Opinion
CASE NO. 1789 CRB-1-93-9
APRIL 26, 1995
The claimant appeared pro se.
The respondents were represented by Richard L. Aiken, Jr., Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.
This Petition for Review from the July 30, 1993 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner acting for the First District was heard June 24, 1994 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commissioners Angelo L. dos Santos, Nancy A. Brouillet and Michael S. Miles.
OPINION
The pro se claimant, Theresa Ettienne-Modeste, has petitioned for review from the July 30, 1993 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner for the First District. She is appealing from the commissioner's decision that her continuing disability was not caused by the accepted injury that occurred on August 1, 1986. After careful review, we have concluded that the commissioner's decision be affirmed.
The transcript of the June 9, 1993 formal hearing in this case was received by the Compensation Review Board on February 21, 1995, and was considered in the formulation of this decision.
The commissioner found that the claimant sustained an injury to her right arm on August 1, 1986, while at work. In a voluntary agreement approved on May 13, 1988, the parties stipulated that the injury caused a five percent permanent partial disability to the claimant's right arm. The claimant, whose job involved lifting handicapped children, continued to work for the respondent employer until February 6, 1987, when she refused offers for two jobs that the commissioner found to be within her lifting restrictions.
The claimant alleges that she continues to be disabled because of her original injury. Although the commissioner found that she originally complained only of right arm pain, he noted that by February 1992 her complaints of pain extended from her neck to her right foot. The commissioner concluded that there was no credible evidence that any of these symptoms "other than those affecting the right arm, shoulder, [and] sub-scapular area" were caused by the compensable injury, and dismissed the claim for all benefits not directly attributable to the right arm injury. The claimant appeals from that decision.
The claimant raises several specific arguments in her brief, all of which challenge the evidentiary basis for the commissioner's Finding and Dismissal. She objects to the commissioner's failure to mention the testimony of certain witnesses. She claims that she originally complained of more than pain to her right arm, and objects to the implication that some of her additional symptoms were not mentioned until 1992. Most importantly, she cites the existence of numerous medical reports relating her back pain to her 1986 injury.
When a person makes a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act, and the parties are unable to resolve the claim by mutual agreement, the commissioner acting for the district where the claim is brought usually holds formal hearings to determine the facts of the claim. Both parties are allowed to present medical evidence and testimony at those hearings, and the commissioner decides which evidence and testimony is the most believable. Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-41 (1988), Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107, 117-19 (1979). Once the commissioner finds specific facts, the Compensation Review Board, as an appellate body, is bound by those factual findings if there is evidence in the record to support them. We do not retry the facts or hear further evidence. Adzima, supra, 118. Similarly the conclusions drawn by the commissioner from the facts found must stand "unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them." Fair, supra, 539.
Taking into consideration these legal principles, there is no doubt that the commissioner was within his authority when he did not cite the testimony of the claimant's witnesses in his findings. He was entitled to decide whether or not the testimony was credible. The commissioner simply chose not to rely on the claimant's witnesses. This Board has no authority to change who the commissioner believed. Adzima, supra, 118; see also Phelan v. Benson, 1583 CRB-3-92-12 (decided Dec. 20, 1994).