Opinion
23-CV-11321 (LTS)
01-29-2024
ELIJAH DAVID ESTRADA, Plaintiff, v. RIKERS ISLAND; NEW YORK CITY; ERIC M. TAYLOR CENTER WARDEN; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who currently is detained at the Eric M. Taylor Center (“EMTC”) on Rikers Island, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. Named as Defendants are Rikers Island, the City of New York, the Warden of EMTC, and the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”). By order dated January 5, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to his claims occurred since he entered Rikers Island on September 14, 2023. Plaintiff states, “Pipes leaking water on my bed, water is asbestos which causes mesothelioma, unhygenic inhuman incarceration, illegal search and seizure of mail, feed is forced malnutrition, spoiled food, toilet backwashes.” (ECF 1 at 3.) He alleges that the food given to him at EMTC is “cold and half eaten” and that “CO Sisto says racial slurs to me and my peers.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff suggests that he may not have received medical attention after suffering an asthma attack. He alleges, “I had a[n] asthma [a]ttack after spray was deployed twice I requested medical and didn't go. I reported it to 311 after being informed by the CO on duty.” (Id. at 5.)
The complaint states that Plaintiff arrived on Rikers Island on “September 14, 2024,” which the Court assumes is a mistake.
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff seeks money damages.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's claims that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. Claims against Rikers Island
Plaintiff's claims against Rikers Island must be dismissed. Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the “Constitution and Laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rikers Island is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of Section 1983 claims); Zuckerman v. App. Div., Second Dep't S.Ct., 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Rikers Island for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court will construe any claims he may be asserting against Rikers Island as being asserted against the City of New York, which is also a named Defendant.
B. New York City Department of Correction
Plaintiff's claims against the DOC must also be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the DOC and construes them as asserted against the City of New York. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396.
C. Claims against City of New York
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City of New York because he alleges no facts suggesting that the City of New York has a policy, practice, or custom that violated his federal constitutional rights. If Plaintiff names the City of New York as a defendant in an amended complaint, he must allege facts suggesting the City has a policy, practice, or custom that caused a violation of his federal constitutional rights.
D. Claims against Warden of EMTC
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how the Warden of EMTC was personally involved in the events underlying his claims. If Plaintiff names the Warden as a defendant in an amended complaint, he must allege facts showing that the Warden was personally and directly involved in the events giving rise to his claims.
E. Conditions of confinement claims
Plaintiff's allegations suggest that he is challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of confinement at EMTC. He alleges that he was subjected to conditions that posed a serious threat to his health or safety, and that Defendants failed to provide him with adequate medical care. Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the events giving rise to his claims, the claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). “[A] detainee's rights [under the Fourteenth Amendment] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
To state such a conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently serious to pose an unreasonable risk to his health or safety, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that a correction official acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Id.
For the objective element, a pretrial detainee “must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety, which “includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.'” Id. at 30 (citing Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), and quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)). “[P]rison officials violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the subjective element, a pretrial detainee must allege “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. The mere negligence of a correction official is not a proper basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
I Leaking pipes and spoiled food
Plaintiff alleges that, since his arrival at Rikers Island, he has been subjected to cracked pipes leaking contaminated water onto his bed and “backwashing” toilets, and that he has been served spoiled food. The Court assumes for the purposes of this order that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged objectively serious conditions. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, however, he should provide additional facts about these conditions, such as how long and how often he has been exposed to leaky pipes, how often he is served “spoiled” food and the nature of the spoliation, what he means by “backwashing” toilets, and how often he was subjected to such problems with the toilets.
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged objectively serious conditions, he alleges no facts suggesting that any individual defendant knew or should have known about each of the risky conditions but recklessly failed to act to mitigate the risk of each condition. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a Section 1983 claim arising from these conditions of his confinement.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in which he names as defendants the individual DOC officers who were personally involved in the events giving rise to his claims, and to allege facts suggesting those defendants were deliberately indifferent to an objectively serious condition. Plaintiff is encouraged to allege additional facts about the alleged conditions, such as when, how often, and for how long he was exposed to each of the conditions.
2. Inadequate medical care
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegation that he may not have received medical care after suffering an asthma attack as asserting a claim that he was denied adequate medical care. It is unclear from Plaintiff's single allegation whether his asthma rises to the level of an objectively serious medical condition. See Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019 (the medical condition must be such “urgency . . . that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain”); Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the medical need must be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff's asthma was an objectively serious medical condition, he does not allege any facts suggesting that any individual defendant knew of or should have known of the risk and failed to act to mitigate the risk. He therefore fails to state a Section 1983 claim for inadequate medical care.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging facts suggesting that his medical condition is objectively serious and that an individual DOC officer or officers recklessly failed to act to mitigate the serious risk to Plaintiff's health.
F. Mail claims
1 Interference with mail claims
The Court liberally construes Plaintiff's claims that his mail was “searched and seized” as arising under the First Amendment. (ECF 1, at 3.) A prisoner's First Amendment rights encompass the right to “adequate, effective and meaningful” access to the courts and to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). “[C]ourts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail, as well as greater protection to outgoing mail than to incoming mail.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)).
