Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP085068, Ronald Sohigian, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of John Derrick and John Derrick for Petitioner and Appellant.
Law Offices of Steven Sandler and Steven Sandler; Hornstein Law Offices and Steven H. Hornstein for Claimant and Respondent.
WILLHITE, J.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Marilyn L. Parry appeals from a judgment granting the petition filed by claimant and respondent Rica P. Conner to determine the existence of a trust under Probate Code section 17200. Parry contends that the trial court erred by relying on parol evidence to establish the existence of a trust where Conner did not adequately demonstrate that the trust document was lost. She further contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the terms of the trust, and specifically the nature and quantity of each beneficiary’s interest. For reasons we shall explain, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Parties Interested in Ralph’s Estate
Ralph and Marilyn were married in October 1960. They separated in 1974, and Marilyn filed a petition for legal separation. However, they never legally dissolved their marriage, and remained married until Ralph’s death in December 2003. They had a son, Martin Parry, who was an adult at the time of the proceedings at issue here.
In 1984, Ralph began living with Conner, and they continued to live together until his death in 2003. Ralph was loving and affectionate toward Conner, and they acted like a married couple. Initially, they lived in a home in Lawndale that Ralph had purchased in 1978. He purchased the Lawndale property as a married man as his sole and separate property, and Marilyn signed a quitclaim deed releasing any interest she might have had in the property. In 1987, Ralph purchased a home in Hawthorne; Marilyn also signed a quitclaim deed as to the Hawthorne property. Ralph and Conner lived together in the Hawthorne home from November 1987 until the time of his death. Conner continued to live there at the time of trial.
At the time of Ralph’s death, Ralph and Marilyn owned rental property together in Baldwin Park. They held the property in joint tenancy.
The Evidence Regarding Ralph’s Estate Planning
Martin Kapp was Ralph’s CPA, and prepared Ralph’s tax returns beginning in about 1981 and continuing until Ralph’s death. Kapp also prepared Conner’s tax returns. Sometime during the late 1990s, Kapp was surprised to learn that Ralph was married to Marilyn. Kapp warned Ralph that if he died, Marilyn would likely inherit Ralph’s property. Ralph was very upset to hear that, and said it was Conner with whom he was close, having lived with her for 20 years. Estate planning was not within Kapp’s realm of knowledge, but he advised Ralph to consult with an attorney about these issues. During subsequent conversations with Kapp, Ralph made clear that he wanted the Hawthorne home he shared with Conner to go to her upon his death. Later, Ralph confirmed that he had signed papers ensuring that his estate would go to Conner if something happened to him.
Kapp also knew Martin, Ralph’s son, having purchased computers from him. It was clear to Kapp that Ralph and Martin did not have a very close relationship.
Marcey Mahler, a licensed insurance agent, conducted estate planning seminars for Boeing, Ralph’s employer, along with Martin Arnoldini and Jerry Boschma, attorneys from Century Law Offices. After attending one of Mahler’s seminars, in October 1999 Ralph met with Mahler regarding preparation of a living trust. Mahler assisted Ralph in filling out an “estate analysis form,” on which he listed his intended trust beneficiaries and trustees and set forth information regarding his assets. Mahler’s practice was to give the completed estate analysis form to one of the attorneys at Century, either Arnoldini or Boschma, and one of them would follow up with an in-depth phone call to the client to review the form to ensure its accuracy and that the client understood it. Thereafter, the attorney would draft the trust documents and return them to Mahler to get them signed and notarized by the client.
The estate analysis form, admitted into evidence as exhibit 1, actually consisted of two copies of the estate analysis form, the second of which had further handwritten notations in addition to the information written on the form by Ralph and Mahler during their meeting on October 13, 1999. Mahler stated that the additional writings were the attorney’s notes that would have been written on the form based on the follow-up telephone meeting between the attorney and Ralph.
