Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County., No. BP058173, Aviva K. Bobb, Judge.
Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks & Lincenberg, Thomas R. Freeman, and John K. Rubiner; Goodson Wachtel and Petrulis and Kenneth G. Petrulis for Objector and Appellant.
Michael J. Collins; Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, Gold, Birnberg & Coleman, Marshal A. Oldman, and Susan J. Cooley for Petitioner and Respondent.
BIGELOW, P.J.
In 1999, appellant Dian L. Rodriguez became conservator of the estate of her father, Romeo Rodriguez. When petitioning for the conservatorship, Dian informed the court she was Romeo’s sole heir. Dian subsequently successfully petitioned for a substituted judgment to minimize future taxes otherwise applicable to Romeo’s estate upon his death. The petition for substituted judgment also represented that Dian was Romeo’s sole heir. Romeo died in December 1999. In 2000, Dian was discharged as conservator.
To avoid confusion, we will refer to Dian and Romeo Rodriguez, and Arthur Sluder, by their first names.
In 2007, Romeo’s biological son and Dian’s half-brother, respondent Arthur Sluder, filed a petition seeking to have the previous orders vacated due to fraud and misrepresentation. Arthur contended Dian intentionally failed to give him notice of the conservatorship proceedings. Following a bench trial, the court found Dian engaged in extrinsic fraud by concealing Arthur’s existence from the court and failing to provide him with notice. The court alternatively held that even if Dian did not have actual knowledge of Arthur’s existence at the beginning of the proceedings, she had constructive notice and deliberately failed to investigate statements Romeo made that he had other children.
We conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of extrinsic fraud and therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We recount the evidence in accordance with the usual standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence. (Fariba v. Dealer Services Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 156, 170-171 (Fariba); Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1489 (Piedra).)
Family History
In 1941, Romeo Rodriguez married Louise Leslie. The following year, they had a son, Arthur Vincent Rodriguez. In 1945, Louise filed for divorce. When the divorce became final in 1946, Louise remarried. Romeo gave his consent for Louise’s new husband, Robert Sluder, to adopt Arthur. Arthur Rodriguez became Arthur Sluder in 1947. Arthur did not learn that Robert Sluder was not his biological father until he was in his early 20’s. Arthur never contacted Romeo or met him.
In or around 1945, Romeo had a relationship with a married woman, Mary Serrano, who became pregnant. Her husband was serving in the army in Europe. When her son, John Serrano, was 21 years old, Mary’s husband, Ray Serrano, told John that he was not his natural father. Without revealing a name, Mary Serrano later told John that his biological father had paid for his wedding and provided other gifts in the past. John subsequently learned from extended family that his biological father was Romeo Rodriguez. However, after Romeo’s death, a DNA test revealed that Romeo was not in fact John Serrano’s father.
Romeo remarried in 1946. Dian Rodriguez was born to the second marriage in 1948. In 1949, the marriage ended in divorce. Romeo received full custody of Dian. Romeo married a third time in 1950, but divorced in 1952. When Dian was three years old, Romeo sent her to live with another unrelated family. When she was 16, Dian asked Romeo to let her live with him, and he agreed. She met her mother only once. Eventually, Dian became a lawyer and moved to Northern California.
Romeo’s Statements About his Son
Although Romeo had no further contact with Arthur after he relinquished his parental rights, he told numerous people he had a son. Romeo owned a commercial building and, in conversation with tenants, he sometimes mentioned having a son. Tenant James Norrington recalled that in the late 1990’s, Romeo told him two or three times that he had a son. Romeo also told his tenant Nicholene Costanti that he had a son, but as far she knew Romeo had no real connection with the son. Romeo’s tenants Raymond and Aileen Radi also remembered that Romeo told them he had a son. According to Raymond Radi, Romeo once showed him a photograph that hung on his office walls and indicated the photo was of his son. Another tenant also reported that he saw a photograph of a young man in Romeo’s office. James Heu was the manager in a store that rented space from Romeo. He recalled seeing a graduation or prom photograph depicting a young man who resembled Romeo, and, upon seeing Arthur Sluder in court, Heu thought the man in the photograph resembled Arthur. Although he was not certain, Heu thought that in one conversation Romeo “mention[ed] something about a son.” Heu remembered Romeo wishing his son was present.
