Opinion
E032124.
11-17-2003
Estate of WOLFGANG ANDREAS FROELICH, Deceased. STEFAN E. FROELICH, as Executor, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. CAROLINE F. FROELICH, Objector and Appellant.
Ward & Ward and Alexandra S. Ward for Objector and Appellant. Swarner & Fitzgerald and Lewis F. Jacobsen for Petitioner and Respondent.
Wolfgang Froelich died on July 3, 2000. At the time of his death, he was in the process of divorcing Caroline Froelich. On November 22, 2000, the executor of his estate filed a petition to obtain an order that Caroline Froelich had no interest in two individual retirement accounts, despite beneficiary designations which named her as the beneficiary of the accounts on Wolfgangs death.
After hearing the matter, the trial court granted the petition. It held that Caroline Froelich has no interest in the two accounts, and that the proceeds of the accounts should be paid to Wolfgangs estate. Caroline appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to the hearing on the estates petition, the parties stipulated to the following facts:
"A. On August 6, 1998, decedent purchased a residence in Murrieta, California, taking title as Wolfgang A. Froelich, M.D., a widower.
"B. On February 26, 1999, Wolfgang Andreas Froelich (`decedent) married Respondent, Caroline F. Froelich (`Caroline).
"C. At the time of decedents marriage to Caroline decedent was the owner of American Funds Individual Retirement Account no. 57414668 and Prudential Securities Individual Retirement account no. OAH-R16027-13.
"D. On April 20, 1999 decedent executed a joint tenancy grant deed naming decedent and Caroline as joint tenants on the residence in Murrieta, California.
"E. On July 29, 1999 decedent executed a beneficiary designation form naming Caroline as the beneficiary of his Prudential Securities IRA account number OAH-R16027-13.
"F. On July 29, 1999, decedent executed a beneficiary designation form naming Caroline as the beneficiary of his American Funds IRA account number 57414668.
"`G. On December 8, 1999 decedent filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage to Caroline in the Riverside Superior Court as Case. No. TED 004388.
"H. On December 8, 1999 decedent executed his will.
"I. On December 8, 1999 decedent executed a declaration terminating the joint tenancy on the Murrieta real property.
"J. On December 10, 1999 Caroline was personally served with the summons and petition for dissolution of the marriage.
"K. On April 12, 2000, the court in the dissolution proceedings entered an order that the marital status of the parties be terminated six months and one day after service of process on Respondent. Six months and one day after service of process on Caroline is June 11, 2000. The judgment terminating the marital status nunc pro tunc as of June 11, 2000 was signed on July 20, 2000.
"L. Decedent died testate on July 3, 2000.
"M. On July 20, 2000, a restraining order was issued by the family law court restraining Respondent from withdrawing or receiving any funds held on account in American Funds Group, account number 57414668 and Prudential Securities account number OAH-R16027-13. That restraining order remained in effect until the probate court in the above entitled matter issued a preliminary injunction on January 26, 2001, enjoining and restraining Respondent from withdrawing or receiving any funds held on account in the same two accounts. The preliminary injunction remains in effect.
"N. Petitioner Mark W. Froelich is the personal representative of the Estate of decedent.
On April 29, 2003, the court appointed Stefan Froelich as successor executor of the estate.
"O. The Prudential Securities IRA Custodial Account Agreement with decedent provides: `Divorce or Annulment. If a decree of divorce or annulment is rendered after you have designated your Spouse as your Beneficiary, any beneficiary designation in favor of your former spouse is not effective unless you notify us that the decree designates your former spouse as your beneficiary, you re-designate your former spouse as your beneficiary subsequent to the effective date of the decree, or your former spouse is designated to receive proceeds or benefits in trust for, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of your children or dependents. The order terminating the marital status in this case did not designate Caroline as his beneficiary. Decedent did not notify Prudential that the decree designated Caroline as his beneficiary. Decedent did not designate Caroline as his beneficiary subsequent to the effective date of the decree. Said Prudential Securities IRA Custodial Agreement also provided that if no designated beneficiary survived him, or if no beneficiary designation was in effect at his death, the account balance will be paid to his surviving spouse and, if he is not survived by a spouse to his estate.
