Opinion
1:03-cv-1023 RLY-WTL.
January 13, 2005
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
While Kenneth Carpenter ("Carpenter") was waiting to be interviewed by a Bail Commissioner in the Bail Commissioner's tank of the Marion County Central Receiving Facility (known as "Central Receiving" or the "Lock-up"), he became involved in an altercation with a fellow inmate, went into a coma, and died six days later. Vicki Smith, representing the estate of Carpenter ("Plaintiff"), brought suit in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against the Marion County Sheriff (the "Sheriff") in his official capacity, alleging that the Sheriff violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sheriff has moved for summary judgment on this claim.
For the reasons set forth below, the Sheriff's motion is DENIED. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Sheriff in his official capacity showed deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates in the Lock-up by failing to take reasonable measures to abate that risk.
I. Evidentiary Objections
The Sheriff advances a number of objections to portions of Plaintiff's evidence on grounds that the evidence relates solely to the Jail and not the Lock-up. The Sheriff contends that any evidence relating solely to the Jail is irrelevant and immaterial, as the Jail and Lock-up are separate physical facilities. The specific factual statements at issue are listed below:
• Sheriff Anderson's admission that: "For over 30 years, the unsafe and inhumane conditions in the Marion County Jail have been the focus of federal litigation." [Plaintiff's Ex. 1, 2003 Annual Jail Report; Plaintiff's Resp. Br. at 6.]
This statement relates solely to the Jail, and, when read in its entirety, does not support Plaintiff's assertion that this is evidence of deliberate indifference. The Sheriff's full statement reads as follows:
For over 30 years, the unsafe and inhumane conditions in the Marion County Jail have been the focus of federal litigation. I am fully committed to bringing the jail up to constitutional standards and thereby terminating the litigation. I am pleased to say that my partners in public safety, throughout Marion County Government, have supported by efforts. From new and improved medical service, to better food service, to hiring additional correctional officers, to maintain[ing] the jail properly. I am proud of the men and women who worked so hard in 2003 to accomplish so much.See Plaintiff's Ex. 1, 2003 Annual Jail Report at 3.
• "The Sheriff's Chief Deputy, David Pankoke's admission that `Sheriff Anderson inherited a federal lawsuit about the deplorable conditions at the Marion County Jail . . ." [Plaintiff's Ex. 1, 2003 Annual Jail Report; Plaintiff's Resp. Br. at 7.]
In addition to relating only to the Jail, this statement also fails to support deliberate indifference when taken in its entirety. The remainder of Deputy Chief Pankoke's statement describes the actions the Sheriff is now taking to solve these problems. Significantly, Pankoke notes that the current Sheriff devotes 80% of his time to improving conditions in the Jail. See Plaintiff's Ex. 1, 2003 Annual Jail Report at 4.
• "Judge Barker's July 10, 2003 ruling in Marion County Jail Inmates v. Anderson, 270 F.Supp.2d 1034, finding the Sheriff in contempt for continued failure to comply with the court's prior orders concerning treatment of prisoners in a county jail — `that each prisoner in the Marion County Jail be provided a bed or bunk above the floor and that all prisoners be treated in a safe and humane manner.'" 270 F.Supp.2d at 1035. [Plaintiff's Resp. Br. at 7.]
• "The parties' stipulation in Marion County Jail Inmates that as of July 2, 2003, the day after Kenneth Carpenter was killed, Corrections Consultants Rod Miller, who has visited over 900 jails and prisons in North America over 31 years, noted that `the conditions . . . in Marion County are among the worst' he has ever seen." Id. at 1036. [Plaintiff's Resp. Br. at 7.]
• "The Executive Summary of the Marion County Jail Staffing Study Analysis (at 2) which found, as of July 29, 2003, that "[t]he team encountered serious problems and deficiencies at every turn . . . Crowding is severe and poses serious security, health and life safety problems for the inmates and staff." [Plaintiff's Ex. 10, Excerpt from Marion County Sheriff's Department, Jail Division Staffing Study, July 29, 2003; Plaintiff's Resp. Br. at 7.]
