Opinion
1:24-cv-651
12-20-2024
KATTIE SHERROD ESTATE, LEYAH YISRAEL, TRUSTEE,[1] Plaintiff, v. KATHLEEN MADDEN, et al., Defendants.
Dlott, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Karen L. Litkovitz United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following defendants: Kathleen C. Madden d/b/a Ohio Department of Administrative Services; Judge Patrick Dinkelacker, Hamilton County Common Pleas Court; Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office, Andrew Hasenberg, County Attorney; Hyde Park Police Station - District 2, Officer Jeffrey Ertel; Hamilton County Public Defender's Office, Angela Glaser, Attorney; Hamilton County Justice Center, Charmaine McGuffey; Hamilton County Clerk of Court, Pavan Parikh; Hamilton County Recorder's Office, Scott Crowley, County Recorder's Clerk; Hamilton County Probation Department, Ella Silverman, Officer; Perrin March and Diana T. March, Previous Owners of 2672 Grandin Place; Quincy Chloe LLC, Current owner of 2672 Grandin Place; and Binnix Bail Bondsman Office. (Doc. 1-1). By separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Screening of Complaint
A. Legal Standard
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328-29; see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
B. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff alleges numerous violations of her constitutional rights stemming from her arrest and prosecution in State of Ohio v. Kattie L. Sherrod, aka Leyah Kayel Yisrael, Nos. 24CRA1818, B2400576 (Hamilton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas). On February 13, 2024, plaintiff was indicted on one count each of burglary, breaking and entering, attempted theft, forgery, and tampering with records. Plaintiff pled guilty to breaking and entering and to tampering with records on October 23, 2024. On November 20, 2024, plaintiff was sentenced to an aggregate term of 36 months imprisonment in the Ohio Department of Corrections. See State of Ohio v. Kattie L. Sherrod, aka Leyah Kayel Yisrael, No. 24CRA1818 (Hamilton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas) (available by name or case number search at https://www.courtclerk.org/ records-search (last accessed Dec. 20, 2024). See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999)) (courts may take judicial notice of court records available online to the public).
Plaintiff filed an original complaint (Doc. 1-2) and a “corrected” complaint (Doc. 1-4) in this federal court on November 13, 2024, one week prior to her state court sentencing. The Court construes the “corrected” complaint as the operative complaint in this matter.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Judge Dinkelacker imposed a $100,000 straight bond “without valid procedural justification, resulting in 55 days of incarceration and 88 days of electronic monitoring”; Sheriff Charmaine McGuffey “perpetuated wrongful imprisonment by enforcing an unreasonably high bond”; Officer Jeffrey Ertel “filed charges” against plaintiff without probable cause leading to her detention; Hamilton County Probation Officer Ella Silverman “imposed unnecessary electronic monitoring” causing plaintiff headaches and numbness; Hamilton County Prosecutor Andrew Hasenberg “filed unsupported charges of breaking and entering, forgery, and tampering with records”; Hamilton County Recorder Scott Crowley “refused to process critical documents for the Estate, including the land patent and quit claim deed”; Public Defender Angela Glaser “coerced Leyah Yisrael into a plea deal under threat of immediate jail time”; and Perrin and Diana March and Quincy Chloe LLC “filed speculative charges to prevent the Estate from securing property rights.” (Doc. 1-4 at PAGEID 133-137). As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
C. Resolution
It appears the bulk of plaintiff's complaint concerns alleged misconduct occurring during the state criminal proceedings that resulted in plaintiff's conviction and incarceration. For the reasons that follow, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief or because the defendants are immune from suit.
Plaintiff's claims challenging the validity of her conviction and sentence in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas should be dismissed. These include plaintiff's claims against defendants Ertel, Hasenberg, and Glaser. To the extent plaintiff seeks relief in the form of an immediate or speedier release from imprisonment, her sole federal remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after she has exhausted her state remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1985).
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff seeks money damages on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence, her claims are barred from review by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). See also Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2005); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1995); cf Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a civil action under § 1983 cannot proceed if the action serves to undermine a criminal conviction not reversed on appeal or vacated by expungement or by writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. By challenging the validity of the charges and voluntariness of her guilty plea, plaintiff seeks to call those convictions into question. Because plaintiff does not allege that her convictions have been reversed on appeal or vacated by expungement or by writ of habeas corpus, plaintiff's claims challenging the convictions are barred by Heck.
Judge Dinkelacker is immune from suit in both his official and individual capacity. A claim against Judge Dinkelacker in his official capacity as a judge of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas is the same as a claim against the State of Ohio. See Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an Ohio common pleas court was an arm of the state and a claim against a judge of that court was a claim against the state); Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., Loc. 860 v. Neff, 29 F.4th 325, 331 (6th Cir. 2022) (identifying many decisions that agree that “the courts in a State's third branch of government count as arms of the State”). “Because official capacity suits against state officials are suits against their employer-the state-[the state's sovereign] immunity also extends to such officers in their official capacities.” Williams v. Parikh, 708 F.Supp.3d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-02 (1984) and Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).
