory time period, that he did not thereafter waive his right to a trial within ninety days, and that, under the circumstances presented here, good cause was not shown to extend the ninety-day period.