• "The `Local System Assessment for Marion County, Indiana, July 7-9 (Report at 13) conducted by the National Institute of Corrections (Technical Assistance Report, NIC-TA-03-C8005), which reported that the staffing levels at the Jail "can only be described as absurdly low.'" [Plaintiff's Ex. 18, National Institute of Corrections, Technical Assistance Report NIC TA 03-C8005, Local Assessment of Marion County, Indiana, July 7-9, 2003; Plaintiff's Resp. Br. at 8.]
Although these statements relate primarily to the Jail, the court is aware that the Jail and the Lock-up are administered by the Sheriff and staffed with Marion County Sheriff's deputies. Thus, the court will consider these statements as evidence which provides background and context to the manner in which the Sheriff treats issues of inmate safety as a general matter, most notably in the Lock-up.
• News articles from Nuvo Newsweekly relating to the conditions of the Jail and the Lock-up. [ See Plaintiff's Exs. 11-14.]
These articles address the conditions at the Jail and Lock-up. However, these articles are hearsay, and Plaintiff's attempts to use these articles to demonstrate constructive knowledge would still require the court to assume the truth of the matters asserted within the articles. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Exhibits 11-14 will not be considered by the court.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A genuine issue of fact "exists only when a reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion based on the record as a whole." Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999).
III. Factual Background
A. The Lock-up
At the time of Carpenter's arrest, the Lock-up was in existence and was the physical facility whereby those arrested in Marion County were "booked in" or processed. [Declaration of David Crisler, Sr. ("Crisler Dec.") ¶ 18, Defendant's Ex. A]. The inmate "book in" procedure involved several steps. First, personal information — such as questions involving medical and mental health conditions — was taken by the Marion County Justice Agency. [ Id. ¶ 22]. Second, the Indianapolis Police Department Identification Section then took fingerprints from the person and photographed them in order to confirm their identity. [ Id.]. Third, each person was interviewed by a Bail Commissioner who made the final determination as to the bond amount. [ Id.]. Finally, the arrested person was "processed." The processing included setting a date and time for the arrested person's first court appearance. [ Id.].
The Lock-up was not considered a "jail" and was therefore not subject to Indiana Jail Standards. [ Id. ¶ 19]. In July 2003, however, the Lock-up was subject to a population cap by federal court order. [ Id.]. For this reason, there were population caps on portions of the Lock-up that contained beds. Since well before July 2003, daily population counts have been conducted to determine the percentage of capacity for each of these portions of the Lock-up, and these records are maintained by the Sheriff's Department Jail Division. [ Id.].
On July 19, 2003, the federal court relieved the Sheriff of his duty to file with the court detailed documentation related to the Lock-up, such as lists of names and time spent in the facility, although the Sheriff is still required to provide population summaries and data reflecting overall capacities. [ Id.]. The cap on the Lock-up imposed by federal court order has not been exceeded since August 2002 and has never been exceeded since Sheriff Anderson took office. [ Id. ¶ 21].
B. The Bail Commissioner's Tank
In July 2003, while awaiting their respective interviews with a Bail Commissioner, the inmates were taken to the Bail Commissioner's tank ("Bail Commissioner's tank" or "tank"). [ Id. ¶ 23]. The tank itself was a large cell of approximately 540 square feet equipped with an interview area and small windows. [ Id. ¶ 23]. It had a video camera that allowed inmates to be monitored from a central location by Marion County Sheriff's Department ("MCSD") correctional officers known as "slate" officers. [ Id. ¶ 24].
There are no beds in the Bail Commissioner's tank. [ Id. ¶ 35]. Inmates are placed in the tank only when they are waiting to be interviewed by the Bail Commissioners. [ Id.]. Once that interview is complete, the inmates are removed to another location. [ Id.].
