We agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting that branch of the NYCTA's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Estate's complaint. " ‘[A] train operator may be found negligent if he or she sees a person on the tracks from such a distance and under such other circumstances as to permit him [or her], in the exercise of reasonable care, to stop before striking the person’ " ( Neenan v. Quinton, 110 A.D.3d 967, 968, 974 N.Y.S.2d 73, quoting Soto v. New York City Tr. Auth., 6 N.Y.3d 487, 493, 813 N.Y.S.2d 701, 846 N.E.2d 1211 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeEstate of Umali v. Long Is. R. R., 182 A.D.3d 581, 581, 120 N.Y.S.3d 809 ). Here, the NYCTA submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that the train operator was not negligent in the happening of the accident and that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Estate's complaint (seeEstate of Umali v. Long Is. R. R., 182 A.D.3d at 581, 120 N.Y.S.3d 809 ; Neenan v. Quinton, 110 A.D.3d at 968–969, 974 N.Y.S.2d 73 ; Mirjah v. New York City Tr. Auth., 48 A.D.3d 764, 764–765, 853 N.Y.S.2d 148 ).
The defendants also submitted the affidavit of the defendants’ expert, in which he averred that the train operator could not have avoided the accident. The defendants’ submissions established, prima facie, that the defendants were not negligent in the happening of the accident and that they were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (seeEstate of Umali v. Long Is. Rail Rd., 182 A.D.3d 581, 581–582, 120 N.Y.S.3d 809 ; Sanders v. New York City Tr. Auth., 83 A.D.3d 811, 813, 922 N.Y.S.2d 106 ). In opposition, the plaintiff submitted only the affirmation of counsel, which was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
" ‘[A] train operator may be found negligent if he or she sees a person on the tracks from such a distance and under such other circumstances as to permit him [or her], in the exercise of reasonable care, to stop before striking the person’ " ( Neenan v. Quinton , 110 A.D.3d 967, 968, 974 N.Y.S.2d 73, quoting Soto v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 6 N.Y.3d 487, 493, 813 N.Y.S.2d 701, 846 N.E.2d 1211 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the LIRR established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it by submitting evidence that the train's engineer was operating the train at a lawful speed at the time of the accident, that he sounded the horn repeatedly, and that he immediately applied the emergency brakes upon seeing the decedent's vehicle, but at that point, it was impossible to avoid the accident (seeEstate of Umali v. Long Is. R.R. , 182 A.D.3d 581, 120 N.Y.S.3d 809 ; Neenan v. Quinton , 110 A.D.3d at 968, 974 N.Y.S.2d 73 ; Mirjah v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 48 A.D.3d 764, 764–765, 853 N.Y.S.2d 148 ).In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The defendants also submitted the affidavit of the defendants' expert, in which he averred that the train operator could not have avoided the accident. The defendants' submissions established, prima facie, that the defendants were not negligent in the happening of the accident and that they were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Estate of Umali v Long Is. Rail Rd., 182 A.D.3d 581, 581-582; Sanders v New York City Tr. Auth., 83 A.D.3d 811, 813). In opposition, the plaintiff submitted only the affirmation of counsel, which was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.