Estate of Hendrix

8 Citing cases

  1. Estate of Burnison

    33 Cal.2d 638 (Cal. 1949)   Cited 25 times

    ( United States v. Perkins, supra, 163 U.S. 625, 629.) The government finally relies on the Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647 [ 176 P.2d 398], to sustain the bequest in question, but an analysis of that case shows it to involve quite dissimilar considerations. There the bequest was made to the "United States Veterans Administration . . . for the purpose of rendering to disabled veterans of the world war . . . such aid, comfort, [and] assistance . . . as may to them be most helpful and profitable, determinable by said . . . [organization]."

  2. Estate of Tarrant

    38 Cal.2d 42 (Cal. 1951)   Cited 39 times

    And finally, while the bequest may also work a benefit to the federal taxpayers, that fact does not change the charitable nature of the gift. The same observation would prevail with respect to the reduction of the taxpayers' burden in the situation discussed in the Estateof Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647 [ 176 P.2d 398], where a bequest to the United States Veterans' Administration was upheld as a gift for charitable purposes. In fact, the basic considerations in the Hendrix case likewise obtain here in placing the Railroad Retirement Board as a government agency in the same category as the Veterans' Administration there involved.

  3. Estate of Hart

    204 Cal.App.2d 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 7 times

    This was approved in the Estate of Hart, supra, when this court said at page 506: "Finally, appellant contends that the court erred in fixing the amount of contribution which the community part of the estate and the separate part of the estate severally ought to bear with respect to the extraordinary services of his attorneys. He argues this was a proper situation for applying the rule that fees for legal services rendered in preserving a common fund for the benefit of all heirs are proper charges against such fund; that each beneficiary should bear his proportionate share of expenses of litigation as a result of which he derives a benefit. (See Estate of Lundell, 107 Cal.App.2d 463, 464-465 [ 237 P.2d 62]; Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647 [ 176 P.2d 398].) But it sufficiently appears that there were numerous items of separate and community property of varying values (at least the contrary does not appear) and the difficulty of proving title to each may have varied immensely.

  4. Estate of Hart

    167 Cal.App.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 3 times

    [5] Finally, appellant contends that the court erred in fixing the amount of contribution which the community part of the estate and the separate part of the estate severally ought to bear with respect to the extraordinary services of his attorneys. He argues this was a proper situation for applying the rule that fees for legal services rendered in preserving a common fund for the benefit of all heirs are proper charges against such fund; that each beneficiary should bear his proportionate share of expenses of litigation as a result of which he derives a benefit. (See Estate of Lundell, 107 Cal.App.2d 463, 464-465 [ 237 P.2d 62]; Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647 [ 176 P.2d 398].) But it sufficiently appears that there were numerous items of separate and community property of varying values (at least the contrary does not appear) and the difficulty of proving title to each may have varied immensely.

  5. Estate of Loescher

    133 Cal.App.2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955)   Cited 6 times

    [2] Whether a devise is residuary, general, specific or administrative depends upon the intention of the testator as shown by the entire will. (Page on Wills, Lifetime ed. vol. 4, p. 101, § 1392; Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647, 654 [ 176 P.2d 398].) [3] There is a general presumption that a legacy is presumed to be general unless it clearly appears to be specific. [4] Where it is of a pecuniary character the intent of the testator necessarily controls, and where it appears that his intent was to give a particular thing or a particular sum of money, not generally but only from a specified and definitely ascertained source, the court has no choice but to give effect to that intent.

  6. United States v. Burnison

    339 U.S. 87 (1950)   Cited 68 times
    In Burnison, the Court held that a State's traditional power to control the testamentary transfer of property included the power to prohibit testamentary gifts to the United States. The Court stated specifically that its holding did not "affect the right of the United States to acquire property by purchase or eminent domain in the face of a prohibitory statute of the state."

    "One judge dissented on the authority of Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647, 651-53, 176 P.2d 398, 400-402. The Hendrix will bequeathed property to the United States Veterans' Administration for the aid, comfort and assistance of disabled veterans.

  7. Stauffer's Estate, In re

    337 P.2d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)

    It appears to me that the sole question in this appeal comes squarely within the rule enunciated in Re Estate of Reade, 31 Cal.2d 669, 191 P.2d 745, and In re Estate of Lundell, 107 Cal.App.2d 463, 237 P.2d 62. See also In re Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647, 176 P.2d 398. In Re Estate of Reade one of the heirs successfully contested the first and final account of the administratrix, thereby making an additional fund available for distribution.

  8. In re Tarrant's Estate

    232 P.2d 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)

    'The effect of such a bequest to the Treasury of the United States would relieve the federal tax payers but the Legislature of the State of California has prohibited such bequest and therefore the court cannot hold that the relief of federal tax payers is a charitable purpose. 'In the Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal.2d 638, 204 P.2d 330, the matter of bequest to the United States Government is discussed and it is there held that such bequests are not permitted under Section 27 of the Probate Code. That case also discusses the Estate of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647, 176 P.2d 398, wherein a bequest to the United States Veterans Administration for the purpose of rendering to disabled veterans of the World War, such aid, comfort and assistance as may to them be most helpful and profitably determined by said organization was upheld. 'The trial court in the case at bar was also the trial court in the Hendrix case and apparently rendered a proper decision but upon the erroneous ground that a bequest to the United States was authorized, for the Supreme Court indicated in the Estate of Burnison that the result in the Hendrix case was proper for the reason that it appeared to be a gift for charitable purposes in pursuance of the intent of the donor.