The Bail Commissioners are not employees of the MCSD, but are civilian employees of JUSTIS. [ Id. ¶ 29]. The Bail Commissioners receive no training on inmate supervision. [Declaration of Julia Lieberman ("Lieberman Dec.") ¶ 6, Plaintiff's Ex. 9; Declaration of Grant William Hawkins II ("Hawkins Dec.") ¶ 7, Plaintiff's Ex. 21]. The Bail Commissioners are instructed to call the slate officer or other correctional officer if there are any disruptions in the tank. [ Id.].
C. July 1, 2003 Incident
On July 1, 2003, Carpenter was arrested for battery, intimidation and public intoxication and brought to the Lock-up for initial processing. [Plaintiff's Complaint ¶ 6]. While awaiting an interview with the Bail Commissioner, Carpenter was placed in the Bail Commissioner's tank along with approximately 53 other inmates. [Declaration of Louis Milharcic ("Milharcic Dec." ¶ 8]. That night, the tank was full of inmates who, according to the declarations of two Bail Commissioners, were arrested on a variety of different charges, ranging from serious charges, like murder, to relatively minor charges. [Hawkins Dec. ¶ 9]. There were no correctional officers in or near the tank, [Hawkins Dec. ¶ 9; see also Lieberman Dec. ¶¶ 12, 15]. and the evidence suggests that the slate officer on duty was not monitoring the tank with great care.
Corrections Officer Mark Beatley ("Officer Beatley") testified that he thought he heard some yelling at approximately 19:50 hours, and that he looked into the tank but did not notice anything out of the ordinary. [Declaration of Mark Beatley ("Beatley Dec.") ¶ 4]. He then radioed the slate officer and told him to check the video monitor. [ Id. ¶ 5]. See also Declaration of Randy Eckleberry ("Eckleberry Aff.") ¶ 7 ("It wasn't until after the beating occurred when the correctional officers showed-up."), Plaintiff's Ex. 7; Declaration of Luther Radcliff ("Radcliff Dec.") ¶ 14 ("The correctional officers did not respond until after [the fight] was all over."), Plaintiff's Ex. 8.
For an unknown reason, fellow inmate Larry Thomas ("Thomas") became angry with Carpenter and struck him. According to the videotaped footage of the incident, and the time-stamps on the footage, Thomas' initial strike occurred at 20:14:06 hours. [Declaration of Linda White ("White Dec.") ¶ 6, Defendant's Ex. C]. By 20:14:27, twenty-one seconds later, correctional officers arrived at the Bail Commissioner's tank and Thomas ceased striking and kicking Carpenter. [ Id. ¶ 6; Videotape, Defendant's Ex. G]. One correctional officer immediately radioed for medical assistance while another placed Thomas in custody and called for medical assistance. [White Dec. ¶ 6]. Thomas was then taken to the "J" Section, which is an isolation cell for inmates who have been segregated from the general population. [Milharcic Dec. ¶ 6].
The videotape shows the time of 20:18:13 hours when the MCSD's medical personnel arrived at the tank. [White Dec. ¶ 7]. The Indianapolis Fire Department and Wishard Memorial Hospital were called at 20:16:28 hours, [White Dec. ¶ 7], and they arrived at approximately at approximately 20:38:56. [Videotape, Defendant's Ex. G].
Carpenter went into a coma and was placed on life support systems. [Plaintiff's Complaint ¶ 20]. On July 7, 2003, he was pronounced dead. [ Id.].
Thomas was charged with murder and aggravated battery. [ Id. ¶ 9]. The criminal charges against Thomas are still pending. [ Id.].
D. Sheriff Anderson's Policies
1. Inmate Safety
The Sheriff has devised policies which address inmate safety. The foremost of these is called "classification." "Classification" is the procedure whereby inmates are evaluated for their dangerousness or vulnerability and housed separately. [ Id. ¶ 8]. Under this policy, men are segregated from women, adults segregated from juveniles, and inmates accused of violent crimes or with a history of violence are segregated from those without. [ Id.]. Inmates with disciplinary problems or who are considered especially dangerous are placed in solitary confinement. [ Id.]. However, Grant Hawkins ("Hawkins"), who was employed as a Bail Commissioner during the Summer of 2003, testified that "[he] was not aware of any attempt to classify or segregate [the inmates] at [the processing] stage." [Hawkins Dec. ¶ 9].
