Opinion
24-cv-01911-SVK
12-19-2024
E.V., Plaintiff, v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Re: Dkt. No. 11
SUSAN VAN KEULEN United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff E.V. appeals from the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security, which denied his application for disability insurance benefits. The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. See Dkts. 6-7. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (the “Motion” at Dkt. 11-1).
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2019, Plaintiff applied for Title II disability insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of January 15, 2019. See AR 361. Defendant denied Plaintiff's application on December 10, 2019, and request for reconsideration of that denial on May 6, 2020. See Id. at 18287, 189-94. Plaintiff then returned to work on May 17, 2020, and requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to reassess his claim on June 4, 2020. See Motion at 2; AR 195. Plaintiff subsequently appeared for a hearing before an ALJ on March 9, 2021. See AR 3868. The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim on May 26, 2021. See Id. at 150-67. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council remanded his claim for further review by an ALJ. See Id. at 168-74. In a brief he submitted following remand, Plaintiff proposed to cut off his period of disability at May 17, 2020 (i.e., the day he returned to work). See Id. at 725. He then appeared for a hearing before an ALJ on December 6, 2022. See Id. at 69-110 (“Hr'g Tr.”).
The Administrative Record is available at Dkts. 8 through 8-8.
The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim on April 5, 2023. See AR 7-30 (the “ALJ Decision”). She first rejected Plaintiff's request to add a cutoff date to his alleged period of disability. See Id. at ¶ 11. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that Plaintiff had returned to work in late May 2020 and accordingly denied his claim to the extent he sought a finding of disability for any time after June 1, 2020. See Id. at ¶ 13. She therefore focused the bulk of her analysis on whether Plaintiff had been disabled for the period January 15, 2019 (the alleged onset date), through May 31, 2020 (the last day before Plaintiff's return to work disqualified him from receiving benefits). See Id. at ¶ 14.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with scoliosis and obesity.” See Id. at ¶ 14-16. She also found that these impairments (both individually and in combination) do not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Section 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Id. at ¶ 16-17. She then found that Plaintiff maintains a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform light work,” but with certain limitations. See Id. at ¶ 17-22. Finally, she found that Plaintiff “is able to perform his past relevant work” and that “there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] also can perform.” See Id. at ¶ 22-24. In light of these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “ha[d] not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,” during the relevant period. See Id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff subsequently requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ Decision, and the Appeals Council denied his request. See AR 1-6. Plaintiff then timely filed an appeal to this Court seeking review of the ALJ Decision. See Dkt. 1. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion, which was filed pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g) and is ready for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Supp. Soc. Sec. R. 5.
II. ISSUES FOR REVIEW
In this Order, the Court reviews the following issues:
1. Did the ALJ err in failing to find that Plaintiff's depressive disorder was severe?
2. Did the ALJ err in discrediting Plaintiff's subjective statements regarding his symptoms?
3. Did the ALJ err in failing to ask the vocational expert (the “VE”) complete hypotheticals?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is authorized to review Defendant's decision to deny disability benefits, but “a federal court's review of Social Security determinations is quite limited.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Federal courts “leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation omitted). The Court's limited role allows it to disturb an ALJ's decision only if that decision is: (1) not supported by substantial evidence; or (2) based on the application of improper legal standards. See id.
Not Supported By Substantial Evidence. “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual determinations,” and this threshold is “not high.” See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019) (citation omitted); see also Rounds v. Comm'r SSA, 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and must be more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court “must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from [Defendant's] conclusion.” Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1002 (citation omitted). But where “the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the Court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” See Id. (citation omitted).
Application Of Improper Legal Standards. Even if an ALJ commits legal error, the Court will uphold the ALJ's decision if the error is harmless. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. But “[a] reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ's error was harmless” and is instead “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” See Id. (citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not dispute the propriety of the ALJ finding him not disabled because of his return to work as of June 1, 2020, and so the Court will evaluate only whether the ALJ erred in her disability analysis concerning the period January 15, 2019 (the alleged onset date), through May 31, 2020 (the last day before Plaintiff's return to work disqualified him from receiving benefits). As discussed below, the ALJ did not commit any error warranting a remand or reversal.
