Opinion
NO. 2019-CA-000155-MR
03-27-2020
AARON ESTELL-BRADSHAW APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Emily Holt Rhorer Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky James P. Judge Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEAN CHENAULT LOGUE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CR-00190 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, SPECIAL JUDGE. COMBS, JUDGE: The Appellant, Aaron Estell-Bradshaw (Bradshaw), entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (heroin) and possession of drug paraphernalia. He appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. After our review, we affirm.
Retired Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
Bradshaw was indicted by the Madison County grand jury for trafficking in a controlled substance, heroin; trafficking in a controlled substance, fentanyl; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of marijuana.
On July 5, 2018, Bradshaw filed a motion to suppress. He argued that his arrest was illegal and that, therefore, the evidence produced from the search of his person and vehicle must be suppressed. He contends that there was no active child support warrant for his arrest to justify the stop by Officer Barron of the Richmond Police Department. The Commonwealth argued that the motion should be denied because Bradford was arrested on a valid active warrant.
On August 15, 2018, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing on the motion in limine. Officer Barron testified that on January 31, 2018, he observed Bradshaw operating a motor vehicle. Officer Barron was familiar with Bradshaw after having had some previous encounters with him; and he believed there was an active warrant for Bradshaw's arrest. Officer Barron ran the license plate tag on the vehicle, which came back as registered to Bradshaw. Attached to the license plate response in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) (the computer in the police car) was an active warrant matching Bradshaw's name, date of birth, and Social Security number. Officer Barron testified that because he was driving, he could not sit still to read the entire report. He just knew that there was a warrant, and thus he initiated a traffic stop.
Officer Barron activated his body camera as he approached Bradshaw's vehicle. Some of the camera footage was played during the hearing as noted in the parties' briefs. Officer Barron informed Bradshaw that there was an active warrant for him. Bradshaw asked what it was for. Officer Barron stated he thought it was for child support. Officer Barron checked with dispatch, which told him it was for child support, and he relayed that information to Bradshaw. Bradshaw phoned Ms. Van Winkle in the child support office. She asked to speak to Officer Barron and told him that she did not show any warrants for Bradshaw on child support. Nonetheless, Officer Barron replied that dispatch had confirmed the existence of the warrant for child support. He had a duty to serve the warrant.
Office Barron testified that he searched Bradshaw's person incident to arrest. He then conducted the vehicle inventory, which produced a heroin-fentanyl mix located in the trunk. When he returned to his cruiser, Officer Barron reviewed the active warrant in NCIC, which showed that the actual charge against Bradshaw was for failure to pay a fine for possession of marijuana. Officer Barron informed Bradshaw of that fact at the scene.
Ruling from the bench, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning as follows:
Well, this is an interesting case that took a little twist I didn't expect with the active warrant, that there actually was one. The way I presumed was that he was arrested and then later learned. So, as I understand the facts, the officer pulled over Mr. Bradshaw, believed he had an active warrant, NCIC showed an active warrant. He approached the car. Mr. Bradshaw said, "What's it for?" He said, "I think it's for child support, we'll figure it out." Later says, "We'll see what it's for, we'll figure it out." There's no definite statement made there. I think we're placing a duty on officers that may - that I do not believe exists to, uh, beyond what an active warrant is. I don't think they owe the person being arrested a great explanation about it. They don't know a lot about it usually.
Now, only in Richmond, Kentucky could a person sitting in the car with an active warrant be allowed to call the child support office. We all know Marquita Van Winkle, chat with her. The officer was even nice enough to talk to her and tell her what to do if in fact her statement was correct. It could have been anybody on the phone. But knowing Ms. Van Winkle, it did sound like her voice, so I figure it was her, and apparently so, and she corrected it. Nevertheless there was still an active warrant. I don't think that you get a free pass because the officer isn't sure of what the proper active warrant is. If there had been no active warrant, Ms. Zeurcher [defense counsel], I think you have a very valid case. But because, you know, [Bradshaw] had an active warrant, then the officer had a duty to serve it and, in fact, served the correct active warrant and made it clear throughout he wasn't sure, he would see. But again, I don't think the duty of the officer is to study the warrant, other than it being active and serve it. It could be from anywhere.
At that point, defense counsel interjected that the officer did call dispatch and was told that it was a warrant for child support. The court replied that it understood "that dispatch told him incorrectly and I agree had there been no warrant, this might be a different case, but there was a warrant."