“There are three exceptions to a State's sovereign immunity” under the Eleventh Amendment: when Congress has abrogated it, when the State has consented to suit, or when the Ex Parte Young exception applies. See S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 817 (6th Cir. 2000) and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The first two exceptions do not apply here, as “Ohio has not consented to suits in federal court nor has Congress abrogated Ohio's immunity under § 1983.” Smith v. DeWine, 476 F.Supp.3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020). The third exception (the Ex Parte Young exception) which allows some state officials to be sued in their official capacity for purely prospective injunctive relief, also does not apply. “That is because the Ex parte Young exception expressly prohibits injunctions directed toward state judicial officers regarding their adjudication of the cases and controversies put before them.” Williams, 708 F.Supp.3d at 1355 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163 (explaining that “an injunction against a state court” or its “machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our government”)) (emphasis in original). As no exception applies, all claims against Judge Dinkelacker in his official capacity are barred by the State of Ohio's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.
The claims against Judge Dinkelacker in his individual capacity should also be dismissed. Section 1983 itself “bars injunctive relief against ‘a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”' Wright v. Finley, No. 1:19-cv-819, 2021 WL 680243, *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2021) (McFarland, J.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Thus, the [§ 1983] statute generally prohibits suits for injunctive relief against judicial officers but provides exceptions for violations of declaratory decrees or the unavailability of declaratory relief,”-factors that plaintiff has not alleged here and do not otherwise appear to apply. Id. All claims for injunctive relief under § 1983 against Judge Dinkelacker in his individual capacity should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. See Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 Fed.Appx. 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding that a district court “properly dismissed plaintiffs' claim [against a judicial officer] seeking injunctive relief, because the plain language of § 1983 allows suits for injunctions only after a litigant has sought a declaratory judgment”).
Finally, the complaint should be dismissed against defendant Judge Dinkelacker in his individual capacity because judges are afforded absolute immunity from damages for acts they commit while functioning within their judicial capacity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 910 (1991) (per curiam); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir. 1997). Judges retain absolute immunity from liability even if they act maliciously or corruptly, as long as they are performing judicial acts and have jurisdiction over the subject matter giving rise to the suit against them. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 35657 (1978). See also Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2001); King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff's complaint alleges no facts to plausibly suggest that defendant Dinkelacker presided over a matter in which he lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and setting bond conditions is a function normally carried out by a judge. See Wright v. Finley, No. 1:19-cv-819, 2021 WL 680243, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2021). Accordingly, the complaint against defendant Dinkelacker should be dismissed.
Sheriff McGuffey is likewise entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for enforcing Judge Dinkelacker's bond order by detaining plaintiff until she posted bond. “It is well established that judges and other court officers enjoy absolute immunity from suit on claims arising out of the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988). “Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). Quasijudicial immunity does not depend on the actor who performed the function, but rather on the nature of the function being performed. Id. See also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988). Enforcing or executing court orders are intrinsically associated with judicial proceedings and qualify for quasi-judicial immunity. Bush, 38 F.3d at 847 (citing Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.1986) (sheriff who enforced court order entitled to quasi-judicial immunity)); Troyer v. Hershberger, No. 5:11cv2536, 2012 WL 488251, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2012) (sheriff executing court-ordered sheriff's sale and court-ordered eviction entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). Therefore, defendant McGuffey is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for enforcing a court order.
In addition, Hamilton County Probation Officer Ella Silverman is entitled to quasijudicial immunity for enforcing Judge Dinkelacker's bond order to include electronic monitoring. “A probation officer is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit on claims that arise out of [her] activities to ensure that the plaintiff complies with the terms of court supervision.” Faber v. Smith, No. 17-2523, 2018 WL 6918704, at *2 (6th Cir. June 6, 2018) (citing Timson v. Wright, 532 F.2d 552, 553 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Huffer v. Bogen, 503 Fed.Appx. 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2012); Loggins v. Franklin County, 218 Fed.Appx. 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). To the extent plaintiff alleges the imposition of electronic monitoring “disregarded medical advice” and caused her headaches and numbness, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts whatsoever giving rise to a plausible inference that defendant Silverman “acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.'” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Kentucky, 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 692 (2024) (quoting Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021)). In the absence of any such allegations, plaintiff's claims against defendant Silverman should be dismissed.
State court records show that Judge Dinkelacker removed the requirement for electronic monitoring on September 19, 2024. See State of Ohio v. Kattie L. Sherrod, aka Leyah Kayel Yisrael, No. 24CRA1818 (Hamilton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas) (available by name or case number search at https://www.courtclerk.org/ records-search (last accessed Dec. 20, 2024).