Correctional officers of the MCSD also receive training related to preventing and dealing with inmate-on-inmate violence. [Crisler Dec. ¶ 10]. Correctional officers initially receive 120 total hours of training before assuming their permanent duties. [ Id.]. In addition, correctional officers are required to receive eight hours of in-service training annually. [ Id. ¶ 11].
Correctional officers are instructed to create incidence reports when an incident of inmate-on-inmate violence comes to their attention. [ Id. ¶ 16; Declaration of Lieutenant Pat Tompkins ¶ 4, Defendant's Ex. F]. In addition, the Internal Affairs Section of the MCSD investigates all such incidents that occur in the Lock-up. [ Id. ¶ 3].
Finally, correctional officers are instructed about the importance of performing clock rounds as a means of ensuring detainees' personal safety and welfare. [ Id. ¶ 15].
2. Inmate Overcrowding
Before this incident occurred, Sheriff Anderson had taken some steps to address inmate overcrowding. First, Sheriff Anderson had contacted the National Institute of Corrections ("NIC") for assistance in evaluating and suggesting methodology for procedural changes that could help the Sheriff's Department manage the inmate population. [Crisler Dec. ¶ 31]. The NIC's personnel met with all levels of individuals involved in the process of moving an arrested person through the courts, bail and bonding and then to housing at the Marion County Jail through their release. [ Id.].
Second, Sheriff Anderson contracted with Rod Miller, co-author of the National Institute of Correction's Staffing Analysis Workbook for Jails (First and Second editions) to have Miller analyze the staffing practices at the Jail and Central Receiving. [ Id.].
3. Findings of the 2003 Jail Division Staffing Study
The result of these efforts culminated in a document entitled The Marion County Sheriff's Department Jail Division Staffing Study ("2003 Jail Division Staffing Study"), which was released on July 29, 2003, which reported, in relevant part:
[T]he operation of the jail (policies, procedures, and practices) are seriously flawed. As the consultant reported to Sheriff Anderson earlier this month:
. . . the basic practice of conducting hourly inmate visual checks was abandoned many years ago. Staff do not enter most of the housing units unless they are accompanied by several officers; inmates are in de facto control of the housing units.
[2003 Jail Division Staffing Study, Plaintiff's Ex. 10 at 3]. Julia Lieberman, employed as a Bail Commissioner during the relevant time frame, testified that in the Summer of 2003, detainees were "not monitored by jail personnel very closely and the supervision was careless." [Lieberman Dec. ¶¶ 3, 12].
Finally, the evidence suggests that the Jail and Lock-up were understaffed. The "Local System Assessment for Marion County, Indiana, July 7-9, 2003" conducted by the NIC, reported that the staffing levels at the Jail "can only be described as absurdly low." [ See Technical Assistance Report NIC TA 03-C8005, Local System Assessment for Marion County, Indiana, July 7-9, 2003, Plaintiff's Ex. 18 at 13]. Moreover, in the Marion County Sheriff's Department Progress Report 2004, Sheriff Anderson states that when he took office in January 2003, "[s]evere problems related to the jail, staffing, professional standards and acceptance of personal responsibility had accumulated." [Marion County Sheriff's Department Progress Report, Plaintiff's Surreply Ex. 4, at 1].
E. Prior Lawsuits
Problems at the Marion County Lock-up have been the subject of litigation for decades. In Marion County Jail Inmates v. Cottey, IP 72-424-C-D/F, Judge Dillin found that in the Lock-up, "violence is endemic, fights in the cell blocks are commonplace, supervision within the cellblocks is minimal, fortuitous or non-existent, and injuries from the conflicts are an everyday occurrence." [ See Plaintiff's Ex. 3, Entry, at 9].