Mahler stated that a trust was prepared for Ralph by one of the attorneys at Century; she did not know which one. She delivered trust documents to him (as well as to some of his co-employees) at Boeing on December 14, 1999. A notary, Patricia Brents, was present and notarized Ralph’s documents. Mahler’s business associate, Yvonne Sanusi, was also there. Their contact person at Boeing, Gary Scapellati, the Southern California Professional Engineers Association vice-president, was also present, and witnessed the signing of the documents. Conner was not present when the documents were signed. However, the check made payable to Mahler for $700 for preparation of the trust was drawn on Conner’s bank account.
Brents, the notary, testified based on her notary journal (admitted as exhibit 11), that she notarized the following documents for Ralph on December 14, 1999: a document entitled “synopsis of trust,” a “declaration of intent,” a “certification of trust,” durable powers of attorney for property management and health care, and deeds from decedent to his revocable living trust.
Mahler testified that she had noted on Ralph’s original estate analysis form that Ralph contacted her in June 2003 because he had not yet recorded the grant deeds with the county recorder, and he wanted to know what he should do. If he had wanted to make any amendments to the trust documents and had contacted her in order to do so, rather than the attorneys, she would have noted that on his original estate analysis form, as was her practice.
Under the first section of the estate analysis form, entitled “client information,” Mahler noted “separated from wife,” and “single grantor trust.” Under the second section, entitled “beneficiaries,” Martin Andrew Parry is listed as his child. In the space for Martin’s date of birth, it appears the number 50 is written next to the date “2-16-65.” To the right of Martin’s date of birth is printed “%,” followed by a blank line, in which “50%” is handwritten.
The contents of the estate analysis form described here are from the second version of the form, on which one of the attorneys had added notes.
Under a subsection called “prior marriage considerations,” Marilyn is listed, with “former wife” in parentheses next to her name, followed by her address and phone numbers. Handwritten at the bottom of this page is the note: “10-22-99 L/M Leave J/T property.” Mahler stated that the attorney who prepared the trust documents would have been the one to write that note.
On the next page, under “Client’s beneficiaries,” is written, “Rica Pulido Conner – friend,” with what appears to be the notation “50%” just above it. Conner’s sons are listed under a subsection that states “Trust Beneficiaries if your above listed beneficiaries predecease you.”
The third section of the form, entitled “trustees,” lists Conner as Ralph’s first choice as successor trustee, followed by his son, Martin, and then by Harold Robert Parry, Ralph’s brother. Conner is listed first as Ralph’s choice for attorney in fact for assets and health care, followed by Martin.
Under the fourth section, “trust types,” Ralph checked the option for married person, separate trust. Next to that, Mahler wrote “client separated 20 yrs not divorced.”
The next section, “financial statement,” lists Ralph’s three bank accounts. Under real estate, Ralph listed his residence in Hawthorne, a commercial property in Lawndale, and a rental property in Baldwin Park. Asterisks appear beside the Baldwin Park address, with the following notation: “joint tenancy with Marilyn Lee Parry (wife).” Ralph also listed three life insurance policies, with Conner listed as the primary beneficiary of each. Martin was listed as the contingent beneficiary of one policy. Ralph responded in the negative to the question whether he and his spouse considered all of the property to be community property. He indicated his desire to continue to hold the identified assets as separate property. Mahler wrote in the next section, “notes,” the following: “client sep[a]rated 20+ yrs – not divorced – see property item for title change & advi[s]e client.”
Conner testified that in December 1999, Ralph gave to her, as a gift, a big red box and said “here is a living trust and this is for your protection and security.” Asked, “What did the trust look like?” Conner replied, “It is a big -- it’s in a big red box and folder is red inside.” She did not know what the various documents inside the box were, and did not really know what the trust would do. She could not recall ever going through the box and examining any or all of the papers inside. The box was kept in various places around the house she shared with Ralph; only she and Ralph had access to the box. In March or April of 2004, after Ralph’s death in December 2003, she gave the entire box to Martin Arnoldini. She did so because “[h]is name was written there in the living trust and I said might as well just check with him or—I don’t know what to do with the living trust. I don’t know what it is. So, I said, well, let him take care of it.” She did not put any papers into the box or take any out before giving the entire box to Arnoldini.
