It is as strong a case of undue influence as this Court has ever listened to. . . ." [2] Appellant Theresa contends the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to admit a 1953 will into evidence by which it was intended to show that the decedent had the same intentions prior to the happening of the acts alleged to constitute undue influence, citing Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308 [ 260 P. 543], and Estate of Hart, 107 Cal.App.2d 60 [ 236 P.2d 884]. Former wills are admissible to show a continuity of purpose and are entitled to be received in evidence to show that a subsequent will followed the settled intent of the testator.

This instruction was a correct statement of the law. ( Estate of Bacigalupi, 202 Cal. 450, 454 [ 261 P. 470]; Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308, 310 [ 260 P. 543]; Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699, 707, 708 [ 235 P. 45].) There is likewise no merit in appellant's contention that the foregoing instructions single out certain facts and tend to emphasize them.

[Citing a case.]" (To the same effect see Estate of McGivern, 74 Cal.App.2d 150, 157 [ 168 P.2d 232]; Estate of Trefren, 86 Cal.App.2d 139, 146 [ 194 P.2d 574]; Estate of Dopkins, 34 Cal.2d 568, 575 [ 212 P.2d 886]; Estate of Spaulding, 83 Cal.App.2d 15, 20 [ 187 P.2d 889]; Estate of Graves, 202 Cal. 258, 262 [ 259 P. 935]; Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308, 312 [ 260 P. 543].) Under the rules announced by these authorities, and many more that could be cited, it must be held that, as a matter of law, there is not sufficient evidence in the record on the issue of undue influence to sustain the challenged finding.

Furthermore, inasmuch as decedent's holographic will of February 10, 1941, herein offered for probate, differs in no way from her original holographic will executed May 17, 1939, excepting expressly to disinherit the respondent, the record herein is uncontradicted that it was decedent's free and uninfluenced intention long before the execution of the will herein offered for probate to leave her entire estate to appellant. Thus the document presently under attack constitutes a complete confirmation of the decedent's wishes as expressed some two years previously ( Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308, 310 [ 260 P. 543]), and establishes the existence of a definite pattern with respect to her testamentary intentions and desires ( Estate of O'Callaghan, 82 Cal.App.2d 108, 116 [ 185 P.2d 659]). It is indelibly written into our law that no person who is competent to make a will is called upon to "consult or satisfy the wishes or views of juries or courts" ( Estate of Nolan, 25 Cal.App.2d 738, 740 [ 78 P.2d 456]).

The court cited Estate of Bemmerly, 110 Cal.App. 550 [ 294 P. 33], to the effect that a testator is of sound and disposing mind and memory, if, at the time of making his will, he has sufficient mental capacity to be able to understand the nature of the act he is doing, and to understand and recall the nature and situation of his property, and remember and understand his relations to the persons who have claims upon his bounty and whose interests are affected by the will. In Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308 [ 260 P. 543], in affirming a judgment based upon a directed verdict for proponent, the court said that the wills of aged and infirm people, or people sick in mind as well as in body, must be upheld as in other cases if, notwithstanding their enfeeblement, testamentary capacity is shown. Citing Estate of Chevallier, 159 Cal. 161, 168 [ 113 P. 130]. [2] It is well established that opinions of witnesses regarding the mental soundness or testamentary capacity of a testator are of no greater value that the reasons given in support of the opinions.

Confirmation of this is found in the testimony of the witness to the will, Arthur G. Brown, conceded by respondents to be a disinterested and truthful witness, who testified that decedent stated, "that is right; I want Dave (appellant) to have everything, my guns and everything." It would, therefore, appear that the will of March 12, 1945, was a complete confirmation of the wishes of the testator as expressed three days previously ( Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308, 310 [ 260 P. 543]). Bearing on the question of the claimed unnaturalness of the will, it must be remembered that a will cannot be characterized as unnatural, even though those not remembered therein are natural objects of the testator's bounty, when the evidence shows that such persons were in no need of funds, aid or assistance (26 Cal.Jur. 699).

( Estate of Donovan, 114 Cal.App. 228 [ 299 P. 816]; Estate of Morcel, supra.) As stated, the will now under attack was identical in its disposition language with the former will, which was executed some three months before; consequently the subsequent will was a complete confirmation of the wishes of the testatrix as expressed in the first will, which of itself, under the authorities, may be taken as a circumstance tending to refute the charge of imposition or undue influence (26 Cal. Jur. 657) and to show a permanent and fixed state of mind on the part of the testatrix with respect to the disposition of her estate ( Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308 [ 260 P. 543].) [5] Contestants contend, however, that in any event the evidence is sufficient to establish a confidential relationship between Lucy Hartnett and the testatrix, which gave rise to a presumption of undue influence legally sufficient to create a conflict in the evidence and thus sustain the verdict.

"Mere proof of opportunity to influence the mind of a testatrix, even though shown to be coupled with an interest, or a motive to do so, does not sustain a finding of undue influence in the absence of testimony showing that there was pressure operating directly on the testamentary act." ( Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308 [ 260 P. 543].) It is evidently, as we have said, the theory of respondent that the supposed influence of Mrs. Prentice affected the decedent at the time the will was made.

On the contrary the will carries out the previously and oft expressed intention of deceased to dispose of her property in this fashion. In re Stump's Estate, 202 Cal. 308, 260 P. 543. The court held that earlier testamentary writings of testatrix were evidence of a permanent and fixed state of mind regarding a plan to dispose of her estate and repudiates the charge of imposition of undue influence.

The present instrument bestows all of it upon her. The evidence presented went directly to the point raised by the contestants. The theory upon which the evidence is received is accurately stated in In re Estate of Stump, 202 Cal. 308, 310, 260 P. 543, 544. "The trial court very properly admitted the contents of the former will of the testatrix as tending to show a permanent and fixed state of mind with regard to her plan for the disposition and administration of her estate." Again, "if they [prior wills] are consistent with provisions of the later will, they may tend to rebut the charge of undue influence.