In Stovall v. McAttee, 35 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 1997), Judge Hamilton agreed with Magistrate Judge Godich's 1997 findings of sufficient facts to deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims alleging insufficient security measures to stem systemic violence in the Lock-up, which resulted in plaintiff receiving a fractured eye socket when attacked by another inmate in the Lock-up on July 3, 1994. See Stovall v. McAttee, 35 F.Supp.2d at 1127 ("[Magistrate] Judge Godich has explained in detail why the evidence, when viewed in the light reasonably most favorable to Stovall, could permit a jury to find an official policy of deliberate indifference to substantial threats of inmate-on-inmate violence in the Marion County lock-up . . . The evidence on the extent of the violence showed that reported incidents of violence occurred in the lock-up about daily over three years.").
In Jeffries v. Marion County Sheriff, IP 99-1942-C-H/C (March 1, 2002), Judge Hamilton found sufficient facts to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment case alleging insufficient security measures to stem systemic violence in the Lock-up, which resulted in plaintiff receiving a fractured jaw when attacked by another inmate in the Lock-up on June 26, 1999. [ See Jeffries v. Marion County Sheriff, Plaintiff's Ex. 2, Entry at 1] ("there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Sheriff Cottey in his official capacity showed deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates in the lock-up by failing to take reasonable measures to abate that risk."). Notably, in Jeffries, the Sheriff's former Lock-up Commander, Gene Tomey ("Commander Tomey"), testified that violence was a characteristic of the Lock-up. [Deposition of Gene Tomey ("Tomey Dep.") at 65, Plaintiff's Ex. 4].
III. Discussion
Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action for "the deprivation, under color of [state] law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff asserts that the Sheriff (as an entity) was deliberately indifferent to his safety needs during his incarceration in the Marion County Lock-up. Because Carpenter was a pre-trial detainee rather than a prisoner when the assault occurred, his claims are properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2002).
The distinction between a Section 1983 claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and one brought under the Eighth Amendment makes little difference, as both claims are analyzed under the deliberate indifference standard. Butera, 285 F.3d at 601 n. 2; see also Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88, 91 (7th Cir. 1991) ("A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment (which applies to persons who have been convicted) and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which applies to pre-trial detainees) when he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate . . .").
A plaintiff raising a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a jail facility must establish two elements. First, Plaintiff must show that Carpenter was incarcerated under conditions posing a "substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1996). Second, Plaintiff must establish that the Sheriff had knowledge of and disregarded the risk to his safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 ("[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety."). It should be noted, however, that jail officials, acting in their official capacity, are not required to ensure the safety of inmates. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 593; see also Stovall, 35 F.Supp.2d at 1127 ("The courts recognize that some level of inmate-on-inmate violence in jails and prisons is virtually inevitable."). The "`existence or possibility of other better policies which might have been used does not necessarily mean that the [jail officials were] being deliberately indifferent.'" Palmer, 327 F.3d at 593 (quoting Butera, 285 F.3d at 605). Thus, in order to prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Sheriff was deliberately indifferent to his safety.
Because this claim is brought under Section 1983, Plaintiff must show that the Sheriff has a custom or policy that contributed to the infliction of his injury. Palmer, 327 F.3d at 594 (citing Butera, 285 F.3d at 605 ("[I]f the Sheriff had notice of a substantial risk of serious harm to [plaintiff] . . . through the general conditions at the Jail, and he devised no policies or devised inadequate policies to attempt to prevent the assault, he would be `deliberately indifferent' and [plaintiff] would prevail."). There must be a causal link between the unconstitutional custom or policy alleged and the constitutional deprivation. Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200, 203 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[A] plaintiff may establish municipal liability for deprivations of a constitutionally protected interest if she can show the existence of a policy or custom and a sufficient causal link between the policy or custom and the constitutional deprivation.").
