Opinion
D070239
06-21-2017
Estate of DOROTHY JEAN JENNINGS, Deceased. PETER ALLEN QUINT Petitioner and Respondent, v. MILES JENNINGS KING, Objector and Appellant.
Peter Allen Quint, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Respondent. Miles Jennings King, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. P190541) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Jeffrey S. Bostwick, Judge. Affirmed. Peter Allen Quint, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Respondent. Miles Jennings King, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.
Dorothy Jean Jennings (Mother) died in February 2006, leaving two adult sons Edward King (Edward) and Miles King (Miles). During the next eight years, Edward and Miles engaged in high-conflict probate litigation. Edward served as one of two executors until he resigned in 2010. In February 2014, the probate court issued an order approving the final estate accounting. Miles appealed, and this court affirmed the order in an unpublished opinion. (Estate of Jennings (Apr. 24, 2015, D065745) (Jennings II).)
In an earlier appeal, this court affirmed an order in Miles's favor relating to a safe harbor petition. (Estate of Jennings (Oct. 16, 2009, D053928) (Jennings I).)
Peter Allen Quint, the executors' former attorney, then petitioned for attorney fees, seeking $273,010 in extraordinary attorney fees and about $3,600 in advanced costs. Miles strenuously opposed the petition. After the court reviewed the parties' papers and held three hearings, it issued an order awarding Quint $109,697 in extraordinary fees plus $947 in costs. (See Prob. Code, § 10811, subd. (a).)
All statutory references are to the Probate Code, unless otherwise specified.
Representing himself, Miles challenges the court's extraordinary attorney fees award, contending the court erred in numerous ways. We determine the court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the order.
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Although the sole issue before us is the propriety of the attorney fees order, it is important to understand the history of the probate litigation to properly evaluate Miles's challenges to this order. We thus first summarize the relevant aspects of the prior probate proceedings. We next describe the grounds and reasoning for the court's attorney fees rulings, and then set forth the court's final conclusions contained in its order.
A more comprehensive description is contained in the Jennings II opinion.
A. Background
Mother's will (Will) named her son Edward and her longtime friend Brigitte Feucht as coexecutors (Coexecutors). Mother designated specific personal property gifts to various individuals, and stated the remaining personal property items were to be given to Edward and "NO ITEM OF PERSONAL PROPERTY . . . is to go to my son, MILES J. KING." The Will provided that Mother's interest in real property located in Texas (including property known as the "Conley Farm") would be distributed one-half to Edward, one-quarter to Miles, and the remaining to two named granddaughters.
Two months after Mother's death, in April 2006, the court issued letters testamentary to the Coexecutors, with a September 2007 expiration date. Soon after, the Coexecutors (represented by attorney Quint) submitted an inventory and appraisal, valuing the estate at $779,311.50. In July 2007, the Coexecutors added to the inventory certain shares of common stock for Conley Production, Inc. (CPI), a Texas corporation that oversees mining operations on Conley Farm. In August 2007, the Coexecutors (represented by Quint) submitted the "First and Final Account" (First Accounting).
Miles objected to the First Accounting, and in 2008, Miles served the Coexecutors with a document production request, seeking numerous categories of documents related to the CPI stock and Conley Farm, including information regarding mineral and oil/gas leases on the property. During the next two years, the parties litigated various aspects of this request and other matters.
In 2010, Miles filed a lengthy (79-page) motion seeking to remove the Coexecutors. In May 2010, Edward resigned as coexecutor. The next month, the court ordered Edward to produce all requested documents, but he did not comply. On September 20, 2010, the other coexecutor (Feucht) died. The parties did not take immediate actions to obtain a successor executor.
In March 2011, the court entered an order finding Edward was in willful violation of the court's discovery order, and imposed "terminating sanctions against Edward[ ] by striking" the First Accounting.