Norrington recalled that Romeo said the son was named George, he lived back East or maybe Chicago, and the son worked as an accountant.
Romeo told Dolores Kelly, a former girlfriend, that he had a son named Arthur from his first marriage. Romeo also told Martha Leonardis—another girlfriend—that he had a son named Arthur, and he told Leonardis’s son-in-law that he had a son. Romeo likewise told at least two of his friends from the L.A. Athletic Club that he had a son.
Romeo’s Failing Health
In June 1998, Romeo asked Dian to move to Southern California to help take care of him. She closed her law practice and relocated from Northern California in January 1999. In August 1999, Romeo suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. He was alert and responsive at least some of the time following the stroke. Yet, Dian prevented some of Romeo’s friends and acquaintances from visiting him. Although Martha Leonardis, Romeo’s former girlfriend, wanted to visit Romeo, Dian warned her to stay away, threatening her with legal action if she did not. Dian also told Raymond Radi not to see Romeo, and asked hospital staff to prevent Radi from visiting. When Nicholene Costanti asked Dian if she could visit Romeo in the hospital, Dian replied by message that Romeo was too ill to be seen.
Dian later explained that Romeo told her before he had a stroke that he no longer wanted to see Leonardis. She said she barred Radi from seeing Romeo after a confrontation in which Radi asserted she should leave Romeo alone. After Romeo’s death, Dian filed suit against Radi for nonpayment of rent.
The Conservatorship Proceedings
Following Romeo’s stroke, Dian initiated conservatorship proceedings. In September 1999, she was appointed temporary conservator of Romeo’s person and estate. The court appointed Attorney Peter D. Pettler to represent Romeo. In his report to the court, Pettler recounted the following:
“In late August of this year, Conservatee had a stroke. His present diagnosis is non-reversible dementia.... When I saw him on September 22, 1999, he was under a 14 day detention at the psychiatric ward of San Pedro Peninsula Hospital. He was very hostile to me. He did say that he trusted his daughter with his affairs. He also stated that he had 2 sons. According to Petitioner, she is an only child. She states that her parents were divorced when she was very young and that, prior to moving out on her own, she was raised by her father.”
The probate notes prepared in advance of an October 1999 hearing on Dian’s petition for permanent conservatorship included the following comment: “RECOMMENDATION: QUERY: does proposed [conservatee] have 2 other children? [I]f yes, [hearing] should be continued to 11/3/99 for [notice]—if [continued], extend temporary letters & new citation to issue.” However, the transcript of the hearing did not include any discussion of whether Romeo had two other children in addition to Dian. The court apparently did not ask Pettler or Dian about Romeo’s “two sons” comment.
As explained in the California Practice Guide on Probate: “[M]any probate departments have staff attorneys who review all probate pleadings before their respective hearing dates. [Citation.] The staff attorneys then issue ‘calendar notes’ (or ‘probate notes’) indicating whether the pleadings are ‘in order’ (e.g., ‘recommended for approval’ or ‘RFA’) or ‘defective,’ with the reasons usually given. These notes are usually available to counsel several days prior to the hearing (although precise availability varies from county to county). As a result, defects may often be cured without causing delay in the proceedings.” (Ross, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 3:538, p. 3-124.5.)
Dian did not ask her father about his comment that he had two sons. She did not discuss the comment with anyone except possibly her attorney. In November 1999, Dian petitioned for substituted judgment to minimize the taxes that would otherwise affect Romeo’s estate upon his death. The estimated value of Romeo’s total estate was approximately $6 million. Dian indicated it would be in the best interests of Romeo and the estate for her, as the conservator, to make gifts to herself outright or in irrevocable trusts. She also indicated it would be in the best interests of Romeo and the estate for her to establish a revocable living trust to be funded with the assets of Romeo’s estate, “leaving the entirety of the Conservatee’s estate outright to Petitioner who is the sole heir at law of Conservatee. To Petitioner’s knowledge, the Conservatee has no current estate plan and his estate would pass by operation of law were he to die. Establishment of the trust will avoid the necessity of probating the decedent’s estate and facilitate transfer of the estate to Petitioner, who is the decedent’s sole heir.”