"P. The American Funds IRA agreement did not contain an express provision regarding the effect of divorce on the beneficiary designation.
"Q. The Prudential Securities IRA and the American Fund IRA were the separate property of the decedent."
Although not mentioned in the stipulation, the value of the two accounts was about $ 1.8 million at the time the petition was filed in November 2000, and about $1.1 million on September 2001, due to stock market losses. The total value of the estate was approximately $ 2.9 million in July 2000. The individual retirement accounts were thus the bulk of the estate.
The petition for an order under former Probate Code section 9860 (now section 850) was heard on January 28, 2002. The court heard extensive testimony concerning the relationship between decedent and Caroline Froelich. Petitioners witnesses generally testified that the decedent was anxious to divorce Caroline, and wanted to prevent her from obtaining any of his assets.
Petitioner relies on a provision in the December 8, 1999, will as illustrative of decedents intent: "I have made no provisions for, and I specifically disinherit, my wife, Caroline Fain Froelich, whom I am intending to divorce, and who has already taken or appropriated (without my consent) a substantial portion of my estate and property."
Caroline Froelich testified that decedent knew that he had a terminal illness, and that he intended to give her the money in the IRAs because he loved her.
The trial court found that the estate was the owner of the IRAs, and that Caroline Froelich had no interest in them. As discussed below, the court adopted its tentative decision as its final decision after Caroline Froelich requested a statement of decision.
APPELLATE ISSUES
Caroline Froelich argues that the trial court erred (1) in failing to issue a proper statement of decision; (2) in refusing to find that the beneficiary designations were valid and effective; (3) in applying the nullification provision in the Prudential individual retirement account agreement; and (4) in giving effect to a nunc pro tunc provision in the trial courts July 20, 2000, judgment.
THE STATEMENT OF DECISION ISSUE
Caroline Froelich first contends that the trial court erred in failing and refusing to act on her request for a statement of decision, and that the error requires reversal.
The facts underlying this contention are that the trial court issued a tentative decision on April 24, 2002. The tentative decision provided: "Unless either party shall request a statement of decision within 10 days of mailing of this tentative decision plus any extension pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure [section] 1013, subd. (a), this tentative decision shall constitute the statement of decision. If any party timely requests a statement of decision, counsel for petitioner shall prepare, serve and submit a proposed statement of decision within 15 days of service of the request."
On May 3, 2002, Caroline Froelich filed her request for a statement of decision. She requested that specific factual findings be made to support the trial courts conclusions.
On May 9, 2002, before petitioner submitted its own proposed statement of decision, the trial court issued a minute order: "[T]he court declines to act upon the respondents request. The tentative decision constitutes the statement of decision." The court gave two reasons: (1) the request sought "minute findings as to individual items of evidence" and only ultimate facts were needed; and (2) respondent had failed to propose the special findings she desired the court to make.
On May 13, 2002, Caroline Froelich filed an amended request for a statement of decision. The principal change was to request conclusions of law in addition to findings of fact on the controverted issues.
Judgment in accordance with the tentative decision was then filed on May 17, 2002.
On May 24, 2002, Caroline Froelich filed objections to the statement of decision. She contested the tentative decision as adopted in the May 9th order and argued the trial court had abused its discretion. She renews those contentions here.
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 provides that the court, upon request, must "issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial . . . ." Respondent cites Kroupa v. Sunrise Ford (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 835: "Kroupas 73-point request for a statement of decision well may have left something to be desired. Some courts have `condemn[ed] the practice, engaged in here, of generally requesting a finding on a subject without suggesting the specific factual finding requested. [Citation.] Nonetheless, the trial courts cavalier dismissal of Kroupas request without any apparent analysis is likewise less than satisfactory. On the other hand, while the trial court did not follow mandated procedures, it is also the case that where `only a pure question of law is presented, the court need not issue a statement of decision. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 842.)
