Estate of Farrar v. Cain

39 Citing cases

  1. Cartwright v. Stamper

    7 F.3d 106 (7th Cir. 1993)   Cited 76 times
    In Cartwright the district court did not have the benefit of Farrar, which was decided before the Cartwright case reached us.

    The district court recognized initially that there was a split in the circuits over whether a civil rights plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages is a "prevailing party" entitled to fees. The court noted that the Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1159, 117 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), to resolve the conflict, but that the Court had not yet ruled on the issue. Accordingly, the district court applied the law of the Seventh Circuit to the effect that a civil rights plaintiff recovering only nominal damages is a prevailing party and entitled to attorneys' fees. Turning to a lodestar analysis, the court determined the lodestar amount to be $79,312.50, but reduced that sum by one-third for three reasons: first, the plaintiffs failed in their punitive damages claim; second, the plaintiffs spent significant time attempting to show mental anguish but recovered nothing; and third, the external benefits or future deterrent effect of the action was limited. No. IP 90-1910, Order at 14 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 31, 1992) (Order).

  2. Domegan v. Ponte

    972 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1992)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that court had jurisdiction where no separate judgment had been entered, even though notice of appeal was not timely filed as measured from the final decision

    But compare Huntley v. Community Sch. Bd., 579 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1978) ( district court did not abuse discretion in determining that $100 damage award on procedural due process claim amounted, at most, to "moral victory") with Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (nominal damage award on constitutional claim stemming from official misconduct "sufficient to support an award of fees") (alternate holding). Much as the Fifth Circuit recently pointed out, however, in Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom. Farrar v. Hobby, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1159, 117 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), all of the cases cited above, except Scofield, antedate Texas Teachers as well as Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987), and Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (Per Curiam).

  3. Farrar v. Hobby

    506 U.S. 103 (1992)   Cited 3,672 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an award of nominal damages, but not purely declaratory relief, suffices for prevailing party status

    Pp. 114-116. 941 F.2d 1311 affirmed. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.

  4. Romberg v. Nichols

    970 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992)   Cited 26 times
    In Romberg, the jury found that the defendant police officers were liable for violating the Rombergs' Fourth Amendment rights.

    To the extent that other courts have declined to adopt this reasoning, we decline to follow them. See, e.g., Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying recovery of fees after one-dollar judgment); Denny v. Hinton, 131 F.R.D. 659 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (characterizing one-dollar judgment as de minimis under Texas State Teachers and denying recovery of fees), aff'd mem., Denny v. Elliott, 937 F.2d 602, and Lawrence v. Hinton, 937 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1991); Carr v. City of Florence, 729 F. Supp. 783, 791 (N.D.Ala. 1990) (characterizing $100 judgment as de minimis under Texas State Teachers and denying recovery of fees), aff'd mem., 934 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1991). In so doing, however, we disavow no great wealth of authority.

  5. Watchorn v. Town of Davie

    795 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1992)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that plaintiff waived a right to nominal damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force case by failing to request a separate line on the verdict form for nominal damages

    "Thus, after Hewitt, Rhodes, and Garland, to qualify as a prevailing party, a plaintiff must show that he won at least some relief from the defendant, that the outcome of the suit changed the legal relationship between the parties, and that the plaintiff's success was not a de minimis or technical victory." Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has not specifically considered the significance of a zero or one dollar verdict under Section 1988(b).

  6. Willis v. Bell

    784 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    That objection was based on its contention that the efforts of Willis' lawyers could be carved up into slices based on the different stages of the litigation involved. Ultimately City backed away from its original partial approval, relying on Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1991) to object to any fee award at all. Application of the Relevant Standards

  7. Montgomery v. Walton

    No. 17-11268 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2019)   Cited 48 times
    In Montgomery, the plaintiff failed to adequately allege a "common motive" for why the purported co-conspirators targeted him. 759 F. App'x at 315.

    To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that there was an agreement among the alleged co-conspirators to deprive him of his constitutional rights and that such an alleged deprivation actually occurred. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994); Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1991). Conclusory allegations that do not reference specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state a civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983.

  8. Jabary v. City of Allen

    547 F. App'x 600 (5th Cir. 2013)   Cited 120 times
    Holding that allegations that local officials "actively conspired with each other" and engaged in "several conversations, private meetings, and other communications" to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights were insufficient under Rule 12(b) to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim

    To prove a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts that indicate (1) there was an agreement among individuals to commit a deprivation, and (2) that an actual deprivation occurred. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring that a plaintiff must prove "an actual deprivation of a constitutional right"). A conspiracy allegation under § 1983 allows a plaintiff to "impose liability on all of the defendants without regard to who committed the particular act."

  9. Milofsky v. American Airlines, Inc.

    404 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005)   Cited 28 times
    Holding a complaint must "identify any specific discretion or decision making authority" to survive a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss

    Because of the arguable conflict with the Sixth Circuit, this opinion has been pre-circulated to the active judges of this court in accordance with our usual policy. See Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1316 n. 22 (5th Cir. 1991). Similarly, the plaintiffs' citation of Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 1999), is inapposite, because there the plaintiffs sought disgorgement of profits, rescission of a stock sale, and reinstatement of a "put" option — relief that would benefit all participants of the plan and thus inure to the benefit of the plan as a whole.

  10. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.

    158 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that a verdict for a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case constitutes a victory on a significant legal issue that serves a public purpose, "notwithstanding the fact that a plaintiff recovers no damages"

    The court of appeals reversed the award, ruling that the plaintiffs' "technical victory" was "so insignificant . . . as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 108 (quoting Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1991)). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that "a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under § 1988."