Pettler was again appointed to represent Romeo, however Romeo’s physician told Pettler that Romeo was no longer able to have meaningful conversations. Pettler noted that Dian stated she was Romeo’s only child and he concluded that were Romeo able to make the decision, he would want to pass his estate on to Dian with the least taxation and administration costs possible. In December 1999, the court granted Dian’s substituted judgment petition.
Romeo died two days later. His death certificate identified his parents as Arthur Vincent Rodriguez and Francesca Rodriguez. Dian was listed as the informant on the death certificate. By June 2000, all remaining property in Romeo’s estate had been transferred to a trust which the court ordered settled and approved, and removed from the continuing jurisdiction of the court. The court discharged Dian as the conservator.
Attorney Michael Collins Locates Arthur
While the conservatorship proceedings were pending, Martha Leonardis, Romeo’s former girlfriend, contacted Attorney Michael Collins about Romeo’s estate. Leonardis informed Collins that Romeo had a son named Arthur from his first marriage. Several of Romeo’s tenants and friends also met with Collins because they believed Romeo left a will. Some of the meeting attendees informed Collins that Romeo had a son. In January 2001, Collins took a few unsuccessful steps to locate the son. Between 2002 and 2005, Collins did nothing more. In late 2005, Collins found John Serrano, but he realized Serrano was not the son that others had mentioned. Collins then began a new search that led to Arthur Sluder.
Collins’s search began with divorce records. He found the records from Romeo’s first divorce and was then able to locate the marriage certificate, which provided him with Louise Rodriguez’s maiden name—Louise Leslie. With Louise’s maiden name, and operating on the assumption that in a stepparent adoption other children would be born to the union, Collins was able to perform various searches in an investigative database. He located Arthur Sluder in Texas. The searches took him less than one day.
Arthur’s Litigation and Trial
In April 2007, Arthur filed a petition to vacate the court’s December 1999 and June 2000 orders. He alleged Dian knew of his existence and intentionally failed to give him notice of the conservatorship proceedings. Arthur further contended the orders allowing Dian to acquire Romeo’s entire estate were the result of extrinsic fraud.
In the course of the litigation that ensued, certain facts about Romeo’s past were revealed, seemingly for the first time. Although Romeo’s father’s name was Arthur Vincent Gorham, Romeo changed his own surname to Rodriguez, his mother’s maiden name. Gorham’s death certificate indicated that he was “negro,” but Romeo had never acknowledged any African-American heritage. Even though Romeo and his first wife—Arthur’s mother—lived with Gorham for a time, Louise Sluder testified that she never knew he was African-American.
Although Romeo’s racial heritage was apparently a secret he kept even from his first wife, the litigation and trial revealed that some of Romeo’s past was decidedly less secret. As described above, several witnesses testified that Romeo told them he had a son. After Arthur’s litigation began, Dian learned from a friend of her father’s from the L.A. Athletic Club that he knew Romeo had a son, and Romeo had told two other friends from the club that he had a son. At least two of Romeo’s former girlfriends knew that Romeo had a son. Even Dian’s former secretary Donna Steward testified she knew Dian had a brother, although she could not recall the source of her knowledge. Steward never met Romeo, but expressed certainty that she knew he had a son when she worked for Dian.
