When Mr. Eugster appealed the trial court's decision dismissing his complaint, this court remanded for fact finding to determine whether a "meeting" occurred for purposes of the OPMA. Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 226-27, 39 P.3d 380 (2002). On remand, the trial court once again dismissed Mr. Eugster's OPMA claim, concluding there was no issue of fact as to whether a meeting took place by a majority of the Council in violation of the OPMA.
Council member Stephen Eugster objected to the informal process used to adopt the selection procedure, and filed this action alleging a violation of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA). When Mr. Eugster appealed the trial court's decision dismissing his complaint, this court remanded for fact finding to determine whether a `meeting' occurred for purposes of the OPMA. Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn. App. 212, 226-27, 39 P.3d 380 (2002). On remand, the trial court once again dismissed Mr. Eugster's OPMA claim, concluding there was no issue of fact as to whether a meeting took place by a majority of the Council in violation of the OPMA. Mr. Eugster appeals.
There is some confusion in the case law regarding the proper standard to avoid summary judgment dismissal of an OPMA claim that does not involve civil penalties. In Eugster v. Citv of Spokane, 110 Wn. App. 212, 222, 39 P.3d 380 (2002), Division Three cited Wood in stating that "[to] defeat summary judgment dismissal of an OPMA claim, the plaintiff must submit evidence showing "(1) that a 'member' of a governing body (2) attended a 'meeting' of that body (3) where 'action' was taken in violation of the OPMA, and (4) that the member had 'knowledge' that the meeting violated OPMA." Wood, 107 Wn. App. at 558
There is some confusion in the case law regarding the proper standard to avoid summary judgment dismissal of an OPMA claim that does not involve civil penalties. In Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wash.App. 212, 222, 39 P.3d 380 (2002), Division Three cited Wood in stating that “[to] defeat summary judgment dismissal of an OPMA claim,” the plaintiff must submit evidence showing “(1) that a ‘member’ of a governing body (2) attended a ‘meeting’ of that body (3) where ‘action’ was taken in violation of the OPMA, and (4) that the member had ‘knowledge’ that the meeting violated OPMA.” Wood, 107 Wash.App. at 558, 27 P.3d 1208.
"Additionally, "a consensus on a position to be voted on at a later council meeting would qualify as a collective position and a 'final action.'"Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn.App. 212, 225, 39 P.3d 380 (2002) (quoting Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn.App. 550, 565, 27 P.3d 1208 (2001)).Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 Wn.2d 318, 331, 979 P.2d 429 (1999).
The fourth factor, knowledge of the violation by the member, is not required in order for a court to award attorney fees. Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn.App. 212, 226-27, 39 P.3d 380 (2002). Here, CFJ does not allege that study sessions involved knowing violations and thus does not seek the imposition of civil penalties upon Board members.
We review a trial court's ruling on CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn. App. 212, 231, 39 P.3d 380 (2002). A trial court abuses its discretion when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.
Moreover, to escape summary dismissal of an OPMA claim, the plaintiff must produce evidence showing (1) members of a governing body (2) held a meeting of that body (3) where that body took action in violation of that OPMA, and (4) the members of that body had knowledge that the meeting violated the statute. Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn. App. 212, 222, 39 P.3d 380, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1021 (2002); Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn. App. 550, 558, 27 P.3d 1208 (2001). "A "meeting" takes place when a majority of the governing body meets and takes 'action.'"
A plaintiff must show (1) that a "member' of a governing body, (2) attended a 'meeting' of that body, (3) where 'action' was taken in violation of the OPMA, and (4) that the member had 'knowledge that the meeting violated the OPMA." Eugster v. City of Spokane, 39 P.3d 380, 384 (Wn.App. 2002). The OPMA does not provide for a private tort action.
Under Pierce County, 159 Wn.2d at 41, these amendments to RCW 49.46.010 cured any defects in the 1989 amendment process.See also Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn. App. 212, 228-29, 39 P.3d 380 (2002) (challenge to city council's improper adoption of employment selection process under chapter 42.30 RCW (Open Public Meetings Act of 1971) barred by subsequent, proper adoption of a rule codifying the new process); Henry v. Town of Oakville, 30 Wn. App. 240, 246-47, 633 P.2d 892 (1981) (challenge to ordinance on grounds of improper enactment under the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 barred by subsequent, proper reenactment of said ordinance). The title of the 1993 legislation was "AN ACT Relating to state government; amending RCW . . . 49.46.010." LAWS OF 1993, ch. 281.