Opinion
E067387
05-04-2018
Estate of EDWARD TAGGART, Deceased. TAMARA SHOOK, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. TIMOTHY L. TAGGART, Objector and Appellant.
Timothy L. Taggart, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant. Hoorspool & Horspool, and Karin E. Horspool for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. PROPS1500141) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Stanford E. Reichert, Judge. Affirmed. Timothy L. Taggart, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant. Hoorspool & Horspool, and Karin E. Horspool for Petitioner and Respondent.
At the hearing on the first and final report of administrator of the estate of Edward Taggart (decedent), objector and appellant Timothy L. Taggart (Timothy) interposed multiple objections to the accounting and requested an evidentiary hearing. The probate court denied the request, overruled his objections, approved the first and final account, and granted the fee requests and distributions as prayed. Timothy appeals, contending: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing; (2) a reference to his disciplinary record with the State Bar during the proceedings prejudiced the court such that the matter should be assigned to a different judge; and (3) multiple fixed filing fee charges are unconstitutional. We affirm.
To avoid confusion, the parties are referred to by their first names.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Decedent died on January 11, 2015, in San Bernardino County. He left no will. His heirs were two stepchildren, a brother (Timothy) and a sister, petitioner and respondent Tamara Shook (Tamara). On April 21, 2015, letters of administration were issued, and Tamara was appointed administrator of decedent's estate, with full authority under the Independent Administration of Estates Act. (Prob. Code, § 10400 et seq.) The principal assets of the estate were two properties. During the administration of decedent's estate, Tamara spent numerous hours cleaning out the properties, readying them for sale. She hired family members to assist in this process. She used her personal funds to pay estate bills, and then sought reimbursement after the properties sold. One property sold on January 8, 2016, and the other sold on May 11, 2016.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Probate Code.
On September 29, 2016, Tamara filed the first and final account and report of administrator and petitioned for settlement, allowance of administrator fees, attorney fees, and accounting. A hearing was set for November 17, 2016.
On October 21, 2016, Timothy filed objections to the accounting, challenging, inter alia, the failure to provide a copy of decedent's marriage certificate; the amounts of attorney fees, administrator fees, and statutory fees; the payment of bond fees and a vehicle registration fee; the payments to family members to assist in cleaning the properties; the failure to allow the properties to be sold at foreclosure; and publication of notices in the Daily Journal. Timothy alleged that, based on his 40 years of practicing law, he would not have used the Daily Journal for legal publication.
On November 14, 2016, Tamara responded to Timothy's objections, providing explanations for each fee or charge and why specific actions were taken. In response to Timothy's assertion that his legal experience would have prompted him to administer the estate differently, Tamara referenced his "disciplinary record with the State Bar of California, and being disciplined with actual suspension . . . ." She opined that "the way [he] chooses to practice law is not the best way to do so."
On November 17, 2016, the probate court proceeded to hold a hearing on the final account. Timothy requested "an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the rights that we have to conduct a factual determination relative to the objections and the responses thereto." He estimated that the hearing would take two days and that he would need 90 days to conduct discovery. The probate court denied his request, stating: "The Court doesn't see a factual dispute here. The Court sees a legal dispute only, and is prepared to rule on the evidence before it at this time." The court then overruled each of Timothy's objections and approved the final account.
II. DISCUSSION
Timothy appeals, contending: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying the request for an evidentiary hearing; (2) the reference to his disciplinary record with the State Bar prejudiced the court such that the matter should be assigned to a different judge; and (3) the multiple fixed filing fee charges are unconstitutional.
A. Necessity of an Evidentiary Hearing.
Timothy contends the probate court erred by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his objections. We find no error.
