Accordingly, the judgment is reversed. 1. "The relative wealth or financial condition of beneficiaries may generally be proved for the purpose of emphasizing the reasonableness or unnaturalness of the testamentary disposition and determining whether undue influence was exercised over the testator at the time of its execution..." Estes v. Perkins, 239 Ga. 636 ( 238 S.E.2d 423) (1977). While this statement accurately reflects Georgia law, it does not address the means which may be employed to discover the financial status of a beneficiary.
Akin v. Patton, 235 Ga. 51, 53 ( 218 SE2d 802) (1975). See also Estes v. Perkins, 239 Ga. 636, 636 ( 238 SE2d 423) (1977) ("The time to be looked at in determining the capacity of a testator [or testatrix] to make a will, in reference to his [or her] mental capacity, is the time when the will was executed. However, testimony relating to a reasonable period of time before and after the execution of the will may be introduced to show the testator's [or testatrix's] state of mind at the time of execution.").
"[T]estimony relating to a reasonable period of time before and after the execution of the will may be introduced to show the testator's state of mind at the time of execution." Estes v. Perkins, 239 Ga. 636 (3) ( 238 S.E.2d 423) (1977). The probate court admitted expert testimony that the testatrix was diagnosed with degenerative dementia approximately three months after the execution of the will.
Compare Mallis v. Miltiades, 241 Ga. 404 (1978), where the caveators produced evidence that the testator lacked testamentary capacity before and after the date of execution of the will and the doctor who testified as to testator's mental state prior to execution of the will stated that if he were like others suffering from severe chronic brain disease and senile psychosis, he would not have been of sound mind on the date he signed the will. See also Ware v. Hill, 209 Ga. 214, 218 ( 71 S.E.2d 630) (1952), and Estes v. Perkins, 239 Ga. 636 ( 238 S.E.2d 423) (1977). There was not in this case sufficient evidence to controvert the testimony of the subscribing witnesses ( Fehn v. Shaw, supra), and the trial court did not err in directing a verdict for the propounder.
This testimony introduced by caveators covering a reasonable period of time before and after the time of the execution of the will constitute a genuine conflict in the evidence regarding the state of the testator's mind on the date he signed the will from which inferences could be drawn by a jury establishing a lack of the requisite mental capacity. Ware v. Hill, 209 Ga. 214 ( 71 S.E.2d 630) (1952); Estes v. Perkins, 239 Ga. 636 ( 238 S.E.2d 423) (1977). "The time to be looked at in determining the capacity of a testator to make a will, in reference to his mental capacity, is the time when the will was executed.
Another exception to the rule also exists in the context of a will contest when such evidence is determined to be relevant and admissible in deciding whether a will is just and equitable as related to the question of fraud and undue influence. For example, evidence that a natural heir excluded as a beneficiary was wealthy when the testator executed his or her will constitutes circumstantial evidence relevant in showing that the testamentary disposition was not suspicious and therefore less likely to have been the result of undue influence. Estes v. Perkins, 239 Ga. 636, 238 S.E.2d 423, 424 (1977); see also 2 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence, § 13:25, at 524 (7th ed.1994). On the other hand, “evidence of the financial condition of persons who would not benefit from a finding of undue influence is properly excluded.”