Dian, on the other hand, claimed she had no knowledge of her father’s past. According to Dian, although Romeo was “warm and fuzzy” with her, he never discussed his family. When Dian asked about her mother, he willingly arranged a meeting with her for Dian, but there were no further discussions between father and daughter about her mother. Dian never asked Romeo about his parents and he never told her their names. She never asked whether Romeo had any other children. She never knew that her father had been married prior to his marriage to her mother. While several other people knew Romeo had a son, Dian testified that before Arthur began the litigation, no one ever mentioned to her that Romeo had another child. She never saw a photograph of any person at all on her father’s office wall, except a group photograph of Romeo and some of his professional colleagues. When Dian learned that Romeo told Pettler he had “two sons,” she never asked Romeo about the comment. She indicated that while he was at the psychiatric ward—where he made the “two sons” comment—he was medicated and sometimes hallucinating. She testified she never asked him about the comment even after he left the psychiatric ward because he was “not there” and she was unable to have substantive conversations with him.
At trial, Dian was impeached on a number of issues. She testified that she never handled any probate matters while practicing law when in fact she was the attorney of record for a probate matter that lasted several years. Although she claimed to have no knowledge of her grandparents, she was listed as the informant on Romeo’s death certificate, which included his parents’ names and birthplaces. Dian denied she was the informant but could offer no explanation for how her grandparents’ information came to be placed on the death certificate. According to Dian, at the conservatorship hearing, the trial court asked her if she had any siblings, whether Romeo was married, and whether there were grandchildren. She suggested these questions were in response to the “two sons” comment from Pettler’s report. However, no such colloquy appeared in the reporter’s transcript of the hearing. Dian had no explanation for this discrepancy.
The trial court did not find Dian credible. The court concluded Dian had actual knowledge of the existence of Romeo’s son, thus her representations to the court that she was Romeo’s sole child and heir constituted extrinsic fraud. The court further found that even if Dian did not have actual knowledge of Arthur’s existence prior to the “two sons” comment, after Pettler reported the comment Dian had a duty to make a diligent search and inquiry to determine the validity of the comment, which she failed to do. The court found that Dian’s failure to undertake such an investigation demonstrated she already knew of the existence of a son, but did not wish to discover more facts confirming his existence or to give notice to anyone beyond herself. The court further found Dian deliberately isolated Romeo from his former girlfriend and acquaintances as a means to limit any contacts that could result in the disclosure of additional information about other potential heirs. The court concluded a reasonable search would have confirmed Arthur’s existence and revealed his name and address; it concluded Dian’s failure to provide Arthur with notice of the substituted judgment proceeding violated her fiduciary duty and Probate Code section 2103, subdivision (b). Finally, the trial court determined the court’s October 6, 1999 orders were not res judicata on the issues of the existence of another heir or whether notice to Dian alone was sufficient, and laches did not bar Sluder’s claims. Judgment for Arthur was entered in November 2008.
This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding of Extrinsic Fraud
The trial court found Dian committed extrinsic fraud by falsely informing the court that she was Romeo’s sole heir and his only child, and by failing to give Arthur notice of the conservatorship proceedings. We conclude substantial evidence supported this finding.
A. Applicable Legal Principles
i. Extrinsic Fraud
“Where a judgment has been obtained through extrinsic fraud it may be set aside, though long since final, by independent suit in equity. [Citation.]” (Lazzarone v. Bank of America (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 581, 595 (Lazzarone).) “ ‘Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept that “tend[s] to encompass almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” ’ [Citations.] The clearest examples of extrinsic fraud are cases in which the aggrieved party is kept in ignorance of the proceeding or is in some other way induced not to appear. [Citations.] In both situations the party is ‘fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.’ [Citations.] [¶] The courts are particularly likely to grant relief from a judgment where there has been a violation of a special or fiduciary relationship.” (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614-615.) However, “[e]ven where a fiduciary relationship is absent, one who speaks is not only obligated to tell the truth but he is equally bound not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which materially qualify those stated. [Citation.]” (Harkins v. Fielder (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 528, 537 (Harkins).)
