Evans v. Dist. Ct.

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wiedemer

    852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 139 times
    Holding that statute's time limitations did "not violate the constitutional prohibition against suspending the right to the writ of habeas corpus"

    Furthermore, we have recognized that the legislature can prescribe the procedural mechanisms for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the constitutional habeas corpus provision and that it may also impose reasonable procedural requirements as conditions to the availability of habeas corpus relief. See Zaborski v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 812 P.2d 236, 237-38 (Colo. 1991) (recognizing need for compliance with provisions of Habeas Corpus Act in order to obtain habeas corpus remedy); Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977) (same); Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 86-88, 385 P.2d 677, 688-89 (1963) (recognizing that statutes can impose procedural requirements on applications for habeas corpus); Wyse, 180 Colo. at 92, 503 P.2d at 156 ("Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, the procedural mechanism for its exercise may change.").

  2. Mulkey v. Sullivan

    753 P.2d 1226 (Colo. 1988)   Cited 17 times
    Stating that habeas corpus is appropriate to review whether a conviction is void

    Evansv. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 302, 572 P.2d 811, 813 (1977). The purpose of an action in habeas corpus is to determine whether the person instituting the proceeding is being unlawfully detained by the respondent who is holding him in custody.

  3. MARSHALL v. KORT

    690 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 19 times
    Recognizing that a committed defendant may have a right to treatment

    Venue in habeas corpus cases is properly laid, in accordance with C.R.C.P. 98(b)(2), in the county where the action complained of took place. Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811, 814 (1977). To the extent that Brisbin v. Schauer, 176 Colo. 550, 492 P.2d 835 (1971) may require a different result in criminal commitment cases, we overrule that decision.

  4. Fetzer v. Exec. Dir. of the Colo. Dep't of Corr.

    399 P.3d 742 (Colo. App. 2016)

    In People v. Watson, (Colo. No. 15SA139, Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished order), the DOC raised two arguments: (1) Watson's petition had become moot because Watson became eligible for parole under DOC's calculation of parole during the appeal and (2) in the alternative, DOC properly calculated Watson's parole eligibility date using the governing sentence method. In Anderson v. Raemisch, (Colo. No. 2015SA32, Sept. 24, 2015) (unpublished order), the DOC raised two arguments: (1) the district court properly dismissed Anderson's petition for habeas corpus because the rule in Nowak v. Suthers, 2014 CO 14, 320 P.3d 340, does not apply to concurrent sentences and (2) Anderson failed to attach a mittimus to his petition and therefore the district court properly dismissed the petition pursuant to Evans v. District Court, 194 Colo. 299, 572 P.2d 811 (1977). Therefore, the supreme court could have affirmed for either of the two reasons in both cases and we may not speculate which reason or reasons the supreme court found to be persuasive.