Opinion
A148922
08-21-2018
Estate of SAMMIE MORRIS, JR., Deceased. SHIRLEY ANNE MORRIS, Petitioner and Respondent, v. GERARD MORRIS, Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RP09458289) MEMORANDUM OPINION
We resolve this appeal by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
The probate dispute that forms the basis for this appeal began over a decade ago with the death of Sammie Leroy Morris, Sr. (Senior) on September 3, 2007. Senior was survived by three sons: Gerard Morris (Gerard), Sammie Leroy Morris, Jr. (Junior), and Maynard Morris. Approximately three weeks after Senior's death, Junior died on September 25, 2007. Junior's wife, Shirley Anne Morris (Shirley), was appointed personal representative of Junior's estate in July 2009 and subsequently filed a petition to determine title with respect to certain assets held by Senior immediately prior to his death in which she believed Junior's estate had an interest.
Many of the individuals involved in this proceeding bear the same surname. Thus, to avoid confusion—and meaning no disrespect—after a person is introduced, he or she may subsequently be referred to by first name or other defining characteristic.
After an August 2011 trial, and an extended post-trial period during which the matter was re-opened and additional evidence submitted, the trial court finally issued its notice of decision in December 2015, determining title with respect to the assets in question. Judgment was entered in June 2016, and Gerard filed a timely notice of appeal. While this matter was pending, however, Gerard died on March 1, 2017. After a number of continuances, Gerard's wife, Patricia Lee Morris (Patricia), filed an opening brief in propria persona. No reply brief was filed.
It is an understatement to say that Patricia's opening brief is seriously deficient in numerous respects. As Shirley correctly points out, the brief fails to state the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, or the judgment appealed from. It does not request any form of relief and fails to include a table of contents or a table of authorities. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(A) & (a)(2).) Rather, it is largely a narrative of extra-record factual claims involving her grief following her husband's death, her difficulties with maintaining appropriate counsel to represent her, and Shirley's "harassment" through her "merciless pursuit" of the instant action. Although Patricia also appears to make certain factual assertions based on the underlying record, her entire 14-page brief is devoid of any citation to that record in contravention of rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). It is not our task to search the record for evidence that supports a party's factual statements, and we may disregard statements not supported by proper citation. (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1310, fn. 3; Regents of University of California v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1 (Sheily).)
Moreover, while it is possible to read Patricia's brief as raising several legal challenges—most obviously to the trial court's decision regarding the termination of joint tenancies in certain Bank of America accounts—none of Patricia's ostensible legal arguments are supported by citation to authority, nor are they placed under discrete headings setting out the issues, as required by rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). When a party fails to cite proper legal authority to support his or her legal contentions, this court need not consider them. (In re Marriage of Duris & Urbany (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 510, 515; Sheily, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, fn. 1.)
In this regard, we note that Patricia repeatedly mentions what appears to be a different case between the parties which a trial court apparently dismissed as abandoned after Patricia failed to be substituted in as personal representative following her husband's death. Whatever the facts of that case, it has no relevance to these proceedings in which the trial court held a trial, considered additional evidence, found numerous facts, and rendered a detailed judgment, leading to the instant appeal.
Based on the opening brief, we must dismiss this appeal. The trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is the burden of the party challenging it on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125.) An appellant's failure to articulate intelligible legal arguments in the opening brief may be deemed an abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal. (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.) Likewise, a failure to present arguments with adequate and comprehensible references to the record on appeal and citation to legal authority can result in forfeiture of any contention that could have been raised on appeal. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 (Nwosu).)
Although we are sorry for Patricia's loss and sympathize with her situation, the fact remains that she had over seven months after Gerard's death to retain counsel and proceed properly with this appeal as either Gerard's personal representative or his successor-in-interest. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 377.11, 377.31 & 377.32.) Instead, Patricia has chosen to file the above-described diffuse narrative in propria persona. Pro per litigants, however, "are held to the same standards as attorneys." (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; see also Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 ["A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation"].) Patricia's status as a self-represented litigant does not exempt her from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve her obligation to present intelligible argument supported by the record and applicable legal authority. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246-1247.) Because any arguments raised in her opening brief are not properly or sufficiently developed to be cognizable, we decline to consider them and treat them as forfeited.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Each party shall bear their own costs.
/s/_________
REARDON, J. We concur: /s/_________
STREETER, ACTING P. J. /s/_________
SMITH, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------