Depending on the nature of the mail that was tampered with, Plaintiff's allegations may implicate both an access-to-courts claim and a general mail tampering claim.
a. Access-to-courts claim
Prisoners have “a constitutional right of access to the courts [that] gives rise to a number of derivative rights, including the right to access legal materials to prepare a case, and the right of indigent inmates to be provided with paper and pens to draft legal documents and stamps to mail them.” Collins v. Goord, 581 F.Supp.2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Bounds, 420 U.S. at 824-28). Protecting these rights “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Assistance from prison authorities, however, is “only the means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant's conduct: (1) “was deliberate and malicious,” and (2) “resulted in actual injury to the plaintiff such as the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious legal claim.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). To demonstrate actual injury, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a valid underlying cause of action separate from the right-of-access claim; and (2) frustration or hindrance of the litigation caused by the defendant's actions. See Harbury, 546 U.S. at 415. A mere “delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F.Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Jones v. Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 151- 52 (2d Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, when a prisoner with appointed counsel claims that prison officials hindered his efforts to defend himself or pursue other legal claims, “he must show that, on the facts of his case, the provision of counsel did not furnish him with the capability of bringing his challenges before the courts.” Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 98.
Here, Plaintiff's allegation that his mail was “search[ed]” and “seiz[ed]” by an unidentified individual or individuals is insufficient to state an access-to-courts claim. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee with pending criminal proceedings. He does not allege any facts suggesting that he is pursuing a “nonfrivolous, ‘arguable' underlying claim” that has been hindered as a result of withholding or opening of his mail. Harbury, 546 U.S. at 415. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff, who is presumably represented by counsel in his pending criminal case, is pursuing a meritorious legal issue arising from his criminal proceedings, he does not allege any facts explaining why his counsel would be unable to assert the claim on his behalf. See Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 98. Because Plaintiff does not allege the existence of a valid nonfrivolous underlying cause of action, and he does not explain why his defense attorney could not raise any arguments in his criminal case, he fails to state an access to courts claim under the First Amendment.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint naming as defendants the individual DOC officers whom he alleges violated his rights and alleging additional facts to state a viable Section 1983 access-to-the-court claim.
b. Mail tampering claim
To state a claim based on general mail tampering, a plaintiff must allege that the incidents: (1) suggest an ongoing practice of censorship unjustified by a substantial government interest, or (2) have unjustifiably chilled the prisoner's right of access to the court or impaired his legal representation. Davis, 320 F.3d at 351. “[A]n isolated incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 351-52. As few as two incidents of mail tampering, however, may constitute a First Amendment violation if indicative of “regular” and “unjustifiable” interference with a prisoner's mail. Id. at 351; see Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff does not allege enough facts to suggest that Defendants interfered or tampered with his mail in a manner that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. He asserts that his mail was “search[ed]” and “seiz[ed]” (ECF 1, at 3), but he does not state when, how often, or by whom his mail was opened or taken from him. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that his mail was opened or delayed, he alleges no facts suggesting that these actions were the result of unjustified government censorship or tampering. Plaintiff's allegations do not suggest that Defendants subjected him to regular and unjustifiable interference with his mail. Moreover, Plaintiff does not name as defendants the individual DOC officers who he alleges interfered with his mail.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint naming as defendants the individual DOC officers whom he alleges violated his rights and alleging additional facts sufficient to state a Section 1983 access to the court or mail tampering claim. For an access-to-the-court claim, Plaintiff must also allege facts suggesting that he was hindered from pursuing an arguably meritorious legal claim for which he is not represented by counsel. In support of a mail tampering claim, he must also allege facts indicating that named defendants subjected him to regular and unjustifiable interference with his mail.
G. Racial slurs
Plaintiff alleges that “CO Sisto,” who is not named as a defendant in this action, “says racial slurs” to Plaintiff. (ECF 1, at 4.) Verbal abuse, threats, and intimidation standing alone, without injury or damage, do not amount to a constitutional deprivation. See Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (name-calling without “any appreciable injury” is not a constitutional violation); Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“verbal intimidation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F.Supp. 460, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“verbal harassment or profanity alone, ‘unaccompanied by any injury no matter how inappropriate, unprofessional or reprehensible it might seem,' does not constitute the violation of any federally protected right and therefore is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Haussman v. Fergus, 894 F.Supp. 142, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he taunts, insults and racial slurs alleged to have been hurled at plaintiff by defendants, while reprehensible if true, do not comprise an infringement of constitutional guarantees.”).
Plaintiff's allegation that a correctional officer used racial slurs does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Since Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants inflicted or caused him any harm or injury along with the verbal abuse, he fails to state a claim under Section 1983. If Plaintiff asserts claims arising from Sisto's alleged use of racial slurs in his amended complaint, he must name Sisto as a defendant and allege facts suggesting that Sisto's conduct caused him any harm or injury.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state valid Section 1983 claims, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to provide more facts about his claims Section 1983 claims unconstitutional conditions of confinement, mail tampering, and the use of racial slurs. Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the caption and in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2023, at EMTC, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff should also adhere to the legal frameworks outlined in the relevant sections above.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Rikers Island and the New York City Department of Correction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-11321 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
(Image Omitted)