She testified that after Ralph died, she “remember[ed] this living trust that he was—that he gave me. And I was looking around the house, couldn’t find it.” The court asked, “You mean you couldn’t find the red box?” Conner replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” She finally found it in the attic of their home in about February of 2004.
Conner stated that after Ralph’s death, she eventually received $372,000 under two of Ralph’s life insurance policies.
Conner testified that she and Ralph rarely saw Martin, particularly after Martin divorced his wife; she could not recall when the divorce occurred. Ralph once loaned Martin $20,000. Martin did not visit Ralph in the hospital during Ralph’s final illness.
On April 5, 2004, Arnoldini filed on Conner’s behalf a petition to determine the existence of a trust. Arnoldini no longer represented Conner at the time of trial.
An information was filed in United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, in April 2004, charging Arnoldini with conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C., § 371), based on allegations that he, along with Jerrold Boschma and others, promoted a fraudulent trust scheme devised to conceal their customers’ income from the IRS. The outcome of that matter is unclear, however, there is no indication that the alleged criminal activity with which Arnoldini was charged involved Ralph’s estate planning in any way.
Admitted as exhibit 6 was a grant deed by which Ralph granted to himself as trustee of the Ralph H. Parry living trust, dated December 14, 1999, the Lawndale property. The grant deed was notarized by Brents on December 14, 1999.
Admitted as exhibit 10 was a grant deed by which Ralph granted to himself as trustee of the Ralph H. Parry living trust, dated December 14, 1999, the Hawthorne property. The grant deed was notarized by Brents on December 14, 1999.
Conner testified that Ralph asked her to mail the two grant deeds, exhibits 6 and 10, to the county recorder in what might have been 2000 or 2001, and that she did so. The deed for the Lawndale property was returned by the registrar recorder because the date had not been filled in. Ralph asked her to date the deed, which she did with the date December 14, 1999 pursuant to his instructions, and she then mailed the deed back to the recorder. She testified that she mailed the deed back while Ralph was still alive. The parties agreed that the grant deed was recorded on January 6, 2004.
When Ralph died, the Baldwin Park property, which had been held in joint tenancy by Ralph and Marilyn, passed to Marilyn. She sold the property shortly after his death. Marilyn also received Ralph’s Social Security benefits and his pension from Boeing.
Ralph’s will was admitted into evidence as exhibit 21. Therein, he gifted all of his property to the trustee of the Ralph H. Parry Living Trust, “created under the declaration of trust executed on the same date as, but immediately before, the execution of this will.” The will was executed on December 14, 1999, and witnessed by Scapellati and Sanusi. Conner was nominated as executor of the will, and Martin and Ralph’s brother Harold were listed as successor executors.
A document entitled “Ralph H. Parry living trust/synopsis of trust” was admitted as exhibit 13. It was not signed by Ralph, and no witness was able to verify that its contents were identical to the living trust purportedly executed by Ralph. This document stated that upon the settlor’s death, the remaining trust estate was to be distributed in equal shares to Martin and Conner. Conner, Martin, and Harold Parry were designated, in that order of priority, as successor trustees.
Admitted into evidence as exhibit 14 was a document entitled “certification of trust of the Ralph H. Parry living trust,” which indicates the trust was created on December 14, 1999. The document was executed by Ralph on December 14, 1999, and notarized by Brents on that date. Admitted into evidence as exhibit 22 was a signed and notarized “declaration of intent” in which Ralph declared that as creator and trustee of the Ralph H. Parry living trust, dated December 14, 1999, and pursuant to the provisions of said trust, he was acquiring and would hold in his individual name the items listed on schedules A and B attached thereto, and that such assets would belong to said trust. However, only a schedule A was attached to exhibit 22. Schedule A indicated that the items listed thereon were transferred into the trust, and listed Ralph’s interest in the properties in Hawthorne, Baldwin Park, and Lawndale. Schedule A also listed Ralph’s interest in five bank accounts.
