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Evans v. City of Miami

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B
Jul 25, 1952
60 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1952)

Opinion

July 25, 1952.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Grady L. Crawford, J.

M. Dudley Burton, Miami, for appellant.

John E. Cicero and J.W. Watson, Jr., Miami, for appellee City of Miami.

Rodney Durrance, Tallahassee, for appellee Workmen's Compensation Division, Florida Industrial Commission.


This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit affirming the holding of the Industrial Commission which had affirmed an order of the Deputy Commissioner.

In this case the original order of the Deputy Commissioner was reviewed by the full membership of the Industrial Commission and the Industrial Commission in an order remanding the cause to the Deputy Commissioner found that the main question involved was whether or not the Statute of Limitations had run. The claimant, had been paid full wages, or salary, which included workmen's compensation, for all intermittent periods of disability. The Commission held "the testimony should therefore be specific as to the last period of disability and medical attention. The present record does not satisfy the Commission in this respect." The Commission then remanded the cause for the purpose of taking additional testimony and for a supplemental order by the Deputy Commissioner.

The supplemental order, among other things not material here, contained the following:

"On December 10, 1946, Marie L, Evans received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Jackson Memorial Hospital, then owned and operated by the City of Miami, a municipal corporation, when she sprained her back in attempting to catch a patient from falling from an examining table that had slipped. * * *

"The City of Miami furnished claimant with medical treatment and paid claimant workmen's compensation for her temporary total disability. * * *

"The last payment of workmen's compensation paid claimant by the City of Miami was on March 1, 1948.

"Claimant filed her claim for further compensation on September 20, 1950.

"At the first hearing held in the cause, at which time all the parties were present or represented, the City of Miami objected to the allowance of the claim on the grounds that it was filed more than two years subsequent to the last payment of workmen's compensation. * * *

"Marie L. Evans did not file a claim for medical treatment; her claim being solely for further workmen's compensation. * * *

"As clearly shown by the evidence at each of the said hearings, the City of Miami sold the Jackson Memorial Hospital to the County of Dade and that the County of Dade has owned and operated the Jackson Memorial Hospital since January 1, 1949.

"The moneys paid to claimant in the year 1949 were paid by the County of Dade, and not by the City of Miami. Though claimant continued working at the same hospital the change of ownership of the hospital resulted in a change of claimant's employer. Jackson Memorial Hospital is not a legal entity. * * *

"At said hearing on July 10, 1951, claimant's attorney contended that the statute of limitations was tolled by the failure of the City of Miami to file promptly the Employer's Report of Injury with the Florida Industrial Commission. In view of the fact that the employer in this case, City of Miami, furnished claimant with medical treatment and paid claimant her full salary as long as she remained in the employment of the City of Miami this contention appears untenable.

"Wherefore, It is the order of the Florida Industrial Commission that the claim of Marie L. Evans against the City of Miami for further workmen's compensation on account of the accidental injury she sustained on December 10, 1946, as aforesaid, be and is hereby denied; the claim being barred and the Florida Industrial Commission being without jurisdiction."

In due course application was filed for review by the Full Commission of the supplemental order of the Deputy Commissioner. After a hearing on this petition the Full Commission made an order affirming the Deputy Commissioner, which contained the following:

"After a review of the record, the Commission herein and hereby adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth by the Deputy Commissioner as its own. Wherefore, it is the

"Order of the Commission that the Supplementary Order of the Deputy Commissioner dated July 13, 1951, be and the same hereby is affirmed."

On appeal to the Circuit Court an order was made affirming the order of the Full Commission of the Florida Industrial Commission. This appeal is prosecuted from that order.

All of the questions involved in this case are controlled and settled by the cases of U.S. Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, Fla., 55 So.2d 741 (Livingston Case); Sonny Boy's Fruit Company v. Compton, Fla., 46 So.2d 17, except that of the application of the Statute of Limitations where there has been a change of employer as shown by the facts in this case. In the final analysis, in the reply brief for the appellant, it is stated:

"The question is, however, whether the claimant should be penalized because the place where she was employed changed hands from one political subdivision to another during the period of time in which she made a claim for further compensation."

The appellant attempts to place an unreasonable and strained construction upon Section 440.02(1), F.S.A., which in part reads as follows:

"The term `employment' includes employment by the state and all political subdivisions thereof * * *."

The appellant contends that because the Statute provides that the term "employment" shall include employment by the state and all political subdivisions, the fact that the title to and the ownership, management and control of the hospital, still remains in a political subdivision, there has been no change in employer. The fact is, as found by the Deputy Commissioner, affirmed by the Full Commission and the Circuit Court, that the City of Miami sold the Jackson Memorial Hospital to Dade County and that Dade County owned and operated the same since January 1, 1949. There are many municipalities in Dade County. The same argument could be made had the hospital been sold to Miami Beach, or to North Miami, each of which is a separate and independent entity, and political subdivision. The hospital could have been sold to the State. It would hardly be argued that the City of Miami would still be liable for what happened after it had sold the hospital to the State and the State had accepted the same and managed, operated and controlled it. There is no merit in this contention.

Affirmed.

SEBRING, C.J., ROBERTS, J., and FUTCH, Associate Justice, concur.


Summaries of

Evans v. City of Miami

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B
Jul 25, 1952
60 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1952)
Case details for

Evans v. City of Miami

Case Details

Full title:EVANS v. CITY OF MIAMI ET AL

Court:Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B

Date published: Jul 25, 1952

Citations

60 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1952)