Applying Kroupa, it could be argued that, since the relevant facts were stipulated, only legal issues, such as jurisdiction, remained to be decided, and a statement of decision was not required as to legal issues. But the statute requires "a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial . . . ." In any event, the primary issue, intent, was a factual issue, and the estate contends that the trial court issued a proper statement of decision when it adopted its tentative decision as the statement of decision on May 9, 2002.
In considering respondents argument, we must consider whether the tentative decision adequately disposed of the factual issues between the parties. The tentative decision is four pages long, in addition to the minute order. It explains the courts reasoning on (1) the jurisdictional issues raised by respondent; (2) the legal effect of the language in the Prudential IRA agreement on the issues here; (3) the legal effect of the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc; (4) the inapplicability of Probate Code section 5600, and the rule applicable under prior law; and (5) the evidence of the decedents intent not to give any more property to respondent.
In our view, the tentative decision adequately sets forth the trial courts views on the factual and legal issues at trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2002) ¶¶ 8:21 to 8:26, pp. 8-7 to 8-13.) Although the trial court changed its mind after receipt of the request for a statement of decision and did not require petitioner to submit its own proposed statement of decision, that change is irrelevant. The trial court had the discretion to adopt the tentative decision as its statement of decision, and it expressly did so. (Slavin v. Borinstein (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 713, 718-719.) As a result, the trial court adequately explained the basis for its decision.
No more was required: "In superior courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required." (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) The trial courts rejection of Caroline Froelichs requests for a statement of decision were not a "cavalier dismissal" of requests on subjects not covered by the tentative decision, as in Kroupa, but rather was a determination that the reasons previously given were adequate. Since we agree that the tentative decision was adequate as a statement of decision, there was no error.
THE INTENT ISSUE
Beneficiary designations are used to make nonprobate transfers which take effect on a persons death. Revocable beneficiary designations are commonly used to transfer bank accounts, stock accounts, and life insurance policies to the decedents spouse or other designated persons. (Prob. Code, § 5000.) Conflicts arise when the parties are subsequently divorced and the decedent has failed to change the beneficiary designation.
Under current law, inapplicable here, a nonprobate transfer to a former spouse "fails" if the former spouse is not a surviving spouse, as defined in section 78. (Prob. Code, § 5600, subd. (a).) If the instrument fails, "the instrument making the nonprobate transfer shall be treated as it would if the former spouse failed to survive the transferor." (Prob. Code, § 5600, subd. (c).)
Probate Code section 5600, subdivision (b), provides exceptions: the beneficiary designation remains valid in several circumstances, including the situation in which "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the transferor intended to preserve the nonprobate transfer to the former spouse."
In other words, "[a] judgment of dissolution (or nullity) automatically cancels, by operation of law, nonprobate transfers between the former spouses. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . A broad range of surviving spouse rights are canceled upon finality of a judgment terminating marital status—including beneficiary rights under retirement plans, pay on death accounts, transfer on death vehicle registration, trusts and a marital property agreement. [Citations.]" (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2003) ¶¶ 15:216-15:216.1, p. 15-47.)
Probate Code section 5601 applies the same rules to joint tenancies. However, these statutes were enacted in 2001 (Stats. 2001, c. 417) and Probate Code section 5604 expressly provides that they do not apply to cases in which the decedent died before January 1, 2002, or the marriage dissolution occurred before January 1, 2002. Both these exceptions are present in this case. In such cases, "the applicable law in effect before the operative date of this part applies . . . ." (Prob. Code, § 5604, subd. (c).)
The issue thus presented for decision is what was the applicable law in effect before enactment of Probate Code section 5600, et seq.
