Opinion
05-21-00812-CV
03-16-2023
SHAMELYA ETIER, Appellant v. SHAHNOOR CHISTI AND NAHID PARVIN, Appellees
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-03220-C
Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE
This is an appeal from a forcible entry and detainer suit tried de novo in county court after the justice of the peace court entered a default judgment against appellant Shamelya Etier. Appellant, proceeding pro se, appeals the county court's judgment awarding appellees Shahnoor Chisti and Nahid Parvin possession of the property at issue, $7,789 in past rent, and reasonable attorney fees. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
In Texas, an individual who is a party to civil litigation may represent themselves at trial or on appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 7; Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). The right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to comply with the rules of appellate procedure. Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 895. Courts regularly caution pro se litigants that courts will not treat them differently from a party who is represented by a licensed attorney. Id. "[W]e must be able to discern what question of law we will be answering." Id. at 896. An appellate brief fails if we must speculate or guess about appellant's contentions. Id. However, we are mindful that the Supreme Court of Texas favors appellate courts reaching the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Garza, 371 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. 2012).
On February 18, 2022, this Court notified appellant that her brief filed on February 16 was deficient because it did not contain: (1) a complete list of all parties; (2) a table of contents; (3) an index of authorities; (4) a concise statement of the case; (5) the issues presented for review; (6) a concise statement of the facts supported by record references; (7) a succinct, clear, and accurate summary of the argument; and (8) a clear and concise argument supported by appropriate citations to the record and legal authorities. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a)-(d), (f)-(i). Pursuant to our order, appellant filed an amended brief on February 28, 2022. Although appellant complied in part with this Court's order to correct the above-noted deficiencies, her amended brief still lacks a complete list of all parties and any citations to the record. Additionally, she references only three legal authorities, none of which are followed by citations: the supreme court's 39th Emergency Order, continued by the 48th Emergency Order; the 14th Amendment; and an unidentified opinion by Justice Huddle out of the First Court of Appeals. Despite these deficiencies, we can discern appellant's central argument on appeal and, thus, will address it.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review: (1) "Did the trial court err in its ruling that as matter of law and fact that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the plaintiff as was reasonably calculated to cause and did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case"?; and (2) "Did the trial court err in its ruling as a matter of law and fact that it did not violate the U.S.C. 14th Amendment?". Throughout her brief, appellant contends that there was confusion below due to various case numbers and transfers and generally argues that the trial court erred when it granted judgment in favor of appellees instead of abating the case under the supreme court emergency orders. Appellant explains that the case was initially abated and that appellees never filed a motion to reinstate the case or a request to extend the abatement; thus, the case should have been dismissed with prejudice. Appellant also contends that appellees used an altered lease agreement to prove their eviction claim. According to appellant, the lease was altered without her consent.
Based on our review of the record, we disagree with appellant's characterization of the factual and procedural history of this case. The record shows that appellees filed an eviction suit against appellant in Docket No. JE21-01009D alleging that appellant's lease of the premises had expired on May 31, 2021, that notice of nonrenewal had been delivered over sixty days prior to filing suit, and that appellant was a holdover tenant who had failed to pay rent in the amount of $5,800. Appellees mailed appellant a written notice to vacate on June 14, 2021. On July 20, 2021, the justice of the peace court entered a default judgment in appellees' favor and ordered appellant to deliver possession of the premises to appellees. Appellant appealed to the county court at law, and the case was originally docketed as Cause No. CC-21-03220-B.
On August 10, 2021, the presiding judge of the Dallas County Court at Law No. 2 ordered Cause No. CC-21-03220-B to be transferred to Dallas County Court at Law No. 3 due to an earlier case filed by appellant against appellees in Cause No. CC-21-02954-C. The transferred case was assigned Cause No. CC-21-03220-C and is the case before us on appeal.
Cause No. CC-21-02954-C involved a tort case filed by appellant against appellees regarding the writ of possession erroneously issued by justice of the peace court after appellant sought a timely appeal to county court of the default judgment enter against her. Because of the error, appellant was forced to leave the property for approximately one week. On August 20, 2021, the county court found that appellant was previously removed from the property without legal cause, that the property should be returned to her immediately, and issued a writ of re-entry to effectuate the return.
The county court held a trial de novo on September 10, 2021. At the trial, appellant's counsel objected that the lease appellees sought to admit was not the original lease and that it had been altered after appellant signed it. Specifically, the commencement date had been changed from June 15, 2020 to June 11 and appellee Parvin's name was added because the original lease listed only her husband Chisti as the owner/landlord. The trial court admitted both versions of the lease, and both versions provided that the lease expired on May 31, 2021. Pursuant to the lease, appellees gave timely notice that they were not offering to renew it.
Appellant's counsel also asked the county court to take judicial notice of the supreme court's 39th Emergency Order and inquire as to whether the parties were interested in participating in the Texas Eviction Diversion Program. Appellant claimed she had filed an application on July 1, 2021, and the application was approved on July 6, 2021. Some monies had been disbursed for utilities, but none for rent.
The county court inquired as to whether the parties were willing to participate in the diversion program. Appellees' counsel stated that his clients were no longer interested in participating in the program. Prior to trial, appellees had offered to participate, but appellant refused to provide appellees with the application number (so that they could claim the money awarded under the rent relief program) because they could not reach an agreement on the past rent as well as monetary damages she was demanding in the tort case. The trial court gave them an opportunity to discuss further, but the parties did not agree to participate in the program.
The county court found in favor of appellees and entered final judgment in Cause No. CC-21-03220-C on September 20, 2021, which awarded appellees $7,789 in past rent; $1,000 in reasonable attorney fees; and $5,000 in reasonable attorney fees for any unsuccessful appeal brought by appellant. The judgment further awarded exclusive possession of the property to appellees.
Thereafter, appellant terminated her attorney's services and, on September 13, 2021, filed a pro-se motion to abate the eviction case, based in part on the supreme court's emergency orders. In her motion, she again explained that she had applied and had been granted assistance under the Texas Rent Relief Program in July. According to her motion, she filed another application on September 11. This appeal followed.
We have previously explained the purpose and procedure of the Texas Eviction Program as follows:
In September 2020, the Texas Supreme Court established the Texas Eviction Diversion Program (TEDP) "in an effort to curb the possible surge of evictions due to the Covid-19 pandemic, assist Texas's most vulnerable tenants, and provide landlords with an alternative to eviction." If a landlord and tenant agree to participate in TEDP, they may then seek an abatement of the eviction proceeding to "pursue rent assistance through TEDP, such that the landlord obtains funds through TEDP to replace the tenant's rent, and the tenant avoids eviction.In re Rent Space Mgmt LLC, No. 05-21-01073-CV, 2022 WL 248075, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 27, 2022, orig. proceeding) (emphasis added; internal citations and footnotes omitted). The Texas Eviction Diversion Program was still in effect when appellees filed their forcible detainer suit against appellant and when the county court held the trial de novo. See Thirty-Seventh Emergency Order Regarding Covid-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 186, 187-89 (Tex. 2021); Thirty-NinthEmergency Order Regarding Covid-19 State of Disaster, 629 S.W.3d 213, 214-216 (Tex. 2021).
Appellant argues the trial court should have abated the case. We disagree. The parties here did not agree to participate in the Texas Eviction Diversion Program as is required to trigger the abatement provision. See Rent Space, 2022 WL 248075, at *2. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to abate the case or in granting judgment in favor of appellees.
We overrule appellant's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear their own costs of this appeal.