For example, “where a legatee knows of the existence of other heirs, and, for the purpose of defrauding such heirs and benefitting himself, fails to notify the court of the existence of such heirs, and knowingly files false petitions with the court representing there are no such heirs, he is guilty of extrinsic fraud warranting the imposition of a trust on the fraudulent distributee’s interest.” (Hewett v. Linstead (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 607, 613 (Hewett); Harkins, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d at p. 535 [extrinsic fraud found where decedent’s brother knew of other heirs but falsely represented to the court that he was the sole heir].) However, there is no extrinsic fraud if the person required to disclose heirs or provide notice does not know other heirs exist. (Hewett, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d at pp. 611, 615.) Similarly, if there are no reasonable grounds to suspect other heirs, there is no duty to try to discover the existence of potential heirs. (Id. at p. 617.)
Thus, in Estate of Carter (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1139 (Carter), the court upheld a lower court decision vacating an order for final distribution of the Carter estate due to extrinsic fraud. The decedent had two daughters born out of wedlock. When the decedent’s brother petitioned the probate court to administer the intestate estate, he concluded the daughters were not the decedent’s heirs, and he did not give them personal notice. (Id. at p. 1143.) When the daughters learned of the proceedings, they petitioned to have the order of final distribution set aside as a judgment procured by extrinsic fraud. (Id. at pp. 1143-1144.)
The reviewing court found substantial evidence supported a finding that the decedent’s brother possessed information which would lead a reasonable person to believe the daughters could successfully claim they were decedent’s heirs. (Carter, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.) Because the daughters were reasonably ascertainable heirs, the brother was required to give them notice. His failure to do so warranted the setting aside of the probate court’s administration order for extrinsic fraud. (Id. at pp. 1149-1150, 1154; Estate of McGuigan (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 639, 649 [niece’s failure to identify decedent’s son in petition to claim escheated estate was extrinsic fraud where she was aware of the son’s existence].) But in Hewett, the defendants did not know the plaintiffs existed, and had no reasonable ground to suspect they existed. The court found they did not commit extrinsic fraud by failing to discover the plaintiffs so that they could be disclosed to the court in the petition for probate. (Hewett, supra, 49 Cal.App.2d at pp. 615-617.)
“Fraud, like any other fact, may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. [Citations.]” (Harkins, supra,150 Cal.App.2d at p. 536.)
ii. Standard of Review
When reviewing a lower court finding of extrinsic fraud, “the standard of review is that a determination of extrinsic evidence is accepted on appeal if supported by substantial evidence [citations], in which case all reasonable inferences from substantial evidence are also drawn in favor of the judgment [citations].” (Carter, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154; Harkins, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d at p. 533.) We resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party and indulge “all reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment [citation]. The issue is not whether there is evidence in the record to support a different finding, but whether there is some evidence that, if believed, would support the findings of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Credibility is an issue of fact for the trier of fact to resolve [citation], and the testimony of a single witness, even a party, is sufficient to provide substantial evidence to support a factual finding [citation].” (Fariba, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 170-171.) “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review is applicable to appeals from both jury and nonjury trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Piedra, supra,123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.)
Inferences to uphold the judgment “may be based on circumstantial evidence: ‘[¶] The inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence are for the [trial court’s] determination and if conflicting inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence which inference is to be drawn lies in the [trial court’s] discretion. [Citations.] It is equally true that a reasonable inference drawn from circumstantial evidence may be believed as against direct evidence to the contrary.’ [Citation.]” (Louis & Diederich, Inc. v. Cambridge European Imports, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1574, 1584 (Louis & Diederich).)
B. The Evidence
There was overwhelming evidence that many people besides Dian knew Romeo had a son. Romeo mentioned his son to people from several different areas of his life ranging from acquaintances to intimates: girlfriends, his tenants, business associates, and friends from his athletic club. While the conversations were one-on-one, there was no indication that the conversations were confidential. Instead, Romeo made no attempt to keep his son’s existence a secret generally. It was reasonable for the trial court to infer that since Romeo casually told others about his son, it was highly probable he would also have told Dian, his daughter.
