An indictment which charges a defendant with the commission of a crime in the language of a valid statute is sufficient to withstand a demurrer charging that the indictment is insufficient to charge the defendant with any offense under the laws of this state. Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 (1) ( 124 S.E.2d 269) (1962); compare Langston v. State, 109 Ga. 153 ( 35 S.E. 166) (1899), where the demurrer was directed specifically to the words "false and fraudulent means." This indictment was not subject to the demurrer urged before and ruled on by the trial court.

1. The indictment was couched in the language of the statute and hence was not subject to general demurrer. Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791 (3) ( 113 S.E.2d 609); Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 (1) ( 124 S.E.2d 269); Schulman v. State, 94 Ga. App. 489 ( 95 S.E.2d 343). In this connection, the defendant argues that the statute requires that one wilfully fail to mail or deliver the certificate of title to the Revenue Commissioner, and the omission of the terminology "wilfully" in the indictment was fatal. It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.

" This caption contains no language indicating that the insurance law described is amended generally. See Rubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 ( 124 S.E.2d 269). It states specifically that Code § 56-407 is amended "so as to provide" coverage for the protection of the insured against loss caused by an uninsured vehicle. There is nothing in the caption to show that the amendment includes any insurance matter except those relating to uninsured vehicles.

Where, as here, the title contains the words "and for other purposes," the body of the Act may incorporate any provision that is incidental or germane to the main objective as indicated by the title. See Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 249-250 ( 12 S.E.2d 64); Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588, 589 ( 124 S.E.2d 269). The language of section 1 relied upon as being different from the title is but an elaboration of taking or attempting to take "any immoral, improper or indecent liberties with a child ..." as stated in the title. The provision in section 2 of punishment for taking, enticing, alluring or persuading a child to a place for the prohibited purposes is certainly incidental or germane to the main objective and purpose indicated by the title.

We are of the opinion that the statute is not subject to any of these objections. See: Plapinger v. State, 217 Ga. 11, supra; Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 ( 124 S.E.2d 269); Lamar v. Prosser, 121 Ga. 153 (4) ( 48 S.E. 977); Meyers v. Whittle, 171 Ga. 509 ( 156 S.E. 120); Collins v. State, 206 Ga. 95 ( 55 S.E.2d 599); Hollis v. State, 152 Ga. 182 (1) ( 108 S.E. 783). 3. By special demurrer it was asserted that the indictment fails to allege a specific intent on the part of the defendant to defraud or that the defendant knew at the time of the purchase and the disposition of the hogs that they had not been paid for or that credit had not been extended.

The act is not subject to the objection that it contains more than one subject matter, since the only matter dealt with is the crime of robbery. Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 ( 124 S.E.2d 269). 2.

It has long been the rule in Georgia that when an indictment is couched in the language of the Code, it will be deemed sufficiently technical and correct to withstand a general demurrer. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70 ( 268 S.E.2d 906) (1980); Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 ( 124 S.E.2d 269) (1962). See also OCGA § 17-7-54.

The language of the indictments here was couched in the language of the statute, hence, they were not subject to demurrer or motion to quash for lack of sufficient specifications. See in this connection Buchanan v. State, 215 Ga. 791 (3) ( 113 S.E.2d 609); Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588 (1) ( 124 S.E.2d 269); Schulman v. State, 94 Ga. App. 489 ( 95 S.E.2d 343). 2.