Two months later, in May 2011, Edward (represented by Quint) filed a report seeking the appointment of a successor executor, and attached a final accounting of all estate assets and executor actions from February 2006 until September 2010 (Final Accounting). Edward requested the court to ratify and approve the accounting and all prior executor acts. Shortly after, the court appointed an experienced professional successor administrator, Marilyn Kriebel (Administrator), and ordered that she conduct a forensic accounting of the prior estate transactions.
In April 2012, the Administrator filed her report concluding the estate transactions had been handled appropriately with two potential exceptions. First, the Administrator noted the court had not yet ruled on the issue whether the CPI stock was "personal property" within the meaning of the Will and therefore whether it was to be distributed solely to Edward or divided among the beneficiaries. Second, the Administrator reported that the Coexecutors had not paid estate income taxes, but stated the Administrator would handle this matter. The Administrator found no merit in Miles's additional challenges to the Coexecutors' actions. The Administrator said the complaints concerned "real property interests in Texas which are outside the jurisdiction of this court . . . ."
One week later, Miles filed a discovery motion seeking the production of numerous categories of documents pertaining to the Administrator's report.
The next month, in May 2012, the court (Judge Julia Kelety) held a hearing on the proper disposition of the Texas property and the CPI stock. Quint (as Edward's attorney), and Miles appeared at the hearing. After a hearing, the court ruled (1) it had no jurisdiction over the Texas property because it was the subject of an ancillary Texas proceeding; and (2) the CPI stock was "personal property" and therefore was to be distributed solely to Edward. Miles did not appeal from this order.
The next month, the court (Judge Jeffrey Bostwick) held a hearing on the estate accounting issues. Quint appeared on Edward's behalf and Miles appeared on his own behalf. An attorney also appeared for the successor Administrator. At the hearing, Miles said that although he continues to believe the case "has been a travesty," he no longer objected to the Final Accounting and was prepared to accept it. At the end of the hearing, the court approved the Final Accounting based on the parties' representations they had no objections.
However, within several weeks, Miles changed his position, and refused to approve the Final Accounting. Quint (on Edward's behalf) then requested the court approve the Final Accounting as an oral settlement agreement. In response, Miles objected and asserted many new issues, including that Edward and his attorney had unlawfully discriminated against him (a military veteran) by referring to him (in a brief filed with the court) as " 'delusional' " and an " 'admitted schizophrenic.' "
The court denied Edward's motion to enforce Miles's prior approval of the Final Accounting, and ordered the Administrator to fully investigate Miles's objections to the Final Accounting, and to report back to the court. Five months later, in December 2013, the Administrator filed a detailed report. As set forth in Jennings II, after an extensive factual investigation, the Administrator found Miles's objections were unsupported. The Administrator concluded: "Miles . . . has no valid complaints or objections to the accounting. He is fixated on issues that are not before this court or relevant to this probate proceeding. Edward . . . has done an adequate job of administering the estate under difficult circumstances. Administrator believes the accounting should be approved with the surcharge of $520.00 previously ordered by the Court [for the delinquent taxes]. Administrator further believes that the expense of this investigation should be allocated all toward Miles Kings' share of the estate since the investigation was done on his behalf in an effort to find misfeasance by the prior [A]dministrator. . . ."
In February 2014, the court issued an order approving the Final Accounting and rejecting Miles's objections. The court found the Coexecutors had properly performed their statutory duties, except for their failure to pay estate income taxes. The court imposed a $520 surcharge for this failure, but otherwise approved and ratified the Coexecutors' actions. Miles appealed from this February 2014 order, and we affirmed the order in April 2015. (Jennings II, supra, D065745.)
B. Current Proceedings
About seven months later, in November 2015, Quint petitioned for extraordinary fees and reimbursement of costs advanced. Regarding the extraordinary fees, Quint sought $271,635, which he said reflected attorney time responding to Miles's claims from about 2007 through 2015 at an hourly rate of $350. Quint requested that the court charge this amount against Miles's interest, claiming Miles's litigation actions were in bad faith. Quint also requested $1,375 for extraordinary services related to a property sale and other administrative actions.
Quint previously brought similar petitions, but because of various procedural issues (not directly relevant here) it was necessary for Quint to file a second amended petition in November 2015 that incorporated his prior declarations. This petition is the subject of the court's challenged order.
In support of these requests, Quint submitted his declarations attaching lengthy lists of his services and the time spent on each service. Quint said that all of his services were on behalf of the former Coexecutors, and that he did not "enter[ ] into a fee agreement with Edward . . . or with Conley Productions." Quint also sought approximately $3,600 for reimbursement of advanced costs.
Miles objected to these requests on numerous grounds. He argued Quint was not entitled to fees for work performed after the Coexecutors' testamentary letters expired in September 2007. He alternatively argued Quint was not entitled to be compensated for work after September 20, 2010 (the date of Coexecutor Feucht's death) because Quint did not represent an executor after that time. Miles also raised many of the same arguments he had unsuccessfully raised during the prior probate proceedings, including that Quint and Edward had committed perjury and had conspired to destroy Miles and his family. Miles claimed that Quint's motion reflected his continuing effort to harass him, his wife, and his four minor children. Miles sought numerous forms of relief, including that the court order Edward to personally pay all of Quint's legal fees; that Quint and Edward be sanctioned; and that Quint pay Miles's legal fees in the amount of $94,720.59 "as a sanction for civil harassment." (Bold font omitted.)
The court held an initial hearing on January 14, 2016. Quint and Miles appeared at the hearing (Miles appeared telephonically). At the outset, the court said it had "devoted a considerable amount of time to reviewing [the] pleadings and the lodgments [in the case]," but it had not finished reviewing the billing statements. The parties stipulated that the court could conduct the hearing and the court would complete its review of the records after the hearing. Both parties then explained (and expanded on) the arguments set forth in their written papers. The court took the matter under submission.
At the next hearing held two weeks later, the court noted it had spent "an inordinate amount of time" reviewing the pleadings and attorney fees records. The court said the main problem was that Quint's time records were not categorized by subject matter, and instead were line item costs for each of the services provided during an approximate eight-year period. The court said that to properly rule on the parties' contentions, it reorganized and recategorized the billing items, which took "many, many, many hours, both during regular business hours and after business hours, . . . [and] on weekend[s] . . . ."
Based on this review, the court determined that Quint was entitled to some, but not all, of his requested fees. To explain its findings, the court first identified each category of tasks for which Quint was seeking reimbursement: (1) work related to discovery (134.5 hours); (2) work related to substantive petitions or motions, which included about 14 different motions/petitions (451.1 hours); (3) work related to two appeals (Jennings I and Jennings II) and research on a potential writ petition relating to discovery orders (185.7 hours); and (4) work related to correspondence (5.1 hours).
The court recognized that these total hours were not precisely equivalent to the hours identified by Quint, but found the difference to be de minimis.
The court then explained the grounds for striking a portion of these hours.
First, the court stated it agreed generally with Miles that Quint was not entitled to be compensated for work performed after Feucht's death (September 20, 2010) because after that time Quint did not "represent any executor in this case." But the court determined it would grant fees for Quint's "post-death" work if the work fell within one of two exceptions. First, the court stated Quint was entitled to recover fees for work relating to the filing and defense of the Final Accounting, citing the statute permitting a court to order an attorney for a deceased personal representative to file an accounting. (See § 10953, subd. (c).) Second, the court stated it would grant fees for the work related to Quint's preparation and defense of his extraordinary fees petition. The court found the total "unauthorized post-death work" to be 94.5 hours (the work that did not fall within either exception), and stated it would reduce the compensable hours by this amount.
In the second category of reductions, the court struck Quint's claimed fees for his work related to the Coexecutors' prior discovery violations, which the court found encompassed 50.2 hours, and for the preparation of the First Accounting (which was struck as a sanction for the discovery violations), which the court found encompassed 35.4 hours.
In the third category of reductions, the court found Quint's billing was excessive in several different areas and reduced the fees as follows: (1) reduction of 23 hours for work on the earlier Jennings I appeal; (2) reduction of 35.1 hours for work on the opposition to Miles's 2010 petition to remove the Coexecutors; (3) reduction of 30 hours for the preparation of the original attorney fees request; (4) reduction of seven hours for the preparation of the supplemental fee statement; (5) reduction of 23.8 hours for work on Jennings II; and (6) reduction of 19.4 hours for work seeking to enforce Miles's initial agreement to the Final Accounting.
The court found the total of these reductions was 318.4 hours, and after subtracting this amount from the total amount of claimed hours (776.1 hours), the court concluded Quint was entitled to be compensated for 458 hours of work. The court then stated that it found Quint's claimed $350 hourly rate to be excessive under the circumstances of the case, and instead the reasonable fee was $275, which the court said was "more reflective of the nature of the work, the quality of the work that was done in this case."
Based on this analysis, the court concluded Quint was entitled to (1) $125,950 for extraordinary fees pertaining to litigation matters; (2) $1,375 for extraordinary fees pertaining to administrative-related matters; and (3) $2,034.77 for net allowable costs. The court also stated that $25,410 of the extraordinary fees would be charged to Miles's distributed estate share, reflecting Miles's unreasonable conduct in the litigation, citing section 11003.
After the court issued a tentative order reflecting these determinations, Miles filed numerous objections. The court then held a hearing, and found several of Miles's objections were meritorious and revised its prior order. Two of those findings are of relevance to this appeal.
First, the court deleted its prior finding that Miles would be charged for a portion of the extraordinary attorney fees. The court said that "on reflection and further research," the court's prior conclusion was not "legally sustainable" under section 11003. The court explained it found both Miles and Edward were at fault for acting unreasonably, and that Miles did not act with malicious intent or without probable cause. The court also noted there was "unreasonable conflict" between Quint and Miles, and that both brothers and "to some extent" Quint "caused the litigation to escalate and become more protracted." Based on these factual findings, the court declined to surcharge Miles's interest in the estate, and instead found all beneficiaries would share in the attorney fees.
Second, the court found the fees should be further reduced based on the court's finding that Quint should not recover for work (57.5 hours) on the Jennings I appeal (Edward did not prevail on that matter), and work (6.6 hours) related to the proposed discovery writ and Edward's resignation as executor.
C. Final Order
On April 4, 2016, the court signed the final order reflecting these conclusions. In the order, the court ruled: (1) Quint is entitled to $108,322 as compensation for extraordinary services in connection with Miles's litigation activities; (2) Quint is entitled to $1,375 for extraordinary services associated with the sale of estate real property and other nonlitigation activities; (3) Quint is entitled to the unpaid sum of $947 as a charge against the estate for reimbursement of unpaid costs advanced; (4) costs related to the Jennings I appeal ($801.07) shall be awarded and charged against Miles's share of the estate; (5) Miles's own request for extraordinary fees is denied without prejudice because it is not properly before the probate court (as no petition was filed); and (6) Miles is entitled to reimbursement for $435 reflecting his fee for filing his amended objections.
Miles appeals from this order.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
Generally, an executor's attorney is compensated for his or her "ordinary" services according to a statutory schedule based on the estate's value. (§ 10810, subd. (a); Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1446, fn. 1 (Gilkison).) This form of compensation is not at issue in this appeal.
In addition to "ordinary" compensation, a probate attorney may also be entitled to compensation for "extraordinary services." (§ 10811, subd. (a).) The executor (and/or the executor's attorney) has the burden to show the need for the extraordinary services and the extent and value of those services. (Estate of Fulcher (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 710, 718.) The court may award any amount of extraordinary fees that the court determines "is 'just and reasonable.' " (Estate of Trynin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873 (Trynin).)