Testimony by Relatives of Ralph
Ralph’s half-sister, Kimberly Parry McBride, testified that Ralph told her in 2002 or 2003 that he had his estate planning affairs in order, and that Conner would be taken care of. Similarly, Ralph’s half-brother, John Edward Parry, stated that his understanding, based on conversations with Ralph, was that Ralph intended to leave everything to Conner, and that Marilyn would receive a small amount, as would Martin. Ralph told John that he had had no relationship with Marilyn for the past 30 years, and that Ralph only expected to see Martin if the latter wanted money. Neither Kimberly nor John had any knowledge of the specific terms of Ralph’s trust. Ralph’s step-mother, Gladys Parry, stated that Ralph had indicated to her that both Conner and Martin were taken care of in his estate plan.
The Statement of Decision and the Judgment
The trial court wrote a comprehensive and detailed statement of decision, which we summarize.
The court rejected Connor’s position that exhibit 13, the document entitled “Ralph H. Parry living trust/synopsis of trust,” could be used to prove the trust and its terms. Connor’s attorney argued that the exhibit was a copy taken from the computer of the attorney who drafted it for Ralph, that the drafting attorney retrieved it from his computer after Conner discovered that she could not find the allegedly executed and notarized original, and that it was an exact copy of the document Ralph signed on December 14, 1999, and that Brents notarized for him.
The court concluded, however, that no evidence had been presented showing what exhibit 13 was, who drafted it, how it came to be produced, or whether it corresponded with what Ralph had signed. Relying on exhibit 11, Brents’s notary book, the court found that Ralph did sign a document called “synopsis of trust,” but the record did not show that exhibit 13 was that document, or a copy of it.
However, the court found other evidence sufficient to decide in Conner’s favor under the standards set out in Probate Code sections 15200 through 15206. The court credited Conner’s testimony that Ralph had given her a big red box, and told her it was a trust for her protection and security, and that she gave the entire box to Arnoldini without taking anything out or putting anything in. Moreover, the court found all of the documents (with the exception of exhibit 13) that Arnoldini or his office created for Ralph were authentic, signed by Ralph, and notarized by Brents.
The court found that the terms of the trust could be derived from exhibits 1 (estate analysis form), 6 (grant deed of Lawndale property), 10 (grant deed of Hawthorne property), 14 (“certification of trust” document), and 21 (will), and were as follows: Conner and Martin are equal beneficiaries; the trust corpus consisted of the Lawndale and Hawthorne properties, and “since there is a deficit of other provisions, the other provisions that may be needed are as provided by law, including designation of a successor trustee.” Although the court found Conner’s demeanor in testifying did not inspire confidence—her claimed recollection was poor and she made discrepant statements—the evidence from other sources showed that a decision in her favor was justified.
The court found that Ralph’s conduct satisfied the applicable legal rules regarding the creation of a trust: “He declared himself to be owning the corpus property as trustee, transferred the trust property to himself as trustee, reiterated in writing that he had set up a trust, named his son and Ms. Conner as beneficiaries, and funded the trust.” The court found that the contents of the estate analysis form accurately showed that Ralph’s intention was to set up an inter vivos trust with Conner and Martin as co-beneficiaries, and properly reflected what Ralph told Mahler he wanted and intended, what he confirmed to the attorneys drafting the estate plan documents he wanted and intended, what he in fact wanted and intended, and what he actually achieved. The court concluded that pages 1 and 2 of exhibit 1 showed that Ralph wanted the trust beneficiaries to be Conner and Martin “on a 50%/50% basis.” The court found that Arnoldini had drafted Ralph’s estate planning documents after Ralph met with Mahler in October 1999.