Continuing, the trial court concluded as follows:
Well, NCIC showed a warrant. Now we don't know what warrant showed up in NCIC, it could have very well been the correct one. There was two obviously in NCIC. So I - one was not valid, one was. Again, I think it was - it could be argued a good faith stop even if the warrant hadn't been active. But where it was RPD that had served the original warrant, I would have been a little more perhaps leaning towards your argument. But where there are two active warrants [sic], and one is still active and one was not, I do not believe I can set this aside based on the fact that he served an active warrant. Alright, so I'm going to deny the motion to suppress on those grounds.
At page 15 of his brief, Bradshaw contends that the court's statement that there must have been two active warrants is not supported by substantial evidence. However, it is evident from the context that the court simply misspoke and that it had intended to say, "where there are two warrants," because it states immediately thereafter that "one is still active and one was not."
On October 18, 2018, Bradshaw entered a conditional plea of guilty to count one of the indictment, trafficking in a controlled substance, heroin; and count three of the indictment, possession of drug paraphernalia. He reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The remaining counts were dismissed. On January 15, 2019, the trial court entered its judgment and sentence of imprisonment. Bradshaw appealed.
Bradshaw's first argument is that the court erred in failing to suppress evidence following his illegal arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and §10 of the Kentucky Constitution. "The exclusionary rule, based upon the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, provides that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not admissible against an accused." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Ky. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
Our standard of review of a circuit court's decision on a suppression motion following a hearing is twofold. First, the factual findings of the court are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. The second prong involves a de novo review to determine whether the court's decision is correct as a matter of law.Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. App. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
We have reviewed the recording of the suppression hearing. The court's factual findings as set forth above are supported by substantial evidence and are conclusive. We must then determine whether the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress because there was an active warrant is correct as a matter of law.
Bradshaw relies upon Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 117 S.W.3d 109 (Ky. App. 2003). In Vaughn, this Court reversed and remanded to determine whether the arresting officer could be chargeable with collective knowledge of the sheriff's department that the warrant had already been served. He also cites Jameson v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-CA-001478-MR, 2013 WL 5436650 (Ky. App. Sept. 27, 2013), which involved a stop based on an invalid ATL (attempt to locate) a vehicle. We agree with the Commonwealth that neither case is applicable because neither involved an active warrant.
Bradshaw acknowledges at page 13 of his brief that "Officer Barron looked at NCIC, and saw an active warrant and stopped [Bradshaw]." The fact that Officer Barron may have thought that the warrant was for child support is irrelevant.
[T]he officer's subjective intention is irrelevant here; subjective intentions do not play a role in either a probable cause or a reasonable suspicion analysis under the Fourth Amendment. "[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)).Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ky. 2017); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (Detective's "subjective motivation does not invalidate the stop as it was made validly and conducted within the bounds of official propriety."). See also Traft v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Ky. 2018), holding that an officer's knowledge that an individual to whom a vehicle was registered had an active arrest warrant created an articulable and reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop -- even though the officer did not know the driver's identity when he initiated the stop. The officer was merely acting in good faith to carry out his duty. Accordingly, he was abiding by the terms of the warrant.
In the case before us, as in Traft, Officer Barron was carrying out his sworn duty. We agree with the Commonwealth that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Barron to initiate the stop and that the "fatal flaw" in Bradshaw's argument is the undisputed fact that there was an active warrant in this case. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress on the ground that there was an active warrant which justified the initial traffic stop, thereby validating the search and seizure that followed.
We also fully agree with the trial court that even if there had there not been an active warrant, an argument for a good-faith stop could be made. United States v. Godfrey, 427 F. App'x 409, 411-13 (6th Cir. 2011) (Good-faith exception cured any unconstitutional police action where officer received warrant alert on mobile data terminal (MDT) after entering wrong license plate number, but failed to scroll through screens to discover identity of individual and description of vehicle. Safety concerns and perceived need for swift apprehension reasonably explained failure to double-check MDT before securing suspect and vehicle).
Bradshaw argues that this Court should remand the case to the trial court to determine whether impoundment of the car was necessary and if the scope of the inventory search was reasonable. Bradshaw concedes that the "issue is not really preserved by [his] motion to suppress." At the hearing, the trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to questioning beyond the scope of the motion. Bradshaw submits that palpable error review under RCr 10.26 is required. We disagree.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In his motion to suppress, Bradshaw did not raise the issue which he now characterizes as palpable error. Because the issue was waived, there is nothing for us to review. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Ky. App. 2011), holds that where "no such motion to suppress [defendant's] identification was made, the trial court necessarily did not conduct the requisite evidentiary hearing or enter any findings of fact. Accordingly, there is nothing that we can review for palpable error." That precedent clearly governs the issue before us in this case.
We AFFIRM the denial of the motion to suppress by the Madison Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Emily Holt Rhorer
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky James P. Judge
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky