Opinion
C085746
07-28-2021
Estate of CARMEN JEANETTE JONES, Deceased. JOYCE HARRIS, Petitioner and Respondent, v. RAYMOND P. HARRIS, Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08PR014
MURRAY, ACTING P. J.
This is appellant Raymond P. Harris's fourth appeal involving the real property at issue. As in our prior decisions, we conclude he has failed to demonstrate reversible error.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent Joyce Harris's request to take judicial notice of the briefs and decisions of the prior cases is granted. The facts of the prior appeals are taken from those decisions: In re Conservatorship of Jones (Cal.Ct.App., Sept. 7, 2011, No. C062865) 2011 WL 3911036; Estate of Jones (Cal.Ct.App., June 26, 2012, No. C064758) 2012 WL 2390560; and Estate of Jones (Cal.Ct.App., May 13, 2016, No. C077183) 2016 WL 2893031.
Raymond and his brother bought the real property in dispute in 1978. Two years later, Raymond acquired his brother's interest. In 1991, Raymond quitclaimed the property to his parents, purportedly because he was suffering a life-threatening illness. When his parents separated, the property was quitclaimed to Raymond's mother. And in 1998, the mother executed a trust, providing inter alia that on her death, the estate would go to Raymond. She transferred the real property to the trust in 1999.
At some point, Raymond became trustee, and in mid-2006, he deeded the property to himself. In 2007, respondent Joyce Harris and Raymond's brother became co-conservators of the mother's person and estate. When they learned Raymond had transferred the property to himself, they petitioned to remove Raymond as trustee, return the trust assets, and for an accounting. They also complained of fraud, conversion, and elder abuse. Raymond separately petitioned to convey the property to himself.
The trial court denied Raymond's petition, concluding the mother owned the property. It also removed Raymond as trustee and appointed Raymond's brother. The deed was quitclaimed back to the trust in 2008.
Raymond appealed (the first appeal; a consolidation of cases C062865 and C064672). Affirming, this court rejected Raymond's challenge to his removal as trustee, his claim to the trust property, his challenge to an order to pay attorney fees, and his challenge to the appointment of conservators for his mother.
In 2009, Raymond's mother died. His brother died several months later. Raymond thereafter petitioned to probate his mother's will, with himself as executor. The probate court dismissed the case, finding the only assets in the estate were trust assets. Raymond again appealed (the second appeal C064758). Affirming, we noted that Raymond appeared to be collaterally attacking the holdings of the prior appeal, including again challenging the appointment of Joyce and his brother as conservators.
In 2010, Joyce was appointed trustee. In 2014, she petitioned to correct the 2008 quitclaim deed, because the deed had been transferred to the trust, instead of the trustee. At the same time, Raymond petitioned to remove Joyce as trustee and appoint himself. The trial court granted the motion to correct the quitclaim and denied Raymond's motion.
Raymond again appealed (the third appeal, C077183). We concluded Raymond had failed to demonstrate error, and the trial court properly ordered him to correct the quitclaim deed, transferring the property to the trustee. As to his claim challenging Joyce's appointment as successor trustee, we noted that Raymond had not appealed from the denial of his petition to remove Joyce as Trustee. And in any event, there were no grounds to reverse the order appointing Joyce as trustee. We also noted that Raymond had again rehashed arguments from his prior appeal, including his challenge to his own removal as trustee.
Subsequent Proceedings
Since the third appeal, Joyce petitioned the trial court in 2017, for approval to sell the property. Raymond opposed the sale, arguing inter alia that Joyce intended to sell the home in order to distribute proceeds to herself and others, “before she is required to inventory and account for her Fraudulent actions as the trustee....” Raymond also petitioned for an accounting, injunctive relief, removal of the trustee, and appointment of himself as successor trustee. Joyce responded that two accountings had already been prepared, and trust assets could not be distributed until the property is sold.
The trial court approved the sale and denied Raymond's petition for an accounting, injunctive relief, and removal of the trustee. A week later, Raymond filed a notice of appeal, attaching the ruling on the petition to sell. The following month, Raymond filed another notice of appeal, again attaching the ruling.
Before filing those notices of appeal, Raymond filed a “petition for unjust enrichment; fraud and [constructive] fraud; conversion; declaratory relief; petition for accounting; preliminary injunctions; injunctive relief; removal of trustee and appointment of successor trustee....” (Capitalization and bold omitted.) In his points and authorities, he complained that Joyce had brought “fictitious motions” in order to “unlawfully sell it quickly to a third party, and distribute the proceeds from such a sale to unjustly enrich herself, her attorneys and other third parties....” He also demanded a “full accounting.”
At the hearing, the trial court noted Raymond had already appealed from the order approving the sale, which limited the relief the trial court could grant. The court noted it could potentially grant an accounting, but went on to say: “Sir, I have to be honest with you.... [W]hat you filed, it really is rather incoherent to me and it's hard for me to know what it is that you want this Court to order.” The court then denied the petition, while inviting Raymond to file another petition for accounting including “a description as to why... the accounting that was previously filed is insufficient.”
In 2018, Joyce filed a second petition for court approval to sell the property and to expunge the lis pendens. The petition explained that the previous sale had fallen out of escrow. Joyce also asked for authority, under Probate Code section 1310, to complete the sale notwithstanding a future appeal. Raymond opposed the petition, arguing, “Joyce Harris came by that possession by fraudulent and deceptive methods.”
Probate Code section 1310, subdivision (b) provides: “Notwithstanding that an appeal is taken from the judgment or order, for the purpose of preventing injury or loss to a person or property, the trial court may direct the exercise of the powers of the fiduciary, or may appoint a temporary guardian or conservator of the person or estate, or both, or a special administrator or temporary trustee, to exercise the powers, from time to time, as if no appeal were pending. All acts of the fiduciary pursuant to the directions of the court made under this subdivision are valid, irrespective of the result of the appeal. An appeal of the directions made by the court under this subdivision shall not stay these directions.”
Following a hearing, the court approved the sale and expunged the lis pendens on the property. It also allowed the sale to go forward notwithstanding a future appeal.
The following month, Raymond moved for reconsideration. In opposition, Joyce noted such motions require a demonstration of new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and Raymond had presented none. Raymond thereafter petitioned to stay proceedings and to “block trust account funds.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Raymond's motion for reconsideration, as well as his motion to “block the case, ” and for a stay.
Raymond then filed another notice of appeal, this time referencing his “motion for reconsideration, ” his “unjust enrichment” petition, and his objection to sale of trust property. He also referred to “procedural tricks against pro per victim.”
Raymond then filed an amended “motion to correct quitclaim deed.” (Capitalization and bold omitted.) He asked that the quitclaim deed of 2017 be corrected to list himself as grantee and trustee. Joyce opposed the motion, noting Raymond had been removed as trustee 10 years ago and he had appealed and lost. Joyce also argued those issues have no bearing on the present status of the case. Raymond then filed another amended motion to correct the quitclaim, again asking for the deed to be placed in his name. A month later, he filed yet another amended motion to “correct quitclaim, ” this time including a “petition to block trust account funds.” (Capitalization and bold omitted.)
Three months earlier, Raymond had filed a motion “to correct quitclaim deed pursuant to the Carmen Jones Trust of 1998 as it were amended 2001.” (Capitalization and bold omitted.) He argued that in 2017, a quitclaim deed prepared by Joyce inadvertently deeded the property to herself. He asked that the quitclaim be corrected to name himself as grantee, “as the Successor Trustee....”
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Raymond's motions. The court's written ruling explained that while Raymond's contentions appear in many documents filed at different times, the court interpreted what was before it as two motions: one to reconsider previous rulings and one to correct a quitclaim. As to the former, the court explained that Raymond did not appear to have stated anything new. It also noted that Raymond may not move the trial court to change rulings where an appeal from the ruling has already been filed. And as to the motion to correct a quitclaim, the court explained that Raymond may not simply repeat his prior objections under the guise of seeking to correct a deed.
The court also noted, “it appears to the court that continued filings by Mr. Harris are not new but are merely repetitive expressions of Mr. Harris' dissatisfaction with the fact that he is not the trustee or the grantee on the deed pertaining to trust real property.”
Raymond then filed another notice of appeal, attaching the ruling.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Raymond is again proceeding in pro per. Pro per litigants are required to follow the rules of appellate procedure; they are treated like any other party and receive no greater consideration. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
In Raymond's prior appeal, we explained that an appellant carries the burden to clearly state the issues on appeal and make coherent legal arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)-(C); see also People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2 [“To the extent [an appellant] perfunctorily asserts other claims, without development..., they are not properly made, and are rejected on that basis”].) If an appellant fails to furnish both a legal argument and citation to facts and authorities on a particular point in his brief, the court may pass it without consideration. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
We also admonished Raymond that we are not required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains evidence sustaining appellant's contentions. (Green v. Green (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 31, 35.) Nor are we obliged to act as counsel for him or furnish legal arguments on his behalf. (See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) “One cannot simply say the [lower] court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.” (Ibid.)
Finally, we explained that the law does not permit us to review decisions or orders that have previously been appealed. (See Woodman v. Ackerman (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 644, 648.) An appellant is not entitled to repeat arguments in what would essentially be two appeals from the same ruling. (See, e.g., Malatka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082; Anderson v. Sherman (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 228, 238-239 [appeals cannot “merely call[] upon the court to repeat or overrule a former ruling on the same facts”].)
In the present appeal, Raymond has failed to heed our past admonishments. As before, it is difficult to discern what contentions Raymond is raising on appeal. As best we can determine, he appears to raise the following contentions: (1) a challenge to Joyce's appointment as trustee and the transfer of the real property to her as trustee; (2) a challenge to the trial court's conclusion that it could not grant relief pertaining to rulings that Raymond had already appealed from and (3) a challenge pertaining to the handling of trust assets. Additionally, Joyce reads Raymond's brief to include (4) a challenge to the trial court's order approving the sale of the real property, so we will address that contention as well.
Raymond's brief also contains a litany of invectives primarily directed at the trial court, including: “breach of judicial duties, ” “conflict of interest, ” “punitive ‘conversion, '” “dirty dealing, ” “unclean hands, ” “judicial misconducts, ” “unlawful appointment, ” “deceptive camouflaging, ” “deceptive collusion of the ‘Court, '” and “punitive depravities.” (Capitalization and bold omitted.) As best we can determine these appear to be no more than strung-together buzzwords (something we noted in the prior appeal) and not separate contentions of legal error.
I. Challenges to the Trustee
At various points in his brief, Raymond challenges Joyce's appointment as trustee, calling it an “ ‘unlawful appointment'” and averring: “ ‘Joyce' could not have lawfully [stepped] in-to ‘Raymond's' shoes as descendant of this ‘Trust', after the death of [the mother], because it was against [the mother's] intended demands by way of [her] ‘Trust amendments of 2001 & 2005' and was not within the discretionary powers of the ‘Court', over this ‘trust'....” He also appears to raise a related challenge to the transfer of trust property to Joyce as trustee: “ ‘Raymond' is entitled to a true correction of this property's deed... back to this ‘trust estate... '” (emphasis removed.)
As was the case in the prior appeal, Raymond has not appealed from the order appointing Joyce as trustee - which occurred in 2010. And were that not an insurmountable obstacle, Raymond has again failed to articulate legal grounds establishing that Joyce's appointment was error. As to the challenge to the transfer of real property to Joyce as trustee, that same contention was raised in Raymond's prior appeal. Again, we may not review a decision that has already been appealed. (See Anderson v. Sherman, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 239 [“Defendants are not entitled to two appeals from the same ruling”].) For these reasons, the contention fails.
II. Jurisdiction to Consider Claims Raised on Appeal
Raymond appears to take issue with the trial court's determination that it could not consider a challenge to a ruling, where Raymond had already appealed that ruling. In various permutations, Raymond writes that he “was continually unfairly Kicked out of Court, by way of ‘the issues are under appeal' Trick....” (Bold omitted.)
Raymond however fails to offer any explanation as to how the trial court's conclusion was legally erroneous. (Niko v. Foreman, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [“One cannot simply say the [lower] court erred, and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why”].) We therefore conclude Raymond has failed to establish error.
III. Handling of Trust Assets
In several places in his brief, Raymond appears to raise a challenge to Joyce's handling of trust assets. At one point he asks that “ ‘[the] artificial Trustees' … be held to account for their actions to this ‘Trust Portfolio...' ” and wrote, “... ‘Public Agents' or ‘Joyce', never had the right to deal with this ‘Trust Properties' as their own....” (Bold omitted.) Elsewhere, he avers to “deceptively shifting the assets back and forth, ” unaccounted trust costs and expenses, and “undocumented excessive expenses not allowable under the law....” (Bold omitted.) At another point, he claims the trust “is missing at least: 296, 729.00 in Properties (not counting appreciations of value) plus 480, 166.00 in actual Rental Cash....”
These averments do not amount to a meritorious claim for several reasons. For one, there is no indication of how the claimed mishandling of trust assets amounts to reversable error. (See People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 482, fn. 2 [“To the extent [an appellant] perfunctorily asserts other claims, without development..., they are not properly made, and are rejected on that basis”].) Indeed, at one point, the trial court invited Raymond to move for an accounting, provided he explain why the previous accounting was insufficient. Raymond failed to do so. And on appeal, Raymond has offered no more of an explanation as to why the accountings provided were insufficient or how trust assets were mishandled. Raymond offers only vague claims of shifting assets and missing funds. And where he offers specific figures of amounts he claims are missing (the $296, 729 and $480, 166 figures), he cites in support his own motion to augment the record on appeal, his letter to the Trinity County Sheriff Office, and two other sections of his appellate brief. This is insufficient. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141 [appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record to assert the claimed error].)
Having failed to show a mishandling of trust assets or that the accounts provided were inadequate, this contention fails.
IV. Sale of Real Property
Joyce, in her appellate brief writes that Raymond has also challenged the order granting the sale of the real property. The argument section of Raymond's brief, however, does not appear to advance any arguments pertaining to that order - though other sections of Raymond's brief make passing reference to the petition for court approval to sell the property. Though we have no duty to respond to improperly headed “lurking” arguments (Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Department of General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581, 593, fn.10), we will address the contention since Joyce has responded to it.
Joyce's response however is principally that the conclusory nature of the argument and absence of supporting authority or cognizable legal reasoning render the claim forfeited. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].) As we are unable to identify any coherent challenge to the order granting the sale, we are inclined to agree with Joyce. The contention is forfeited.
Raymond did not file a reply brief.
*****
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Raymond Harris shall pay Joyce Harris's costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
We concur: HOCH, J., KRAUSE, J.