The court determined that the record showed that Ralph wanted to make some financial provision upon his death for Conner, Martin, and Marilyn, although he did not wish that Marilyn would benefit to the same extent as Conner and Martin.
The court addressed Marilyn’s reliance on the presumption applicable to wills that disappearance of a will in the possession of a fully competent testator is presumed to indicate destruction of the will, which is presumed to indicate revocation by the testator. The court assumed the presumption to be equally applicable to trusts, but noted that the presumption only affected the burden of producing evidence, and vanished when evidence which would support a finding of its nonexistence is placed into the record. The court found there was abundant evidence both to negative a finding of revocation and to negative a finding of deliberate destruction. The mere fact that an executed trust instrument could not be found did not give rise to an inference that Ralph destroyed it. No evidence was produced showing that Ralph intended to revoke it, change it, or destroy it, or even to express slight dissatisfaction with its terms.
DISCUSSION
I. Reliance on Parol Evidence to Establish the Existence and Terms of the Trust
Marilyn acknowledges that the mere fact the trust instrument was missing does not mean that the trust fails, and further concedes that voluntary trusts may be proved by parol evidence. She argues, however, that a high degree of proof is required in order to establish a trust by parol evidence, and that such proof is lacking here. We disagree.
Only if “suspicion hangs over the instrument, or … it is designedly withheld,” must the court undertake “a rigid inquiry . . . into the reasons for its nonproduction. . . . [W]here there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required is reasonable diligence to obtain the original--in fact, courts in such cases are extremely liberal.” (Kenniff v. Caulfield (1903) 140 Cal. 34, 41-42.) Thus, “[t]he general rule concerning proof of a lost instrument is, that reasonable search shall be made for it in the place where it was last known to have been, and, if such search does not discover it, then inquiry should be made of persons most likely to have its custody, or who have some reason to know of its whereabouts. [¶] The party must show that he has in good faith, and to a reasonable degree, made an effort to discover the instrument, and to that end has exhausted all sources of information and means of discovery which were open to him, and which in the nature of the case were possible. No fixed rule as to the necessary proof to establish loss, or what constitutes reasonable search, can be formulated. The terms ‘reasonable search’ and ‘in good faith,’ applied to proof of lost instruments, must be construed and defined under the facts in each particular case; there is no inflexible definition under which they can be applied to all cases. The sole object of such proof is, to raise a reasonable presumption, merely that the instrument is lost, and this is a preliminary inquiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.” (Kenniff v. Caulfield (1903) 140 Cal. 34, 41-42. See also Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1068-1069; Evid. Code, § 1523.)
In the instant case, Marilyn argues that Conner admitted she saw the trust instrument after Ralph’s death before she gave the red box to Arnoldini, and this admission cannot logically be reconciled with the court’s finding that she did not take it out of the box, that it was missing when she gave the box to Arnoldini, and that no one else had access to it. The record, however, does not support the assertion. Conner referred to “the big red box” as a whole as “the living trust.” At no time did she display any particularized knowledge regarding any of the individual documents contained within the red box. Her testimony did not amount to an admission that she had seen Arnoldini’s name on the specific document, the “Ralph H. Parry living trust/synopsis of trust,” that was alleged to be missing at the time of trial.
Next, Marilyn notes that the court opined that Conner “was a bad witness on her own behalf,” and cited as an example her prolonged hesitation in answering the court’s question whether she could explain the absence of the document, after which she said she had no explanation. Marilyn argues the document should not be treated as lost where the court said it was ruling in Conner’s favor based on evidence other than her testimony, but there was no other testimony regarding why or whether the document was lost. However, the court did not state that it was finding the document to be lost based strictly on evidence other than Conner’s testimony. The statement of reliance on other testimony related to the court’s finding with regard to the existence of a trust. Although the court found that Conner’s demeanor in testifying did not inspire confidence, because her claimed recollection was poor and she made discrepant statements, evidence from other sources showed that a decision in her favor “on the issue of the existence of a trust” was justified. The court did not, however, discredit everything Conner said. In finding the document to be lost, the court believed that she did not remove anything from the red box or put anything into it after Ralph’s death and before giving it to Arnoldini.
