The State specifically argued at trial that L.D.'s testimony was admissible to show Bedsole's motive. In addressing the admissibility of collateral acts of sexual abuse in the trial of a defendant charged with rape and sexual abuse, this Court in Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), stated: "Ordinarily, a prior act of sexual abuse would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b).
Proctor v. City of Prattville, 830 So.2d 38, 41-42 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). See also Garner v. State, 977 So.2d 533 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).
’" Bedsole v. State, 974 So. 2d 1034, 1038–39 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), quoting Estes v. State, 776 So. 2d 206, 210–11 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)." E.L.Y. v. State, 266 So. 3d 1125, 1137 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018)
"Bedsole v. State, 974 So.2d 1034, 1038–39 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), quoting Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206, 210–11 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by allowing the State to present evidence of E.L.Y.'s collateral acts of sexual abuse.
In Bedsole v. State, 974 So.2d 1034 (Ala.Crim.App.2006), this Court addressed the use of collateral acts to prove motive:"In addressing the admissibility of collateral acts of sexual abuse in the trial of a defendant charged with rape and sexual abuse, this Court in Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), stated:" ‘Ordinarily, a prior act of sexual abuse would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b).
830 So.2d at 41–42. See also Ex parte Register, 680 So.2d 225, 228 (Ala.1994) (testimony regarding collateral acts of sexual abuse was admissible to establish motive, i.e., it “had some tendency to show that [the defendant] had a passion or propensity for unusual and abnormal sexual relations”); Garner v. State, 977 So.2d 533, 537 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (testimony regarding collateral acts of sexual abuse was admissible to show the defendant's motive, i.e., his “unnatural sexual desire for young girls”); Bedsole v. State, 974 So.2d 1034, 1039 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (testimony regarding collateral acts of sexual abuse was admissible to prove that the defendant was “ ‘motivated by an unnatural sexual desire for young girls' ” (quoting Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206, 211 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ). In this case, the charged offenses and the collateral acts all involved young vulnerable girls of approximately the same age and were similar, albeit not identical, in nature.
With regard to Rule 404(b) evidence used to prove motive, this Court has stated: “[I]t is permissible in every criminal case to show that there was an influence, an inducement, operating on the accused, which may have led or tempted him to commit the offense.” Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206, 210–11 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). The record indicates that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed testimony regarding Windsor's actions at the Walgreens store because that evidence tended to prove both identity and motive.
' “Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206, 210–11 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).”Garner v. State, 977 So.2d 533, 537 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).
When an order purporting to modify a sentence is void for lack of jurisdiction, the original valid sentence must be reinstated. See, e.g., Ex parte Hitt, 778 So.2d 159, 162 (Ala. 2000) ("[T]he order purporting to modify Hitt's D.U.I., sentence is void. The original D.U.I., sentence must be reinstated."). See also Cruitt v. State, 893 So.2d 1236 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003); State v. Trussell, 880 So.2d 1177 (Ala.Crim.App. 2003); Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999); and State v. Gagliardi 747 So.2d 366 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999) (all ordering reinstatement of original valid sentence when resentence was void for lack of jurisdiction). The 60-year sentence was clearly within the statutory range for a murder conviction in 1991.
"' Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 123, 130 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997), quoting Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1237 (Ala. 1988)."Estes v. State, 776 So.2d 206, 210-11 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999). In this case, the prior acts were substantially similar to the acts that formed the basis for the instant offense.