An executor's attorney may be a party to an extraordinary fees petition. (Hutchinson v. Gertsch (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 605, 614.)
A probate court has broad discretion to consider all relevant factors and determine whether an award of extraordinary fees is appropriate in the particular case. (Gilkison, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.) When the court's determination is challenged on appeal, a reviewing court must affirm unless the probate court "exceed[ed] the bounds of reason." (Estate of Lanza (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 720, 727; accord, Gilkison, at pp. 1448-1449; Estate of Downing (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 256, 266-267.) An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court's discretionary conclusions. (Estate of Merritt (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 70, 76.) "The award[ ] must be upheld unless [it] appear[s] so clearly out of proportion to the services performed as to be an abuse of discretion." (Estate of Beach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 623, 645.)
II. Analysis
On our examination of the entire appellate record, we determine the court acted within its discretion in its attorney fees award. The court presided over this probate matter for an extended period, and conducted a detailed review of Quint's billing statements and Miles's challenges. Based on its familiarity with the litigation and its consideration of the facts and claims, the court awarded Quint $108,322 in litigation-related fees after substantially reducing his claimed hours and lowering his hourly rate from $350 to $275. The court detailed the grounds for its determination that Quint was entitled to about 40 percent of his claimed fees. The court's conclusions were reasonable, appropriate, and supported by the evidence in the record.
Miles raises a myriad of challenges to the court's extraordinary fees order in his appellate briefs. In doing so, he violates many appellate court rules, including by failing to provide a coherent summary of the applicable facts, identify each contention under a separate subheading, develop his legal arguments, and support each of his contentions with an appropriate citation. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C), 8.204(a)(2)(C); see Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1406; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457.) Quint's respondent's brief is also unhelpful. Quint did not clearly set forth the applicable facts or law, and included much information irrelevant to the appellate issues.
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
In the interests of justice, we have devoted substantial time to understand and decipher Miles's numerous arguments and to evaluate the applicable portions of the record. Based on this review, we find Miles's contentions to be without merit. We highlight the reasons for our conclusions below.
A. Post-Executor-Death Work
As his primary appellate challenge, Miles contends the court erred in awarding fees for work performed when Quint was not representing an executor. In May 2010, Edward resigned as executor, and in September 2010, his coexecutor Feucht died. After this time, Quint continued to work on estate matters and wanted to be paid for this work. Miles objected to compensation for these services. The court agreed with Miles and did not award fees for work after Feucht's death with two exceptions: (1) work related to the filing of, and defending, the Final Accounting; and (2) work related to the extraordinary attorney fees petition.
In his appellate briefs, Miles does not specifically challenge the applicability of the two exceptions. He therefore forfeited his right to assert error on appeal. (Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1, 19, fn. 12.) Further, on the merits, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding these exceptions applicable under the circumstances of the case.
As to the first exception, California law provides that when an executor dies, the court may order the executor's former counsel to present an estate accounting, and that the attorney may be compensated for this work as an extraordinary service. (See § 10953, subd. (c); rule 7.703(c)(11).) Although the court did not expressly order Quint to submit the Final Accounting, the court later stated it would have done so had the issue been presented to it. Under these circumstances, the court acted within its discretion in awarding Quint attorney fees for services related to the Final Accounting and successfully defending the accounting against Miles's numerous claims, including in the Jennings II appeal.
We recognize that the court had appointed the successor Administrator by the time of the Jennings II appeal. However, Edward (represented by Quint) was the sole respondent who appeared in the appeal. Because the appeal was from the order approving the Final Accounting that had been filed by Quint (on behalf of the former Coexecutors) it was within the court's discretion to find that Quint was entitled to be compensated for his work defending the court's ruling in this appeal. There was no double compensation because the successor Administrator (who was appointed primarily to review the work of the prior Coexecutors) did not appear in the Jennings II appeal and expressly approved Edward's participation as a respondent.
In a related argument, Miles argues Quint abused his authority in speaking with Feucht's trustee after Feucht's death and obtaining Mother's records that were in Feucht's control. The record does not support that Quint's actions were inappropriate or unauthorized. --------
With respect to the second exception, a court has the discretion to award extraordinary attorney fees for "[l]itigation in support of [the] attorney's request for extraordinary compensation . . . ." (Rule 7.703, subd. (c)(9); see Trynin, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 871; see also Estate of Gump (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 582, 604-605.) This rule ensures attorneys will be fairly compensated for their services despite the need to defend against unjustified objections to their fee claims. (Trynin, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 871.) The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees for Quint's work preparing and defending the extraordinary fees petition.
B. Expiration of Letters Testamentary
Miles next contends the court erred in awarding attorney fees for work after September 18, 2007, when the Coexecutors' testamentary letters expired. Miles forfeited this argument because he did not timely object to the Coexecutors' authority based on this expiration date. Additionally, the Coexecutors were under the probate court's supervision at all relevant times, and thus the record supports that the court in substance extended the expiration date and reissued the letters, even if there was no technical filing to this effect. After Miles petitioned to remove the Coexecutors, Edward resigned and Feucht died. On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Quint fees for work that benefited the estate, even if the Coexecutors had not obtained a formal extension of the letters. (See Estate of Siberell (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 332, 333-334 [party cannot collaterally attack letters of administration].)
C. Allegations of Perjury and Conspiracy to Defraud and Deceive
Throughout his briefs, Miles argues that Edward and Quint committed perjury on numerous occasions; conspired to defraud and deceive him; and refused to cooperate in the probate proceedings. Most of these assertions are not properly before us because they pertain to alleged actions that happened long ago and were decided adversely to Miles in prior appeals or appealable orders. Our appellate jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the court's rulings in the order currently being appealed—the April 4, 2016 attorney fees and costs order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 906; Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967; In re Marriage of Lloyd (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 216, 219.)
To the extent Miles's assertions are relevant to the April 2016 attorney fees order and were not the subject of prior orders, they constitute a challenge to the court's credibility determinations, and thus do not show reversible error. In the probate court, Miles argued the court should not award Quint attorney fees because Quint and/or Edward engaged in bad faith conduct and had made numerous misrepresentations. The court rejected these arguments as a ground for denying Quint any attorney fees. The court recognized that both Miles and Edward were responsible for the escalation of disputes, and that Quint also bore some responsibility for the protracted litigation. But the court did not credit Miles's assertions that Quint and/or Edward acted in bad faith or that they misrepresented material facts. The evidence in the record—including Quint's declaration—supports the court's factual conclusion.
Once a probate court has made factual determinations, we are required to accept those determinations if supported by the evidence. "It is not our function as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicting evidence and inferences, or to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 806.) Miles argues he presented evidence showing that Quint and Edward took advantage of him, particularly because he is disabled and is supporting a large family. The court was not required to agree with this assertion. "When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we do not substitute our deductions for those of the finder of fact. [Citation.] We must affirm if substantial evidence supports the trier of fact's determination, even if other substantial evidence would have supported a different result." (Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 394.) This rule applies if the trial court makes a credibility determination based on declarations as well as oral testimony. (See United Health Centers of San Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 63, 74; Fininen v. Barlow (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 185, 189-190.)
D. Texas Property
Miles devotes various portions of his brief to discussing the Texas assets that were part of Mother's estate, and claims he was not treated fairly with respect to the distribution of those assets. These contentions were resolved adversely to Miles in Jennings II and/or they involve matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction. Thus, the arguments are not properly before us in this appeal.
E. Discovery Orders and Sanctions
Miles contends the court erred in awarding Quint fees for work on discovery motions that resulted in orders favorable to Miles. However, in ruling on Quint's attorney fees motion, the court stated it was striking the fees request for work on the discovery motions based on the court's earlier order sanctioning Edward for failing to produce the ordered documents. Miles also repeatedly argues the court's discovery sanctions were insufficient to remedy Edward's discovery violations. However, the discovery sanctions were the subject of a prior appealable order, and are thus not a proper matter to challenge in this appeal.