For example, the court credited Conner’s testimony authenticating certain signatures as being Ralph’s, over expert testimony offered by Marilyn that the signatures were not Ralph’s.
Moreover, the trial court’s statement that Conner hesitated in order to give herself time to analyze the question, before answering whether she had an explanation why the trust document was missing, cannot be interpreted as a finding by the court that “suspicion [hung] over the instrument, or that it [was] designedly withheld,” such that a more rigid inquiry should have been made into the reasons for its nonproduction. (Kenniff v. Caulfield, supra, 140 Cal. at p. 42.) The court credited Conner’s statement that she never took anything out of the box or put anything into it, before giving the box to Arnoldini. Implicitly, the trial court found sufficient the proof that, despite an exercise of reasonable diligence in locating the original, the document was lost.
Marilyn contends that without testimony from Arnoldini, who received the box, it cannot be concluded that the instrument is missing. To the extent that Marilyn is suggesting wrongdoing on Arnoldini’s part, we note that nothing in the record indicates that Arnoldini engaged in any nefarious conduct with respect to Ralph’s trust document, notwithstanding his apparently being criminally charged with regard to unrelated matters. In any event, as the trial court noted, one could easily infer from the absence of the trust document that Ralph had removed it to copy or read it, and then carelessly failed to replace it in the box.
“Questions whether the search was sufficient in scope and was conducted in good faith are addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion.” (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1069, citing Kenniff v. Caulfield, supra, 140 Cal. at pp. 41-42.) The record does not establish that the proof the document was lost was “manifestly insufficient.” Thus, we conclude that the court’s reliance on secondary evidence to establish the terms of the trust was proper.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish the Trust Terms
Marilyn next argues that, in the event we conclude that the trial court properly relied on parol evidence to establish the existence of and terms of the trust, the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the terms of the trust regarding the share to be given each beneficiary. “On appeal, Marilyn concedes that the record contains sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find that, in 1999, Ralph executed papers intended to create a trust whose beneficiaries were to be Conner and Martin and that the trust was properly funded. She also concedes that the intended trust corpus consisted of two properties, one of which was the home that Ralph occupied with Conner. [¶] However, Marilyn contends that the record at trial does not contain sufficient evidence from which the terms of the trust could be determined—in particular, the proportions that the two intended beneficiaries were to receive.”
Marilyn contends that in order for a valid trust to be found to exist, the nature and quantity of the beneficiaries’ interests must be shown with reasonable certainty. The statutory requirements regarding creation and validity of trusts are set forth in Probate Code sections 15200, et seq. Relevant here, section 15205 addresses the requirements with regard to designation of a beneficiary. It provides as follows: “(a) A trust, other than a charitable trust, is created only if there is a beneficiary. [¶] (b) The requirement of subdivision (a) is satisfied if the trust instrument provides for either of the following: [¶] (1) A beneficiary or class of beneficiaries that is ascertainable with reasonable certainty or that is sufficiently described so it can be determined that some person meets the description or is within the class. [¶] (2) A grant of a power to the trustee or some other person to select the beneficiaries based on a standard or in the discretion of the trustee or other person.”
On its face, Probate Code section 15205 does not require that the nature and quantity of the beneficiaries’ interest in the trust be defined, in order for the trust to be found valid. It requires only that the existence of a beneficiary be ascertainable with reasonable certainty.