1. Further Background Information.
Beginning with Timothy's opinion that the properties should have gone through a lien sale or foreclosure, the probate court found no legal basis for the objection because it was "discretionary with the administrator." The court found that the sale "was done in a proper way," and there was no basis to assume that a foreclosure sale would have provided a greater monetary recovery. Also, the court rejected Timothy's objection to the payment of $20 per hour to individuals who cleaned the properties to make them ready to sell, agreeing that a professional cleaning company would have required more money. Decedent had committed suicide in the house, which "creates special problems with respect to a cleanup. Especially if there is any blood or any bodily fluids in the house. It becomes a huge problem, and actually Hazmat teams have been called in, in the Court's experience . . . . And the Court can take judicial notice that it can cost thousands of dollars, not the dollars here." The court added that the fact that the work was done on Mother's Day failed to provide a "legal basis for an objection."
Regarding the lack of a marriage certificate, the probate court found "there is no dispute that the decedent was married." Although Timothy was unable to find information about decedent's marriage to Teri Claire Taggart, also known as Sarah Taggart, (Teri) via Ancestry.com, he admitted that decedent disclosed that he had gotten married, and Timothy agreed that the "title of the property controls the vesting and distribution . . . ." Tamara verified that the properties were held in title as husband and wife. At the hearing, Tamara also offered a copy of the death certificate for Teri showing the informant was decedent. The court found "no legal basis to proceed with [an] evidentiary hearing with respect to the marriage."
Concerning the various fees charged to the estate, the probate court found that the extraordinary fees associated with the special administration are supported by the fact that the properties were not immediately ready to sell because the decedent committed suicide in the house, causing a "gap between the death" of decedent and "getting the house prepared for sale." Regarding the legal fees, generally, judges "are deemed to be experts on the value of legal services," and may rely on their first-hand observations of legal proceedings and their own experience about reasonable and proper fees. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 276.) Here, the legal representation involved both straightforward issues arising from routine estate matters, along with a few special issues due to decedent's suicide. These matters were encompassed within the court's experience, the court could fairly determine the reasonableness and necessity of the services without the need for an evidentiary hearing.
Regarding the various expenses paid by the estate, including overdraft charges, insurance payment, the probate court found that those expenses were included because there was a period of time "between the death and the time the administrator was appointed to have access to the account." The court also found that Tamara received $1,339.41 for estate expenses she had to pay out of pocket, and Timothy's objection to advertising in the Daily Journal amounted to nothing more that "second guessing" Tamara's actions. The court noted that "the Daily Journal is a well-known paper of general circulation," and the amount paid was reasonable "to get the notice filed with respect to the bond" for both properties.
After explaining its reasons for finding there were no material issues of fact, the probate court offered Timothy an extra hour or two to prove otherwise. He declined because he did not believe "that [would] be sufficient time;" however, he reiterated his objection to the failure to produce a marriage certificate.
2. Applicable Legal Principles.
Section 1022 provides, in its entirety: "An affidavit or verified petition shall be received as evidence when offered in an uncontested proceeding under this code." With respect to contested matters, "[i]t has long been the rule that in probate matters 'affidavits may not be used in evidence unless permitted by statute. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Consequently, 'when challenged in a lower court, affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as evidence at a contested probate hearing. [Citations.]'" (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1308-1309.) However, a party's right to an evidentiary hearing for any contested issue is not absolute. "[W]here the parties do not object to the use of affidavits in evidence, and where both parties adopt that means of supporting their positions, the parties cannot question the propriety of the procedure on appeal." (Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088.) Moreover, as in all civil actions, a party is entitled to present evidence only if the evidence is "competent, relevant and material" to a disputed issue. (Estate of Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 808-809.) In ruling on these matters, a probate court has flexibility to manage its proceedings to further the estate's best interests and reduce unnecessary expenses. (Estate of Ferber (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 244, 253.) We review a court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (O'Neal v. Stanislaus County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1198-1199.)
