Evans v. Dist. Ct.

8 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. Williams

    443 P.3d 56 (Colo. 2019)   Cited 11 times

    ยถ11 The DOC asserts that the statutory warrant requirement is jurisdictional and that noncompliance deprives the court of the authority to act on the petition. To support its position, the DOC relies on Evans v. District Court , 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977). Evans is the fourth case in a line of cases discussing the warrant requirement.

  2. Butler v. Zavaras

    924 P.2d 1060 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    First, the court held that since a copy of the petitioner's warrant of commitment was not attached to the petition, as required by section 13-45-101(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987), the petition would be dismissed. Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (if petition for writ of habeas corpus is not accompanied by warrant of commitment as mandated by section 13-45-101(1), petition should be summarily denied since warrant is jurisdictional requirement). This defect in and of itself is sufficient to uphold the district court's dismissal of the petition.

  3. Dreismeier v. Clements

    Civil Action No. 12-cv-00131-BNB (D. Colo. Jun. 15, 2012)

    In Colorado, filing the mittimus is jurisdictional. Evans v. Dist. Court, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (Colo. 1977). An improperly filed postconviction motion does not toll the limitations period.

  4. O'Neal v. State

    290 Neb. 943 (Neb. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    In O'Neal v. State, 290 Neb. 943, 951, 863 N.W.2d 162, 169 (2015), we held that "failure to attach a copy of the relevant commitment order to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over that petition."

    Moreover, most states with statutory requirements similar to ยง 29โ€“2801 do not treat compliance with such requirements as jurisdictional. See, Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 651 S.E.2d 681 (2007), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Crawford, 289 Ga. 722, 715 S.E.2d 132 (2011); State ex rel. v. Adult Parole, 80 Ohio St.3d 639, 687 N.E.2d 761 (1998); People ex rel. Negron v. Herold, 33 A.D.2d 1076, 307 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1970); State ex rel. Hansen v. Utecht, 230 Minn. 579, 40 N.W.2d 441 (1950); State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111 (1930); In the Matter of Beard, 4 Ark. 9 (1842); In re Spates, No. 14โ€“14โ€“00524โ€“CV, 2014 WL 3051311 (Tex.App. July 3, 2014) (unpublished). But see Evans v. Dist. Ct., 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Consequently, we conclude that the failure to attach a copy of the relevant commitment order to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over that petition.

  5. Cardiel v. Brittian

    833 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1992)   Cited 13 times

    "Because a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to the [Habeas Corpus] Act initiates a special statutory proceeding, the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proceeding insofar as they are consistent with the procedures delineated in the Act." Calyer, 736 P.2d at 1207; see Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (stating converse of foregoing proposition); Wright v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 258, 260-61, 365 P.2d 691, 692 (1961) (same). The Habeas Corpus Act, however, contemplates a less structured and more abbreviated hearing procedure than that utilized in other civil proceedings.

  6. MARSHALL v. KORT

    690 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 19 times
    Recognizing that a committed defendant may have a right to treatment

    Venue in habeas corpus cases is properly laid, in accordance with C.R.C.P. 98(b)(2), in the county where the action complained of took place. Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 814 (1977). To the extent that Brisbin v. Schauer, 176 Colo. 550, 492 P.2d 835 (1971) may require a different result in criminal commitment cases, we overrule that decision.

  7. Fetzer v. Exec. Dir. of the Colo. Dep't of Corr.

    399 P.3d 742 (Colo. App. 2016)

    In People v. Watson, (Colo. No. 15SA139, Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished order), the DOC raised two arguments: (1) Watson's petition had become moot because Watson became eligible for parole under DOC's calculation of parole during the appeal and (2) in the alternative, DOC properly calculated Watson's parole eligibility date using the governing sentence method. In Anderson v. Raemisch, (Colo. No. 2015SA32, Sept. 24, 2015) (unpublished order), the DOC raised two arguments: (1) the district court properly dismissed Anderson's petition for habeas corpus because the rule in Nowak v. Suthers, 2014 CO 14, 320 P.3d 340, does not apply to concurrent sentences and (2) Anderson failed to attach a mittimus to his petition and therefore the district court properly dismissed the petition pursuant to Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Therefore, the supreme court could have affirmed for either of the two reasons in both cases and we may not speculate which reason or reasons the supreme court found to be persuasive.

  8. People v. Mueller

    851 P.2d 211 (Colo. App. 1992)   Cited 7 times
    In People v. Mueller, 851 P.2d 211 (Colo.App. 1992), a division of this court construed ยง 16-14-104(1) in accordance with its plain language and held that when the defendant's request pursuant to this section for trial within ninety days was not granted and the ninety-day requirement was not waived, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render its judgment of conviction.

    1982). See Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) ("A jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived; the . . . court cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself."). In summary, we conclude that the defendant's demand for final disposition of the detainers began the running of the statutory time period, that he did not thereafter waive his right to a trial within ninety days, and that, under the circumstances presented here, good cause was not shown to extend the ninety-day period.