A. Analysis Of Issue One: The ALJ Permissibly Failed To Find That Plaintiff's Depressive Disorder Was Severe
While the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from severe physical impairments, she did not find that he suffers from any severe mental impairments. See ALJ Decision at ¶ 14-16. Plaintiff argues that this constituted error because the ALJ should have found his depressive disorder to be severe. See Motion at 10-12. To support his position, Plaintiff points solely to the November 13, 2019 report of Dr. Jacklyn Chandler. See AR 885-90 (the “Chandler Report”). As relevant to Plaintiff's argument, Dr. Chandler noted that Plaintiff experienced “moderate difficulty enduring the stress of the interview” and concluded that Plaintiff's “ability to interact with the public, supervisors, and coworkers appears to be moderately impaired.” See Id. at ¶ 888. The ALJ considered these “moderate” findings to be unpersuasive because they were not consistent with “the lack of other mood reports outside of [Dr. Chandler's] examination despite other treatment,” “the lack of mental health treatment,” “minimal cognitive findings” and Plaintiff's “good activities of daily living.” See ALJ Decision at ¶ 21-22.
Plaintiff offers four reasons for the Court to reject the ALJ's conclusion.
First, Plaintiff argues that medical evidence in the record supports Dr. Chandler's findings. See Motion at 11 (citing AR 733, 783, 846, 852). But all of Plaintiff's cited evidence predates his onset date of January 15, 2019, and accordingly do not justify reversing the ALJ. See, e.g., Cheetham v. Colvin, 31 F.Supp.3d 1146, 1152-53 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (where ALJ failed to find certain impairments to be severe, no reversible error despite evidence of severity predating alleged onset date); cf. Carmickle v. Comm'r, SSA, 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance.” (citation omitted)).
Second, Plaintiff argues that his failure to obtain mental-health treatment stems from a failure on the part of his insurance provider to authorize treatment and, accordingly, does not support any finding that his depressive disorder lacked severity. See Motion at 11 (citing AR 735); Dkt. 14 (the “Reply”) at 3 (citing AR 825-27). However, Plaintiff's evidence does not reflect that his insurance provider affirmatively declined to authorize mental-health treatment and instead notes only that his physician had not received any response from the insurance provider following Plaintiff's depression screening. See AR 735, 827. Further, this evidence again predates the alleged onset date, and Plaintiff does not point to any evidence of his insurer stifling his efforts to obtain mental-health treatment during the relevant period. While one could reasonably interpret the evidence as indicating that Plaintiff failed to obtain mental-health treatment because his insurance provider stonewalled him, one could also reasonably interpret the evidence as supporting the ALJ's position-Plaintiff simply did not pursue mental-health treatment during the relevant period because his depressive disorder was not severe. Where “the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld.” See Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also King v. Astrue, 497 Fed.Appx. 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the evidence as a whole can support either outcome, we may not substitute our judgement for the ALJ's.” (citations omitted)).
Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not explain why “minimal cognitive impairment . . . [is] in any way inconsistent with the limitations Dr. Chandler described.” See Motion at 12. But the inconsistency is self-evident: experiencing only minimal impairments is inconsistent with the moderate limitations described by Dr. Chandler. Further, the ALJ expressly analyzed how Plaintiff's mental impairments impacted his functional limitations and concluded that those impairments “cause[d] no more than ‘mild' limitation[s].” See ALJ Decision at ¶ 15-16.
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not explain why Plaintiff's activities of daily living “are in any way inconsistent with the limitations Dr. Chandler described.” See Motion at 12. The Court disagrees, as the ALJ expressly did do so. See ALJ Decision at ¶ 15-16 (finding, at worst, “mild” limitations in Plaintiff's “mental functioning” based on his activities of daily living). Plaintiff also asserts that his activities of daily living are “not comparable to the social functioning required to interact appropriately . . . in a work setting.” See Reply at 4. These activities included, for example, performing chores, shopping, dining out with others and driving. See ALJ Decision at ¶ 18. The Court agrees that Plaintiff's ability to interact with the public while engaged in such relatively innocuous activity does not present an inconsistency with an inability to interact with the public, coworkers or supervisors under the stresses of a typical work setting. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 at 12.00C(6)(b) (“Your ability to complete tasks in settings that are highly structured, or that are less demanding or more supportive than typical work settings does not necessarily demonstrate your ability to complete tasks in the context of regular employment during a normal workday or work week.”); see, e.g., Binford v. Colvin, 113 F.Supp.3d 1067, 1072 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“Plaintiff's ability to maintain a relationship with his son and father, and his ability to sometimes interact appropriately with doctors during one-time examinations, are not indicative of Plaintiff's ability to maintain competitive work ....” (citations omitted)).
Thus, to the extent the ALJ discounted Dr. Chandler's opinions based on Plaintiff's purportedly inconsistent activities of daily living, doing so was error. But her other reasons for discounting Dr. Chandler's report are supported by substantial evidence. The Court is therefore left with a situation where reasonable minds could interpret the evidence differently, and when that happens, the Court must defer to the ALJ. See Farlow, 53 F.4th at 488; King, 497 Fed.Appx. at 760. Accordingly, the ALJ did not commit reversible error in discounting Dr. Chandler's opinions or failing to find that Plaintiff's depressive disorder was severe in light of those opinions.