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Officer Ertel filed charges against her without probable cause. Plaintiff's guilty plea estops plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against defendant Ertel. See Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 507 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs are estopped by their pleas in state court from now challenging the reasonableness of their arrest in the instant § 1983 action.”); Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1988) (No contest pleas, finding of guilt, and imposition of fines “estop plaintiffs from now asserting in federal court that the defendant police officers acted without probable cause.”). See also Zar v. Payne, 760 F.Supp.2d 779, 784 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“The Sixth Circuit has ruled that pleas of guilty or no contest in a state court preclude a person from later bringing a § 1983 action alleging unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”) (citing Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1988)). Therefore, the complaint against defendant Ertel should be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claim that prosecutor Hasenberg “filed unsupported charges of breaking and entering, forgery, and tampering with records” (Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 7) should also be dismissed. Prosecutors are “absolutely immune from liability” for actions that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (“a prosecutor who undertakes acts in the preparation or initiation of judicial proceedings is entitled to absolute immunity”). “The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity is whether the actions in question are those of an advocate.” Red Zone 12 LLC v. City of Columbus, 758 Fed.Appx. 508, 514 (6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). As plaintiff's claims against Hasenberg concern his role in filing criminal charges against her, Hasenberg is entitled to absolute immunity.
Plaintiff alleges defendant Crowley of the County Recorder's Office “refused to process critical documents for the Estate, including the land patent and quit claim deed, obstructing the Estate's right to secure its property. This misrepresentation of legal responsibilities caused financial harm and emotional distress from property instability.” (Doc. 1-2 at PAGEID 8).Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing a deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights to state a claim under § 1983. See Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Bey v. Sessler, No. 23-3421, 2024 WL 2078564, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 2024). Plaintiff also alleges defendant Crawley's actions amount to a state court claim of fraud. This federal Court has no diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law fraud claim as plaintiff and defendant Crawley are both Ohio citizens. As there is no complete diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the Court has no jurisdiction over this claim.
State court records show that at her arraignment, plaintiff was ordered to “stay away from the Recorder's Office- may file at Recorder's Office with leave of Court.” (Entry of 3/1/2024). On June 20, 2024, Judge Dinkelacker ordered plaintiff to not to have any contact with individuals concerning any contact with the Hamilton County Recorder's office” and “to not file any documents with the Hamilton County Recorder's Office without leave of court.” (Entry of 6/20/2024). See State of Ohio v. Kattie L. Sherrod, aka Leyah Kayel Yisrael, No. 24CRA1818 (Hamilton County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas) (available by name or case number search at https://www.courtclerk.org/ records-search (last accessed Dec. 20, 2024). To the extent defendant Crowley was enforcing these state court orders, he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the reasons discussed above.
Plaintiff's complaint also fails to state a claim for relief against her former defense attorney, defendant Glaser. In order to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the person sued acted under color of state law and that this conduct deprived plaintiff of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). As a lawyer representing a client, defendant Glaser was not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 Fed.Appx. 163, 165 (6th Cir.2003) (“A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.”); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 613 (D.C.Cir.1979) (applying Polk County to retained criminal lawyers). Therefore, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant Glaser.
Any official capacity claims brought against defendants Hasenberg, Glaser, McGuffey, Crowley, and Silverman must also be dismissed. An official capacity suit is generally “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). A suit against a defendant in his official capacity under § 1983 is equivalent to a suit against the local government entity. Powers v. County of Lorain, 259 Fed.Appx. 818, 822, n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, “the entity's ‘policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Plaintiff has not stated a viable claim against Hamilton County. In order to state a cognizable claim against the county defendant, plaintiff must “identify” the county custom or policy that allegedly resulted in a violation of her federal rights, “connect the policy to the [County] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Aladimi v. Hamilton Cnty. Justice Ctr., No. 1:09cv398, 2012 WL 292587, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2012) (Bowman, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2012 WL 529585 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2012) (Barrett, J.). No such allegations are contained in plaintiff's complaint. Cf. Aladimi, supra, 2012 WL 292587, at *7 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); citing Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 2007)) (dismissing complaint against Hamilton County in the absence of any allegation indicating that that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the county).
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Perrin and Diana March and Quincy Chloe, LLC “filed speculative charges to prevent the Estate from securing property rights.” (Doc. 1-4 at PAGEID 137). It appears from the state court criminal complaint attached to plaintiff's federal complaint that the March defendants were the homeowners who reported a possible breaking and entering to the police and defendant Quincy Chloe LLC is the current property owner. These defendants are not state actors under Section 1983. “Reporting a crime to the police does not expose a private party to liability under § 1983.” Downing v. Life Time Fitness, 483 Fed.Appx. 12, 20 (6th Cir. 2012), as amended, (May 18, 2012) (citation omitted). “Providing information to the police, responding to questions about a crime, and offering witness testimony at a criminal trial does not expose a private individual to liability for actions taken ‘under color of law.'” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 399 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the complaint against defendants Perrin and Diana March and Quincy Chloe LLC should be dismissed.
Finally, the complaint against the remaining named defendants should be dismissed. A plaintiff, even one proceeding pro se, must plead sufficient facts to show how each defendant allegedly violated plaintiff's rights. Reid v. City of Detroit, No. 18-13681, 2020 WL 5902597, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2020) (citing Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)). “Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to sustain recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 92 Fed.Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff fails to include any allegations about Kathleen C. Madden d/b/a Ohio Department of Administrative Services; Hamilton County Clerk of Court, Pavan Parikh; and Binnix Bail Bondsman Office in the complaint. Therefore, the complaint against these defendants fails to state a claim for relief.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains free to apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party's objections WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).