3. Analysis.
In this case, Timothy's objections to the final accounting did not challenge the admissibility of Tamara's evidence. Rather, they raised issues of reasonableness of the amount charged or the actions taken. Finding no factual dispute in these issues, the probate court concluded that further evidence was unnecessary. The court had rational grounds to reach this conclusion. Tamara verified the accounting that detailed the nature of the services provided to the estate, the time spent, and the hourly fees. Timothy's challenge was not to the veracity of Tamara's accounting. Instead, he sought to challenge whether the claimed services and fees were necessary, reasonable and beneficial to the estate. As the probate court observed, the objections "were broad, confusing, rambling. . . . [T]hey were really not proper legal objections. They were just mostly criticisms and second-guessing the actions that the administrator took." The objections did not create a factual dispute warranting an evidentiary hearing. When provided the opportunity to make an offer of proof, Timothy was unable to establish the necessity for witness testimony. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Timothy's request for an evidentiary hearing.
B. Reference to Timothy's Disciplinary Record with the State Bar.
Timothy contends that the reference to his disciplinary record with the State Bar prejudiced the probate court's decision, warranting the matter be assigned to a different judge. We disagree.
In support of his objections, Timothy declared that he "was licensed by the California Bar in June 1976, and [has] engaged in numerous types of cases and law, including some probate cases." Relying on his "40 years" of experience, he opined that the "payment to the Daily Journal of $1500 for legal publication is outrageous and unconscionable." He added that his objections "are based upon [his] reasonable belief that they are inappropriate charges, potential double billing, and dubious claims of expenses." In response, Tamara argued that Timothy was "attempting to substitute his own judgment on how the Administrator should have probated the decedent's estate because of his experience as an attorney for 40 years. Based on [his] disciplinary record with the State Bar of California, and being disciplined with actual suspension in case numbers . . . the Administrator and her counsel believe that the way [he] chooses to practice law is not the best way to do so."
At the hearing, the subject of Timothy's disciplinary record came up when he objected to the probate court's statement that his legal arguments have no credibility. Viewing Timothy's comments as an insult, the court stated: "Maybe I should take you back to the state bar." Timothy took offense to the court's statement and requested the court disqualify itself on the grounds of prejudice. The court withdrew its comment and stated it was not prejudiced.
The following exchange occurred:
"[TIMOTHY]: . . . Credibility has nothing to do with the legal aspect of something. There is either lack of grounds or there is no merit. But the credibility of a legal argument, your Honor, is not any grounds that I have ever been aware of in any evidence code or any case that I'm aware of.
"THE COURT: Okay. You failed to meet your burden of persuasion. I'm unpersuaded. Your legal argument had no merit. It had no legal grounds. It had no legal basis. And your insult to the Court is not appreciated. Maybe I should take you back to the state bar.
"[TIMOTHY]: I take exception to your comment. Request you to disqualify yourself on the basis that you have already prejudiced yourself on the basis set.
"THE COURT: No. I'm not prejudice. I just don't find any merit to your legal argument.
"[TIMOTHY]: I don't have any objection to you making those types of comments. But when you make reference to state bar proceedings, I find that is improper and that's insulting.
"THE COURT: That's withdrawn. Thank you.
"COURT ATTENDANT: We're done.
"THE COURT: We're not done. I haven't ruled yet. I withdraw that. And it was mentioned in the paperwork. But it's withdrawn. Never mind, and the Court doesn't consider it.
"[TIMOTHY]: Thank you. I appreciate that.
"THE COURT: You're welcome. Okay. Let's work through these. . . ."
To the extent Timothy is claiming that the probate court's order was based on its prejudice against him, we reject his claim. The court acknowledged its comment was inappropriate, withdrew the comment, and stated that it was not prejudiced. We conclude there are no grounds for disqualification. Moreover, because we are not reversing the court's order, there is no reason to direct that the matter be assigned to a different judge.
C. Fixed Filing Fees in Probate Proceedings Are Not Unconstitutional.
Timothy contends that the multiple fixed filing fees in probate proceedings "constitute an unreasonable shifting of the cost of court operations to probate parties, and violate[] the equal protection clauses" of our state and federal constitutions. We disagree. "Fixed filing fees are entirely appropriate. But the imposition of [a fee] based on the appraised value of an estate . . . violates Proposition 6 and the California Constitution, article II, section 10, subdivision (c)." (Estate of Claeyssens (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 465, 473.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: MCKINSTER
J. CODRINGTON
J.