B. Analysis Of Issue Two: The ALJ Permissibly Rejected Plaintiff's Testimony About His Symptoms
“A claimant's subjective symptoms, if credited, are relevant to the determination of a claimant's [RFC].” Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2024). The ALJ found that Plaintiff maintains the following RFC:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. He could stand and walk for six hours cumulatively and sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday. He should not climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He could occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He should not be required to balance as defined in the SCO/DOT. He could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
ALJ Decision at ¶ 17. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have credited his testimony about his pain causing somewhat frequent absences at work, preventing him from driving and requiring him to take frequent breaks during the day, his inability to stand, sit or walk for more than a few minutes at a time and his inability to bend. See Motion at 14; see also Hr'g Tr. at ¶ 84-87.
An ALJ must follow a two-step analysis in evaluating a claimant's subjective statements abouts their symptoms:
First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives specific, clear and convincing reasons for the rejection.Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The “clear and convincing” standard requires an ALJ to “explain why the medical evidence is inconsistent with the claimant's subjective symptom testimony.” See Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1200 (citation omitted). An ALJ does not satisfy the standard by pointing to a lack of corroborating evidence; instead, the ALJ must point to inconsistent evidence. See id. at 1200-01.
Plaintiff offers three reasons why the ALJ did not satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard.
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly pointed to Plaintiff's treatment as being mostly limited to chiropractic care for his back. See Motion at 13; ALJ Decision at ¶ 19-20. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this lack of evidence of other care does not satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard. See Ferguson, 95 F.4th at 1201 (“[T]he ALJ cannot rely on an absence of positive medical evidence to discredit a claimant's subjective symptom testimony.” (citation omitted)).
Second, Plaintiff explained to Dr. Chandler that he needs a cane if his symptoms worsen (see Chandler Report at ¶ 886), and he argues that the ALJ improperly found this statement to “be[] inconsistent with his reports and presentation to” Dr. Chandler. See Motion at 13; ALJ Decision at ¶ 19. The Court agrees with Plaintiff and disagrees with the ALJ that potentially needing a cane is inconsistent with anything in Dr. Chandler's report. Although it does not appear that Plaintiff presented to Dr. Chandler while using a cane, Dr. Chandler nevertheless observed that Plaintiff “walked with a slow, guarded gait” and “appeared to be experiencing physical pain.” See Chandler Report at ¶ 887. These observations are consistent with Plaintiff potentially needing a cane if his symptoms worsened.
Third, Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ cited the objective medical evidence, generally, as contradicting [Plaintiff's] alleged limitations, but identified no particular findings which were inconsistent with any of the specific functional deficits [that Plaintiff] described.” See Motion at 14. The Court disagrees, as the ALJ expressly referred to the reports of Drs. Thu Do, C. Bullard and Nayyar Masood (which she found to be partially persuasive), in which those doctors noted, inter alia, that Plaintiff had fewer limitations with walking, sitting, standing and bending than what Plaintiff reported. See ALJ Decision at ¶ 20-21. This is precisely the type of inconsistent medical evidence on which an ALJ may rely in discrediting a Plaintiff's subjective testimony at step two of the inquiry. See, e.g., J.B. v. Kijakazi, No. 23-cv-01855-SVK, 2024 WL 40184, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2024) (“[T]he ALJ discussed in detail the medical evidence in the record on which she based her rejection of Plaintiff's subjective statements.” (citations omitted)); D.T. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-07245-SVK, 2023 WL 6852505, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2023) (ALJ properly discredited subjective symptom testimony where, inter alia, “the ALJ did not merely provide a ‘boilerplate statement,' and instead discussed in detail the medical evidence in the record” (citations omitted)).
Thus, to the extent the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's symptom testimony because it was inconsistent with his treatment being limited to chiropractic care and his reports and presentation to Dr. Chandler, doing so was error. However, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff's symptom testimony as she pointed to specific medical evidence in the record that was inconsistent with Plaintiff's statements. Balancing these results, this Court finds that the ALJ's decision to discredit Plaintiff's symptom testimony is supported by substantial evidence, and the errors noted above are harmless.
C. Analysis Of Issue Three: The ALJ Did Not Fail To Pose A Complete Hypothetical To The VE
Derivative of Plaintiff's first argument, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to pose a complete hypothetical to the VE because she failed to account for the moderate limitations discussed in the Chandler Report. See Motion at 14-15. As discussed above, the ALJ properly discounted the Chandler Report to the extent Dr. Chandler opined that Plaintiff suffered from certain moderate limitations. The ALJ's hypotheticals, therefore, were not incomplete for failing to incorporate these moderate limitations.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.
SO ORDERED.