Dian relies upon Louis & Diederich, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d 1574 to support her argument that such an inference was not reasonable, however we find the case inapposite. Louis & Diederich concerned several parties involved in a dispute over an automobile. The plaintiff received a legal interest in the car when it was in the hands of a dealer. The dealer fraudulently sold the car to another party (Cochran), who sold it to yet a third party (Miller) through a broker (Perrins). The issue on appeal was whether Miller was a bona fide purchaser, and specifically, whether he had actual knowledge of a defect in title when he purchased the car. (Id. at pp. 1587-1588.) The only evidence presented was that Cochran had reason to suspect there may have been a problem with the title. However, there was no evidence he told Perrins, the broker, about the potential title defect. And even if he had told Perrins, there was no evidence Perrins told Miller, the third party. (Id. at pp. 1589-1590.)
Unlike the case at bar, Louis & Diederich involved unrelated parties in a single commercial transaction. Given a lack of evidence that anyone told Miller about possible defects in title, it was not reasonable to infer that Miller had the requisite actual knowledge. But this case involves a father and daughter and personal, family information. Here, Romeo’s comments about his son spanned several years and included numerous people, including some with whom Dian was acquainted. The entirely different context of this case distinguishes it from Louis & Diederich.
On appeal, Dian also argues that Romeo’s hidden African-American heritage demonstrates he would not have told her about Arthur because he was generally secretive and had reason to hide facts about his past. However, since Romeo told numerous people he had a son, the court could reasonably conclude Romeo kept some facets of his past a secret, but not others. Further, the trial court could reasonably reject Dian’s suggestion that Romeo kept Arthur a secret from her specifically to prevent her from also learning about her grandfather’s racial background. There was no evidence that Arthur knew about his biological grandfather’s racial heritage; in fact Arthur’s mother lived with Romeo and Arthur Vincent Gorham, yet she testified she did not know that Gorham was African-American. The trial court could reasonably reject the implication that the two facts about Romeo were so inextricably intertwined that Romeo had reason to keep one from Dian—the existence of her half-brother—to avoid revealing the other—his African-American heritage.
Other evidence additionally supported a finding that Dian knew of Arthur’s existence. For example, there was evidence that even Dian’s secretary in Northern California knew that Romeo had a son. Although Steward could not recall how she knew of Romeo’s son, she was completely certain she was aware of his existence when she worked for Dian. While the trial court indicated it would give Steward’s testimony only marginal weight, on appeal we must evaluate all evidence admitted and considered. We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 356-357 [witness’s uncertainty about recollection of events goes to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility]; Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622-623.) The trial court could reasonably infer that if Steward knew about Dian’s brother when she worked for her, Dian was the most likely source of that information, since Steward lived and worked in Northern California, she never met or spoke with Romeo, and she never met any friends or acquaintances of Romeo other than Dian.
Steward’s testimony was problematic for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, she could not explain how she knew Dian had a brother. Second, she admitted she left Dian’s employment on unfriendly terms.
Moreover, the impeachment of Dian significantly affected her credibility. Dian falsely indicated she had no familiarity with probate law, when in fact she was appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate in a matter filed in probate court. The record indicates she engaged in several activities on the matter, including selling property and filing petitions and notices in the probate court. Dian further testified there was a colloquy during the conservatorship hearing about Romeo’s “two sons” comment, when the transcript revealed no such discussion. She also claimed that she knew nothing about Romeo’s parents, when she was listed as the informant on Romeo’s death certificate, which provided names and birthplaces for his parents.
Dian asserts she was impeached only on collateral matters, and her impeachment did not support a finding that she knew Romeo had a son. In other words, Dian argues that even if she had probate experience, was the informant on the death certificate, and lied about the colloquy in court on the “two sons” comment, this is not affirmative evidence that she knew of Arthur’s existence. Yet, “if a witness is shown to have testified erroneously as to any particular relevant matter, an inference of untrustworthiness may be drawn as to the rest of his or her testimony.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation at Trial, § 340, p. 423.) As Dian was successfully impeached on several relevant matters, the trial court could reasonably infer that her other testimony was untrustworthy. The court did so and explicitly found that Dian was not credible on the key issues in the case. In addition, the court found Dian’s deception on matters such as the death certificate showed she had something to hide and was an attempt to support her incredible testimony that Romeo kept all family information from her.
We defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) While Dian’s impeached credibility did not by itself prove she had actual knowledge of Arthur’s existence, it cast a significant doubt on her testimony to the contrary. And, in addition to the trial court’s belief that Dian was not truthful about her complete ignorance of Romeo’s family, including Arthur, it reasonably drew inferences from other evidence offered in the case. This included Romeo’s disinclination to keep his son’s existence a secret, Steward’s testimony that she knew Romeo had a son, and Dian’s other questionable behavior suggesting she knew she was not Romeo’s sole heir.
As the trial court reasonably interpreted the facts before it, Dian’s actions after Romeo told Pettler he had two sons indicated she already knew that she was not Romeo’s only child. Although Dian testified that her father was sometimes lucid after he left the San Pedro psychiatric facility, she never asked him about the “two sons” comment. She also did not ask his friends about the comment, including his friends from the L.A. Athletic Club, with whom she was acquainted. Further, the trial court found that Dian’s efforts to prevent his former girlfriend and other friends from seeing Romeo at the end of his life suggested “that she wished to limit any contact with [Romeo] that might result in a further disclosure of the existence of other competing heirs.” These were reasonable inferences in light of the record as a whole.
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Dian knew she was not Romeo’s sole heir. As such, the trial court properly concluded Dian’s representation to the court that she was Romeo’s sole heir constituted extrinsic fraud. As a known heir, Arthur was entitled to notice of the conservatorship proceedings. (Prob. Code, §§ 1206, subd. (a)(1), 1821, subd. (b), 1822, subd. (b)(2), 2581, subds. (b), (d).) Under California Rules of Court, rule 7.52, although Dian did not know Arthur’s address, she was required to file a declaration describing diligent efforts to locate him. Dian’s failure to disclose Arthur’s existence to the court prevented him from having the opportunity to contest the substituted judgment proceedings, in which Dian represented that she was not only the sole logical object of Romeo’s bounty, but also that she would inherit the entire estate by intestacy in any event. (Harkins, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d at pp. 537-538.)
A declaration under rule 7.52 must include “a description of the attempts to learn of the person’s business and residence addresses by: (1) Inquiry of the relatives, friends, acquaintances, and employers of the person entitled to notice and of the person who is the subject of the proceeding; (2) Review of appropriate city telephone directories and directory assistance; and (3) Search of the real and personal property indexes in the recorder’s and assessor’s offices for the county where the person was last known or believed to reside.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.52.)
Given the trial court’s finding of extrinsic fraud, there is no issue of res judicata or collateral estoppel as it might otherwise apply to Dian’s failure to give Arthur notice in connection with the substituted judgment proceeding. Any rulings gained by fraud could not form the basis for res judicata or issue preclusion in a second proceeding. (Lazzarone, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 595.)
Finally, we find substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling that laches did not apply to bar Arthur’s claims. (Womack v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 854, 858-859.) To assert laches, Dian needed to establish that Arthur unreasonably delayed in bringing his petition to set aside the conservatorship proceedings and such delay prejudiced her. (Estate of Molino (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 913, 925 (Molino).) Arthur learned of Romeo’s death and the conservatorship proceedings in September 2006. In less than one year, he filed his petition to have the proceedings set aside. The trial court could properly conclude Arthur did not unreasonably delay in pursuing his claims of extrinsic fraud.
Dian argues that Arthur’s claims should be barred because he never initiated contact with Romeo while he was alive, and he was not around when Romeo was sick and dying. However, laches will not apply until the party to be barred is aware of his potential claim. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897, 909-910; Molino, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) The trial court properly focused its attention on whether Arthur acted with unreasonable delay once he learned of the conservatorship proceedings, not whether he acted unreasonably in failing to seek out a relationship with his biological father while he was alive and in good health.
Because we affirm the trial court’s judgment based on its findings of extrinsic fraud due to Dian’s actual knowledge of the existence of Romeo’s other heir, we need not address the court’s alternative basis for its judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: FLIER, J., LICHTMAN, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.