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that Carpenter gave the Sheriff or any of the Sheriff's personnel any warning that he was threatened by Thomas or was otherwise at a specific increased risk of harm. Indeed, there is no evidence that any of the Sheriff's personnel had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Carpenter either because of any actions he had taken prior to his incarceration, nor did any Sheriff's personnel have any information on Thomas that would indicate that he posed a substantial risk of harm to other inmates. Rather, Carpenter alleges he was incarcerated under conditions that posed a serious harm to him.
"A prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he `knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Jeffries, No. IP 99-1942-C-H/C (March 1, 2002), Entry at 18 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In other words, "it is enough if the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Moreover:
Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious . . . For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.Id. at 842-43 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the failure of the Sheriff to classify and segregate inmates according to the seriousness of their alleged offenses and the degree of risk of harm they represent to other detainees, the failure to properly supervise the inmates housed in the Bail Commissioner's tank, coupled with the Sheriff's general awareness of the dangerous conditions in the Jail and Lock-up gained from prior lawsuits, etc., creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Sheriff had knowledge that a substantial risk of serious harm could befall a detainee in the Lock-up such as Carpenter. For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees.
First, although there is an existing policy of "classification" in the Lock-up, Plaintiff has brought forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the policy was not practiced. As stated in Section III.D.1. of this opinion, Hawkins, an individual employed as Bail Commissioner during the relevant time period, testified that he was not aware of any attempt to enforce such a policy at the processing stage. Hawkins Dec. ¶ 9.
Second, Plaintiff submitted evidence that the detainees in the Bail Commissioner's tank were not properly supervised. Lieberman, a former Bail Commissioner, testified that the detainees were not closely monitored and the supervision of the detainees was "careless." Lieberman Dec. ¶ 12. She further testified that "[t]here was little if any measures taken to prevent violence in the tank, and the intervention which did take place was always reactive to a fight." Id. ¶ 15. This fact is supported by the evidence that no one was monitoring the Bail Commissioner's tank at the time Thomas struck Carpenter despite previous lawsuits addressing these types of concerns. See Section III.C., n. 1; Section III.E; see also Eckleberry Dec. ¶ 7; Radcliff Dec. ¶ 14. The 2003 Jail Staffing Study is further evidence of a lack of control of the premises. Jail Staffing Study at 3 ("the basic practice of conducting hourly inmate visual checks was abandoned many years ago."). Although this fact relates to the Jail, it is indicative of the way the Sheriff considers inmate safety in a general way.
Third, Plaintiff submitted Judge Dillin's opinion in Marion County Jail Inmates, supra., in which Judge Dillin found that in the Lock-up "violence is endemic" and that "fights in the cell blocks are commonplace, supervision within the cellblocks is minimal, fortuitous or non-existent, and injuries from the conflicts are an everyday occurrence." Marion County Jail Inmates, Entry at 9. Plaintiff also submitted the deposition testimony of Commissioner Tomey, the former Lock-up Commander, who testified that the Lock-up is a violent place to be, Tomey Dep. at 65, as well as the affidavits of other detainees in the Lock-up on the night of Carpenter's death who testified that based upon their experience, the Lock-up was a violent and dangerous place and that fights were a common occurrence. Declaration of William Lee ("Lee Dec.") ¶¶ 6-8, Plaintiff's Ex. 6; Eckleberry Dec. ¶ 4; Radcliff Dec. ¶ 15. Given this evidence, and the evidence of prior jail cases discussed in Section III.E., the court finds that Plaintiff has brought forward evidence which creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Sheriff knew that the conditions in the Bail Commissioner's tank were such that he was on notice that violence may occur in the tank.
The Sheriff contends that he responded "reasonably to the risk" and that therefore, he should be absolved of liability. See Farmer, 511 U.S. 844-45 ("[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was ultimately not averted."). Whether the Sheriff acted reasonably, however, is an issue best left for a jury to decide.
Finally, the court finds a causal connection between the Sheriff's alleged failure to adequately monitor the Bail Commissioner's tank — including his alleged failure to segregate the more violent offenders from the less violent offenders — and the injury at issue.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES the Marion County Sheriff's Motion for Summary Judgment.