Prior to 1927 special orders made after final judgment were treated as being within the scope of this general rule. ( White v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 54 [42 P. 471]; Stoddard v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 [41 P. 278] (order held appealable either as an order after final judgment or as an injunction); Livermore v. Campbell, 52 Cal. 75; Dyerville Mfg. Co. v. Heller, 102 Cal. 615 [36 P. 928] [no discussion]; Estate ofDunsmuir, 149 Cal. 67 [ 84 P. 657] [no discussion].) In these cases no attempt was made to distinguish one type of void order from another, and the White and Livermore cases flatly refused to consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction, denying certiorari upon the ground that in any event an appeal was available.
[3] Furthermore, so long as the order is one of those enumerated in the code as appealable, an appeal may be taken from it, even if it is void. ( Dunsmuir v. Coffey, 148 Cal. 137 [ 82 P. 682]; Estate of Dunsmuir, 149 Cal. 67 [ 84 P. 657]; Luckenbach v. Krempel, 188 Cal. 175 [ 204 P. 591]; 2 Cal. Jur., p. 184, sec. 40.) Thus the order of May 14, 1937, being an appealable order, is not subject to review in this proceeding. Petitioner cites in support of her claim to relief by certiorari, a line of cases headed by Stanton v. SuperiorCourt, 202 Cal. 478 [ 261 P. 1001].
No independent suit was brought to set aside the order of the Power county probate court and the motion was not made within the time specified in the statute, so not within a reasonable time ( Nixon v. Tongren, 33 Idaho 287, 193 P. 731; Blandy v. Modern Box Mfg. Co., 40 Idaho 356, 232 P. 1095); hence the probate court had no authority to set aside the appointment and his action in that regard as well as restoring the administrator was a nullity, the only valid order extant being that appointing the administrator. ( Dunsmuir v. Coffey, 148 Cal. 137, 82 P. 682; In re Dunsmuir's Estate, 149 Cal. 67, 84 Pac. 657.) The trial court's order quashing the writ of review is affirmed and costs are awarded to respondent.