Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. INP021210. Randall Donald White, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ronald T. Golan and Ronald T. Golan for Objector and Appellant.
Nether & Obeyer and D. Martin Nether for Petitioner and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER, J.
Objector and appellant Donald Yokaitis and petitioner and respondent Heidi Morandi are, respectively, the surviving spouse and adult daughter of decedent Marilyn Yokaitis. Petitioner and objector each presented competing wills for probate, but under either will, petitioner is the residuary beneficiary to the bulk of the estate. Petitioner petitioned the probate court for a family allowance to be charged against her share. The court granted the request.
Objector opposed the family allowance petition below and he contends on appeal that the lower court erred in finding petitioner qualified under the statute for such an allowance, and disputes the amount of the allowance granted. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The decedent, Marilyn Yokaitis, had substantial separate property assets, including stocks, bonds and commercial real property. At the time of the decedent’s death, her estate was estimated to amount to $23 million dollars, and to generate at least $1 million in income annually. During her lifetime, decedent had provided significant income to petitioner, her only surviving child. Decedent had claimed petitioner and petitioner’s two children as dependents on decedent’s income tax returns. Decedent provided a regular cash allowance of $7,000 a month, paid the expenses of petitioner’s vehicle and insurance, and gave petitioner temporary employment at $2,000 a month, managing apartment buildings and collecting rent during the six months a year that decedent spent traveling. Once decedent died, all these income items, totaling approximately $10,200 a month, ceased.
Petitioner produced a 1992 holographic will; objector filed a 2006 holographic will. Indeed, petitioner represents that objector does not seriously challenge the 2006 document, but argues that it is a codicil to the 1992 will. Petitioner states that it is undisputed that she is the residuary beneficiary under either will and will inherit the bulk of the decedent’s estate in any case.
Petitioner filed a petition for a family allowance under Probate Code section 6540, subdivision (b)(1). Probate Code section 6540 provides:
“(a) The following are entitled to such reasonable family allowance out of the estate as is necessary for their maintenance according to their circumstances during administration of the estate:
“(1) The surviving spouse of the decedent.
“(2) Minor children of the decedent.
“(3) Adult children of the decedent who are physically or mentally incapacitated from earning a living and were actually dependent in whole or in part upon the decedent for support.
“(b) The following may be given such reasonable family allowance out of the estate as the court in its discretion determines is necessary for their maintenance according to their circumstances during administration of the estate:
“(1) Other adult children of the decedent who were actually dependent in whole or in part upon the decedent for support.
“(2) A parent of the decedent who was actually dependent in whole or in part upon the decedent for support.
“(c) If a person otherwise eligible for family allowance has a reasonable maintenance from other sources and there are one or more other persons entitled to a family allowance, the family allowance shall be granted only to those who do not have a reasonable maintenance from other sources.”
Petitioner requested a family allowance under Probate Code section 6540, subdivision (b)(1), as an adult child who was actually dependent upon the decedent for support. Petitioner’s spouse earns $2,000 a month, which is inadequate to provide for the support of petitioner and petitioner’s two children. One of the children is severely autistic and has special needs. Petitioner had no other means of support, aside from the allowances and other monies her mother provided for her. Her request for a family allowance was based on the same amounts as her mother had given her during her lifetime, or $10,200 a month. As petitioner put it in her declaration, her “household costs are structured around the support she had from the decedent and only recently lost. It would be a patent injustice to deny Petitioner her basic household necessities while she waits for distribution of millions of dollars in assets from her mother’s estate.”
Objector opposed the petition for a family allowance. First, he argued that petitioner did not qualify under the statute, because petitioner was not physically or mentally disabled from earning a living. He further argued that, even if the statute grants a family allowance to petitioner, there is no provision in the statute for grandchildren; because a significant portion of petitioner’s expenses relate to the grandchildren, the family allowance should be denied. In addition, objector disputed the amounts petitioner claimed for various living expenses, and questioned their reasonableness.
Based in part on objector’s claim that petitioner’s expenses were not backed up with documentation, the court ordered petitioner to prepare an expense and income declaration, reviewed by a professional accountant. Petitioner had an income and expense declaration prepared, based upon the accountant’s examination of petitioner’s financial records from December 1, 2005, to March 31, 2007. The monthly averages calculated and reported on the income and expense declaration comported with petitioner’s request for an allowance of $10,200 a month.
The court granted the petition for family allowance. Objector appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
To the extent that objector asks this court to construe the meaning of Probate Code section 6540, we review the question de novo. (CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 892, 906.) Otherwise, objector presents challenges to the reasonableness of the allowance order; that is a matter we review under the abuse of discretion standard. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478 [order setting amount of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Wakefield v. Bohlin (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 963, 978 [award of attorney fees after trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion]; People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470 [abuse of discretion standard of review in setting restitution].)
II. The Family Allowance Was Permissible Under the Statute
Objector’s chief legal objection is that many of the claimed monthly expenses related to the support for and needs of petitioner’s children. Objector argues that Probate Code section 6540, subdivision (b)(1), “does not authorize the payments directly or indirectly, for Grandchildren.” That is, Probate Code section 6540, subdivision (b)(1), provides that a reasonable family allowance from the estate may be given to “[o]ther adult children of the decedent who were actually dependent in whole or in part upon the decedent for support.” Objector argues that this language must be construed absolutely literally: “The statute makes no mention of Grandchildren—only Adult Children.”
“ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to effectuate the purpose of the law. . . . In doing so, we first look to the words of the statute and try to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of the language, at the same time not rendering any language mere surplusage. The words must be construed in context and in light of the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear. . . . The statute “ ‘must be given a reasonable and commonsense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the Legislature, practical rather than technical in nature, and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity. . . .’ ” . . . If the language of a statute is clear, we should not add to or alter it to accomplish a purpose which does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.’ [Citation.] Statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other. [Citation.]” (Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 994.)
We find nothing in the “plain language” of Probate Code section 6540, providing for a “family allowance,” which militates against the award made here. The apparent and evident purpose of Probate Code section 6540, subdivision (b)(1), is to “continue, during settlement of the estate, the support of the surviving spouse (or eligible child) that he or she was receiving or was entitled to receive during the decedent’s life.” (Estate of Wallace (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 196, 202.) The court in its discretion may set the amount “necessary for their maintenance according to their circumstances during administration of the estate.” (Prob. Code, § 6540, subd. (b), italics added.)
Here, petitioner’s circumstances, as she explained in her declaration, include her legal responsibility to care for her minor children, one of whom is severely disabled. During the decedent’s lifetime, the extraordinary expenses for the children were part and parcel of the support the decedent provided to petitioner. The family allowance awarded by the probate court simply continued the same level of support that petitioner had received while decedent was alive.
As noted, construction of legislative intent should be practical, rather than technical, and seek to achieve wisdom rather than absurdity. It would be absurd to construe the statute to grant a “family allowance” wholly inadequate to meet petitioner’s actual needs and obligations. To parse the amounts as between petitioner (the adult child) and the assertedly ineligible grandchildren, as objector insists, would effectively impoverish and ruin both petitioner and the grandchildren. We discern nothing in the intent of the legislation that requires such a harsh result.
The probate court properly allowed, as part of petitioner’s “family allowance,” amounts she requires to undertake to provide for the special needs of her children.
III. The Family Allowance Award Was Proper
Objector essentially raises a series of objections to the amounts claimed by petitioner as her average monthly expenses.
A. The Court Properly Considered the Accountant’s Declaration
At the threshold, objector contends the declaration of petitioner’s financial expert is hearsay upon hearsay, without providing objector an opportunity to cross-examine the expert as to petitioner’s expenses and income. Sabby Jonathan, Certified Public Accountant (CPA), averred that another CPA in the firm had prepared the income and expense declaration based upon financial records provided by petitioner. Jonathan reviewed the income and expense declaration for accuracy and compliance with proper accounting standards. Objector complains that the source financial records were not attached to substantiate the figures in the income and expense declaration, and that the affiant, Jonathan, did not actually prepare the income and expense declaration, so that Jonathan is effectively vouching for work done by someone else.
The objections are not well taken. An expert may base an opinion on matters, which would otherwise be inadmissible, if they are of a kind that may reasonably be relied upon by the expert in forming such opinion. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Accountants reasonably and necessarily rely on financial records of various types in analyzing income and expenses. In addition, a CPA may reasonably rely on the expert assistance of another CPA in preparing an income and expense declaration, consisting of averaging the amounts found in the financial records provided. Jonathan reviewed the entire matter for accuracy, and for conformance with accepted accounting standards.
The court proceeded properly, at a law and motion hearing, in taking evidence by declaration, without oral testimony or cross-examination. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a).)
B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Setting the Amount of the Allowance
The probate court “has a broad discretion in determining the reasonableness and necessity for a family allowance.” (Estate of Hafner (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1399.)
Objector repeats the criticisms he made below of the expenses claimed by petitioner, largely by comparing petitioner’s items with objector’s counsel’s personal circumstances. For example, counsel disputes petitioner’s claim (averred in the income and expense declaration under penalty of perjury) for $1,100 a month for utilities (gas and electric), complaining anecdotally that petitioner “lives in Long Beach California cooled by the coastal breezes. Not like the Desert in the summer months where one has to run his or her air-conditioner around the clock. The average electricity consumption for a resident of the Coachella Valley in summer is around $200.00 per month. How can [petitioner] burn $1,100.00 per month in a seaside community?” Similarly, counsel complains of a telephone expense of $280 a month, stating, “I don’t even pay that much for my office phones and I have plenty of volume[; petitioner] must be engaged in a business.” Or again, as to dry cleaning expense of $200 a month, counsel remonstrates, “I have to wear suits to work and to court and appointments and I spend about $50.00 a month on dry cleaning. It must be that [petitioner] is working someplace which requires her to wear a lot of suits to justify the amount she claims she spends.”
These “objections,” and many others like them, amount to nothing more than personal comments, or subjective dissatisfaction with petitioner’s lifestyle. It must be remembered, however, that the decedent was an extremely wealthy woman, who consistently shared that wealth with her daughter. Objector’s counsel’s personal circumstances do not detract from petitioner’s expense claims, which are commensurate with her status and conditions, not his.
The evidence as to petitioner’s needs and circumstances stood uncontradicted. The claimed amounts were reviewed and verified by CPA’s, and presented by sworn declarations. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the family allowance in the amount requested.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the family allowance is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to petitioner.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P. J., MILLER, J.