Marilyn relies on cases decided when the predecessor statutes to section 15205, Civil Code Sections 2221 and 2222 (provisions repealed by Stats. 1986, ch. 820, § 7), were in effect, and which held that it must be reasonably certain not only who the beneficiaries are, but also what nature and quantity of interests they are to have. (See Reagh v. Kelley (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1089; Estate of Berges, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 109; Souza v. First Nat. Bank of Hanford (1918) 36 Cal.App. 384, 388-389.) Marilyn asserts that there was no relevant change in the statutory language when the Probate Code was modified and section 15205 was enacted, and that the cases upon which she relies remain valid such that the “nature and quantity of interest” requirement still exists. In support of this contention, Marilyn points to the Law Revision Commission Comments, which state in relevant part: “Subdivision (b) continued the requirement of former Civil Code Sections 2221 and 2222 that the beneficiary be indicated with ‘reasonable certainty,’ but also permitted trusts to describe a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries in a less strict fashion so long as it can be determined that someone satisfies the criteria in the trust instrument.” (Prob. Code, § 15205, 20 Cal.L.Rev.Comm.Reports 1001 (1990).) She argues that the comment indicates that the introduction of language about a “class of beneficiary” was the only relevant change in the statutory language, and is not applicable here.
Former Civil Code section 2221 provided: “Subject to the provisions of Section 852, a voluntary trust is created, as to the trustor and beneficiary, by any words or acts of the trustor, indicating with reasonable certainty: [¶] 1. An intention on the part of the trustor to create a trust, and, [¶] 2. The subject, purpose, and beneficiary of the trust.” (Estate of Berges (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 106, 109, fn. 2.)
We disagree. The comment states that the revised language “permit[s] trusts to describe a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries in a less strict fashion so long as it can be determined that someone satisfies the criteria in the trust instrument.” (Italics added.) This statement indicates that the Legislature intended that the requirements for describing beneficiaries in general (“a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries”) were to be less strict under section 15205 than under the statutes that preceded it.
In any event, even if Marilyn’s construction of the statute is correct, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that Conner and Martin were intended by Ralph to share equally in the trust proceeds. Thus, there is substantial evidence to prove the proportions that the two intended beneficiaries of Ralph’s trust were to receive.
According to Mahler, after she assisted a person in filling out an estate analysis form, the established practice was for one of the attorneys, either Arnoldini or Boschma, to contact that person to conduct an in-depth review of the form in preparation for drafting the trust documents in accordance with the client’s wishes. She testified that practice was employed with regard to preparation of Ralph’s trust documents. The handwritten notations which were added to the estate analysis form after Ralph and Mahler’s meeting on October 13, 1999 indicated that Martin and Conner were to be equal beneficiaries: “50%” was written next to each of their names. Mahler stated that the additional writings were the attorney’s notes that would have been written on the form based on the follow-up telephone meeting between the attorney and Ralph.
Mahler further testified that she received back from the attorneys the estate planning documents they had prepared for Ralph, which she delivered to him on December 14, 1999, and which Brents notarized. Although Ralph later contacted her when he realized he had failed to record the grant deeds, he did not contact her at any time to say that the trust documents were not prepared in accordance with his wishes.
We disagree with Marilyn’s assertion that the foregoing evidence amounted to nothing more than “speculation from which an inference is invited” as to who wrote “50%” next to Martin and Conner’s names. Rather, the trial court could reasonably infer that Ralph created a trust, under which it was Ralph’s intention that Martin and Conner were to share equally in the trust proceeds.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent, Rica P. Conner.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., SUZUKAWA, J.
Former section 2222 provided: “Subject to the provisions of section 852, a voluntary trust is created, as to the trustee, by any words or acts of his indicating, with reasonable certainty: [¶] 1. His acceptance of the trust, or his acknowledgment, made upon sufficient consideration, of its existence; and, [¶] 2. The subject, purpose, and beneficiary of the trust.” (See Del Costello v. State of California (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 887, 892-893, fn. 7.)