In a related argument, Miles argues the court erred in awarding fees for work on an unsuccessful protective order motion. Miles did not meet his appellate burden to show the court's award included fees for this motion. Additionally, "an attorney may be entitled to compensation even though the extraordinary services rendered 'turn out to be entirely valueless'. . . . Services that do not directly benefit the estate in the sense of increasing, protecting, or preserving it are nonetheless compensable if the estate's attorneys or representatives in performing the services were 'acting in consonance with the fiduciary duties imposed upon them'. . . ." (Trynin, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 874.) There is no showing that Quint's work on this motion was inconsistent with his fiduciary duties.
F. Claimed Surcharge for Extraordinary Fees Request
In his appellate briefs, Miles discusses the court's initial order that a portion of the ordered attorney fees be charged to Miles's distributed share of the estate. Miles suggests this ruling was unfair and unsupported. However, the court modified the order to delete this requirement. Because Miles is not a legally aggrieved party on this issue, we need not discuss it further.
G. Claimed Unfair and Discriminatory Treatment
Miles contends he was a victim of disability discrimination and defamation in the probate court proceedings based on Quint's statements made in probate briefs and pleadings. He argues that Quint repeatedly called him " 'delusional' "; " 'schizophrenic' "; and " 'a documented liar,' " and that these assertions are false because the "correct diagnosis is Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, secondary to child abuse."
Miles made similar arguments in the Jennings II appeal and we rejected them as a basis for showing reversible error in the probate court. We reach the same conclusion here. There is no showing the court considered or accepted the truth of the assertions, or that they had any impact on the court's decisionmaking.
Miles contends the court treated him unfairly and denied him his constitutional due process rights because it spent substantial time reorganizing Quint's billing statements to understand the basis for his fee requests, whereas the court routinely refused to accept Miles's documents that did not satisfy procedural requirements. However, there is nothing in the record showing the court unfairly enforced procedural rules against Miles. Moreover, the time spent on Quint's billing statements benefited Miles, as the court's detailed review revealed that about 60 percent of Quint's claimed fees were not justified by the record and/or were excessive. The court did not accept Quint's fee request at face value, and instead sought to ensure his claims were justified and the beneficiaries' rights were protected. The court's efforts to understand Quint's attorney fees claim did not violate Miles's due process rights or show unfair treatment.
The probate court expressed awareness that Quint bore some responsibility for the escalation of disputes. These actions were likely one factor in the court's decision to reduce the amount of time and hourly rate recoverable in this matter. In ruling on the attorney fees motion, the court conducted a comprehensive review of all relevant evidence; expressly considered the parties' numerous contentions; acted in a patient and impartial manner; applied applicable law; and appropriately exercised its discretion on the facts before it.
H. Remaining Contentions
Miles's remaining contentions have no arguable merit as they are unsupported by factual citations and legal argument, and/or they pertain to matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction. We thus need not discuss these contentions further. (See Linhart v. Nelson (1976) 18 Cal.3d 641, 645 ["Having examined [appellants'] other contentions, we find them of insufficient merit to warrant discussion."].)
At the conclusion of his brief, Miles asks this court for 25 separate remedies. The only one of those "remedies" that is properly before us is Miles's request that we reverse the court's April 2016 order granting Quint attorney fees and costs. Based on our review of the record, we determine Miles has not met his burden to show reversible error.
I. Motions for Judicial Notice
The parties filed several motions for judicial notice seeking to augment the record with materials from the probate court files. We granted those motions while the appeal was pending. We additionally grant Miles's unopposed motion for judicial notice filed on February 9, 2017 pertaining to additional materials from the probate court's files.
DISPOSITION
Order affirmed. The parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
HALLER, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. NARES, J.