Former law may be generally described as follows: "In California, as in most states, the dissolution or annulment of a persons marriage automatically revokes a disposition to a former spouse in that persons will. This policy is based on the assumption that typical divorcing parties will not intend or expect a will provision benefiting a spouse to survive the dissolution of their marriage. Where a person fails to change a will after a divorce, that failure is probably inadvertent. [¶] California law does not extend similar protection to a divorcing person who has chosen to pass property on death by means of an instrument other than a will. For example, the designation of a spouse as beneficiary to a life insurance policy is unaffected by dissolution of marriage. Where a person fails to change such a beneficiary designation after divorce, the policy proceeds will go to that persons former spouse, and not to that persons current spouse or children. [¶] The Law Revision Commission recommends that dissolution of marriage prevent the operation of a revocable nonprobate transfer on death to a former spouse unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the transferor intends to preserve the nonprobate transfer in favor of the transferors former spouse. This would protect the likely intentions of most divorcing parties and would eliminate the inconsistency that currently exists in the treatment of probate and nonprobate transfers on death after dissolution of a marriage." (Recommendation Relating to the Effect of Dissolution of Marriage on Nonprobate Transfers (Sept. 1998) 28 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1998) p. 603, fn. omitted.)
See also the following section entitled Existing Law (id. at p. 604), Recommendation Relating to Estate Planning During Marital Dissolution (Oct. 2000) 30 California Law Revision Commission Report (2000) page 603; and California Law Revision Commission 2001-2002 Annual Report: Appendix 7, entitled Report of the California Law Revision Commission on Chapter 417 of the Statutes of 2001, 31 California Law Revision Commission Report (2001) page 75.
Caroline Froelich contends that the beneficiary designations were valid and effective under former law and that the trial court erred in determining that the beneficiary designations could be invalidated by specific evidence that decedent did not intend that she receive any more money from him. In other words, the beneficiary designation could only be changed by the method prescribed in the individual retirement account agreements.
She cites Shaw v. Board of Administration (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 770. In that case, the decedent was covered by the State Employees Retirement System. He filed a beneficiary designation naming his spouse as beneficiary of plan death benefits and they subsequently divorced. The divorce decree did not mention the right to recover benefits from the state pension system. A dispute arose after the former husbands death. The trial court held that the divorce decree abrogated the former wifes rights under the beneficiary designation. The appellate court reversed and found that the divorce decree did not invalidate the beneficiary designation. The appellate court applied life insurance law in reaching its decision: "The general rule is that the designation of a beneficiary in a policy of life insurance initiates in favor of the beneficiary an inchoate gift of the proceeds of the policy, which, if not revoked by the insured prior to his death, vests in the beneficiary at the time of his death. [Citation.] It is also the general rule that a designation of a beneficiary, valid in its inception, remains so, although the insurable interest, or the relationship, has ceased. [Citations.] [¶] A decree of divorce in and of itself has no effect on the right of a wife to the proceeds of a policy on the life of the husband designating her as beneficiary issued prior to divorce of the parties. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 774-775.)
Disapproved on other grounds in Watenpaugh v. State Teachers Retirement (1959) 51 Cal.2d 675, 681-682.)
The subject of beneficiary designations for the Public Employees Retirement System is found in Government Code section 21490 et. seq. Section 21492 now provides that a beneficiary designation is automatically revoked upon dissolution of the marriage.
We should note, however, that our Supreme Court subsequently disapproved Shaw and found that "the provisions for death benefits under retirement systems differ in important respects from ordinary life insurance policies." (Watenpaugh v. State Teachers Retirement, supra, 51 Cal.2d 675, 681.) The court said: "The purpose of the provisions requiring the filing of a change of beneficiary is largely to protect the retirement system against the possibility of being called upon to pay twice. A second purpose, no doubt, is to provide a method of ascertaining the desire and intent of the member with reference to the payment of death benefits. The statute should be construed to give effect to an executed designation when there is a clear manifestation of intent by the member to make the change and the designation is filed promptly after death so as to prevent any prejudice to the retirement system." (Ibid .)
The estate relies upon Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy (1984) 35 Cal.3d 599 and Snyder v. Snyder (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 6.
In Cassidy, the issue was whether a written beneficiary designation under a life insurance policy remained effective to transfer the policy proceeds to the former Mrs. Cassidy, despite an intervening divorce and property settlement agreement. (Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy, supra, 35 Cal.3d 599, 602.) Our Supreme Court "concluded that the designation of [the former wife] as beneficiary was superseded as of the date the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement which comprehensively disposed of all the rights and obligations between them. . . . . The evidence produced at trial clearly shows that the fact appellant remained the named beneficiary of the subject insurance policy was not the result of an intent by the deceased to make a new gift of the benefits of the policy to his former spouse, but was contrary to his expressed intent that she be removed as beneficiary of all insurance policies on his life. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court." (Ibid.) The trial court had found that the terms of the marital settlement agreement were dispositive. The former wife argued that the agreement did not waive her rights because it did not explicitly revoke the beneficiary designation. (Id. at pp. 604-605.)
Relevant here, our Supreme Court said: "As previously noted, Mr. Cassidys failure to change the beneficiary on the INA policy ordinarily would be regarded as a confirmation of the original designation. [Citations.] [¶] Other evidence was presented, however, which negated any inference of donative intent on the part of appellants former husband. . . . [¶] . . . Under the facts of this case, the testimony was relevant to establish that appellant remained the beneficiary designated under the INA policy only because of inadvertence and that Mr. Cassidy did not intend to confirm a gift of the proceeds to her. [Citation.]" (Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy, supra, 35 Cal.3d 599, 609.) Our Supreme Court therefore held that evidence of intention was relevant and that the evidence supported the trial courts conclusion that the decedent did not intend to make a gift to his former wife. Accordingly, the former wife was not entitled to the policy proceeds, even though a formal beneficiary designation in her favor was on file.
In Snyder, the trial court relied on Cassidy and the issue was whether it properly interpreted Cassidy. (Snyder v. Snyder, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 6, 9.) The decedent, Gordon Snyder, had designated his wife, Shirley, as the beneficiary of his defined contribution savings plan at Rockwell International, his employer. (Id. at p. 7.) Upon their divorce, the savings plan was awarded to Gordon as his separate property, but the beneficiary designation was unchanged. (Id. at pp. 7-8.) Subsequently, Gordon married Alexandra. (Id. at p. 7.) Following his death, Alexandra filed a declaratory judgment action as executrix of the estate, contending that the savings plan proceeds were the property of the estate. (Id. at p. 8.)
Since the plan was an employer-sponsored employee benefit plan, it would appear that the preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 would apply. (29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).) However, the opinion does not mention that possibility. (See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner (2001) 532 U.S. 141.)
The appellate court held that, although there was no marital property settlement agreement, the Snyders stipulated to their property division in open court, and this stipulation "alone demonstrates Shirley relinquished her ownership interest in the savings plan when it was awarded to Gordon." (Snyder v. Snyder, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 6, 10.) Referring to the evidence of intention, as stated in Cassidy, the court said: "Here, no testimony was offered with respect to Gordons intention to change the beneficiary designation. There is, however, documentary evidence of his intent to supersede the original beneficiary designation: his will. Furthermore, we can see no reason why Gordon would have wanted to make a gift to Shirley of the plans proceeds. From a practical standpoint, any desire to retain his former wife as beneficiary could have been implemented by submitting a postdivorce designation to that effect. The Cassidy court alluded to this requirement when it noted the appellant had failed to show the decedent had made a `new gift to her after the marital settlement agreement was executed." (Id. at p. 11, fn. omitted.)
In the present case, there had been no property settlement at the time of Mr. Froelichs death. But in Snyder, the stipulation of the parties in open court was given effect and in this case the parties stipulated that the individual retirement accounts were Mr. Froelichs separate property. Thus, Caroline had no community property ownership interest in the individual retirement accounts. Her sole interest was an expectancy interest created by beneficiary designations which could be revoked at any time. "It is a fundamental rule of law, as conceded by both parties, that in an ordinary life insurance policy where the insured reserves the right to change the beneficiary named therein, such change may be made by him at any time prior to his death, and that the beneficiary has no such vested right therein prior to the death of the insured as will enable him to prevent the change. [Citation.]" (Cook v. Cook (1941) 17 Cal.2d 639, 644.) Since Mr. Froelich could change beneficiary designations on his separate property accounts at any time, we reject the contention that Caroline Froelich had to consent to the change, or that she had to waive her rights to take under the beneficiary designations in order to make the change effective.
In this case, as in Snyder, decedents will provided clear evidence of his intent to supersede the original beneficiary designation. Although no intent testimony was introduced in Snyder, there was ample additional testimony of Mr. Froelichs intent. That testimony, coupled with the will, provides very clear and overwhelming evidence that Mr. Froelich wanted his funds to go to his estate and then to his children. He did not want Caroline Froelich to receive anything, and certainly not the bulk of his estate.
The issue is whether this clear intent is relevant. We believe that it is. As discussed above, under the current law, a beneficiary designation is invalidated upon divorce unless an intent to continue it in effect is established. We think the converse is also true: under the prior law, a beneficiary designation was valid unless an intent to invalidate it was proven.
While such intent is clearly shown by the signing of a new beneficiary designation, the issue is whether it can also be shown by other evidence, including a will which disinherits the former spouse. Snyder finds such evidence relevant to the determination of whether the decedent intended to give any property to his former spouse after the divorce. Indeed, it finds such evidence to be conclusive. In other words, as in Cassidy and Snyder, the clear intent of the decedent trumps the formal beneficiary designation. (Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy, supra 35 Cal.3d 599, 610; Snyder v. Snyder, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 6, 11.)
The trial court found Snyder dispositive and held that the decedents failure to change the beneficiary designations was merely an oversight in view of the clear evidence that decedent did not intend to make any further gifts to Caroline. The trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion or in considering evidence of decedents intent under the former law.
THE VALIDITY OF THE PRUDENTIAL BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION
Although evidence of decedents intent is dispositive, we briefly consider Caroline Froelichs contention that the trial court erred in applying what she refers to as the nullification provision in the Prudential Securities IRA Custodial Account Agreement with decedent.
The account agreement provides: "Divorce or Annulment. If a decree of divorce or annulment is rendered after you have designated your Spouse as your Beneficiary, any beneficiary designation in favor of your former spouse is not effective unless you notify us that the decree designates your former spouse as your beneficiary, you re-designate your former spouse as your beneficiary subsequent to the effective date of the decree, or your former spouse is designated to receive proceeds or benefits in trust for, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of your children or dependents."
Application of this provision would make the Prudential beneficiary designation ineffective. Caroline Froelich argues that this provision is inapplicable, and the beneficiary designation was effective, because the dissolution decree was "rendered" after Mr. Froelichs death. Accordingly, the trial courts subsequent attempt to make the status dissolution effective prior to Mr. Froelichs death by use of a nunc pro tunc order was ineffective. Caroline thus assumes that the nullification provision was ineffective because she became entitled to the funds in the account when Mr. Froelich died on July 3, 2000, even though a status dissolution decree was "rendered after [Mr. Froelich] designated [Caroline Froelich] as [decedents] beneficiary . . . ."
Caroline Froelich thus raises two issues: whether the July 20, 2000, judgment was entered nunc pro tunc and, if so, was it beyond the courts power to do so.
The facts underlying these contentions are that the parties stipulated that "[o]n April 12, 2000, the court in the dissolution proceedings entered an order that the marital status of the parties be terminated six months and one day after service of process on Respondent. Six months and one day after service of process on Caroline is June 11, 2000." The register of actions confirms this order and provides "written Judgment to be Submitted. . . . No further notice to be given." The register also confirms the estates claim that, despite the language of the order, the proposed judgment was returned for lack of a proof of service. Although the estate contended that no such proof of service was required for a status only judgment, the matter was not resolved until the July 20, 2000, hearing. On that date, the trial court signed a judgment terminating the marital status nunc pro tunc as of June 11, 2000.
We agree with the parties that the issue is when the status only dissolution was "rendered." The estate contends that the decree was rendered at the April 12, 2000, hearing. Caroline Froelich responds by arguing that a judgment could only be rendered in written form (former Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1244 & 1287), a judgment is not effective for any purpose until entered (Code of Civil Procedure section 664) and the judgment was not actually rendered until it was signed by the court on July 20, 2000.
"The rendition or giving of judgment is a judicial act that can only be performed by the judge. It is distinct from entry, which is a ministerial act of the clerk. [Citations.]" (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 44, p. 575.) "Rendition of a judgment is effected when trial court in open court declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue, and it is distinguishable from `entry of judgment, which is a purely ministerial act by which the judgment is made of record and preserved. [Citation.]" (Blacks Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1296, col. 2.)
The estate cites Casa de Valley View Owners Assn. v. Stevenson (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1193. After citing the Witkin section quoted above, the court said: "Where, as here, a `statement of decision is not required or waived, the judgment is `rendered as soon as the decision is entered in the minutes of the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1193.)
As noted above, Caroline Froelich relies on former California Rules of Court, rule 1244: "If the court finds that a judgment altering the marital status of the parties is appropriate, the court shall render its judgment in the form prescribed by rule 1287." Former California Rules of Court, rule 1287 prescribed a written form for entry of judgment, i.e. the form filed on July 20, 2000.
Notwithstanding the rules, we think that the Prudential IRA agreement used the term "render" in its more general sense, defined above to mean the issuing of a judicial decision. For the purposes of defining the intent of the parties, it is logical to assume that, after the court announces its status dissolution decision, the intent to give separate property to the former spouse is lacking, and must be reconfirmed to be effective. The Prudential provision thus guards against the situation in which the account holder neglects to change a beneficiary designation after divorce.
Caroline Froelichs reliance on Code of Civil Procedure section 664 is also unavailing. Although a judgment is ineffective for any purpose until entered, that provision refers to the finality, effectiveness and enforceability of the judgment. It does not prevent the oral rendition of the trial courts decision from being used for the purpose here, i.e., as an indication of the intent of the account owner to not make any further gift to the former spouse by a nonprobate transfer.
We therefore agree with the estate that the courts decision terminating the marital status was made on April 12, 2000, to be effective June 11, 2000. Thus, even though the actual judgment was signed on June 20, 2000, the decision was "rendered" on April 12, 2000 within the meaning of the Prudential IRA agreement. Thus, under the terms of the Prudential agreement the beneficiary designation was ineffective unless it was reconfirmed. The parties stipulated that it was not reconfirmed. Caroline Froelich was therefore not entitled to receive the account funds pursuant to the beneficiary designation.
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider Caroline Froelichs contentions regarding validity of the June 20, 2000, order which allegedly entered the marital status dissolution judgment nunc pro tunc to June 11, 2000.
DISPOSITION
By order filed April 11, 2003, we reserved decision on Caroline Froelichs request for judicial notice filed March 24, 2003. The request relates to the judgment filed July 20, 2000. The request is denied because the relevant page of the document is in our record at CT 993. The request may be renewed if Caroline Froelich contends the other pages of the judgment are relevant to any issue in this case.
By order filed April 25, 2003, we reserved decision on the estates request for judicial notice filed April 8, 2003. The request relates to 10 documents which were filed in the dissolution action. Although we agree with Caroline Froelich that the relevance of the documents, except exhibit 7, is marginal, some are useful for background information. The request is therefore granted.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J. KING J.