Furthermore, we have recognized that the legislature can prescribe the procedural mechanisms for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the constitutional habeas corpus provision and that it may also impose reasonable procedural requirements as conditions to the availability of habeas corpus relief. See Zaborski v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 812 P.2d 236, 237-38 (Colo. 1991) (recognizing need for compliance with provisions of Habeas Corpus Act in order to obtain habeas corpus remedy); Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (same); Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 86-88, 385 P.2d 677, 688-89 (1963) (recognizing that statutes can impose procedural requirements on applications for habeas corpus); Wyse, 180 Colo. at 92, 503 P.2d at 156 ("Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, the procedural mechanism for its exercise may change.").
Venue in habeas corpus cases is properly laid, in accordance with C.R.C.P. 98(b)(2), in the county where the action complained of took place. Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 814 (1977). To the extent that Brisbin v. Schauer, 176 Colo. 550, 492 P.2d 835 (1971) may require a different result in criminal commitment cases, we overrule that decision.
Evansv. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977). The purpose of an action in habeas corpus is to determine whether the person instituting the proceeding is being unlawfully detained by the respondent who is holding him in custody.
"Because a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to the [Habeas Corpus] Act initiates a special statutory proceeding, the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proceeding insofar as they are consistent with the procedures delineated in the Act." Calyer, 736 P.2d at 1207; see Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (stating converse of foregoing proposition); Wright v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 258, 260-61, 365 P.2d 691, 692 (1961) (same). The Habeas Corpus Act, however, contemplates a less structured and more abbreviated hearing procedure than that utilized in other civil proceedings.
¶11 The DOC asserts that the statutory warrant requirement is jurisdictional and that noncompliance deprives the court of the authority to act on the petition. To support its position, the DOC relies on Evans v. District Court , 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977). Evans is the fourth case in a line of cases discussing the warrant requirement.
Nor can a court confer jurisdiction upon itself when it has none. See Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Jurisdictional defects may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.
[1,2] A motion to change venue on the ground of convenience of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will be accepted as final on review unless an abuse of discretion is apparent. Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). The burden of proof of the right to change of venue is upon the party who seeks the change.
1982). See Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) ("A jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived; the . . . court cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself."). In summary, we conclude that the defendant's demand for final disposition of the detainers began the running of the statutory time period, that he did not thereafter waive his right to a trial within ninety days, and that, under the circumstances presented here, good cause was not shown to extend the ninety-day period.
Moreover, most states with statutory requirements similar to § 29–2801 do not treat compliance with such requirements as jurisdictional. See, Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 651 S.E.2d 681 (2007), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Crawford, 289 Ga. 722, 715 S.E.2d 132 (2011); State ex rel. v. Adult Parole, 80 Ohio St.3d 639, 687 N.E.2d 761 (1998); People ex rel. Negron v. Herold, 33 A.D.2d 1076, 307 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1970); State ex rel. Hansen v. Utecht, 230 Minn. 579, 40 N.W.2d 441 (1950); State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111 (1930); In the Matter of Beard, 4 Ark. 9 (1842); In re Spates, No. 14–14–00524–CV, 2014 WL 3051311 (Tex.App. July 3, 2014) (unpublished). But see Evans v. Dist. Ct., 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Consequently, we conclude that the failure to attach a copy of the relevant commitment order to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over that petition.
Because a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to the Act initiates a special statutory proceeding, the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proceeding insofar as they are consistent with the procedures delineated in the Act. E.g., Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977); Wright v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 258, 365 P.2d 691. The proper respondent is that person allegedly restraining the liberty of the petitioner, not the People of the State of Colorado. Oates v. People, 136 Colo. 208, 315 P.2d 196; see also People v. Lent, 187 Colo. 248, 529 P.2d 1317; Gallegos v. Schooley, 155 Colo. 215, 393 P.2d 573; Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677; Lowe v. People, 139 Colo. 578, 342 P.2d 631 (1959). Calyer commenced this habeas corpus proceeding by filing a petition pursuant to section 13-45-101 expressly naming the executive director of the Department as respondent. The writ issued in response to the filing of the petition required Calyer to be presented for a hearing and then returned to custody.