But the statutory provisions requiring the witness to write the testator's name near his mark and to sign his own name as a witness must be met. "If the testator cannot write, then the mark is permitted if the name of the testator is written out by the witness and the name of the witness is added." ( Estate of Edwardson, 186 Cal.App.2d 122, 127 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 889] .) Here the attorney who prepared the will caused Mangeri's name to be typewritten below the line prepared for his signature. Mangeri placed his mark upon the signature line, but the attorney who prepared the will was not present when the mark was made, did not witness it, and did not sign his own name as a witness.

" ( Id. at p. 463.) In Estate of Edwardson (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 122 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 889], the court required strict compliance with the applicable statutes when the original will executed by mark was lost, the testator's name was not written anywhere near the mark on the copy of the will, and the requirements for proof of a lost will were not met. Again, it was the court's concern with opportunities for fraud which led to this result. ( Id. at pp. 128-129.)

Here not even one witness testified to the provisions of the will. The language used by the court in Hull v. Cartin (1940) 61 Idaho 578 [ 105 P.2d 196, 200-201], in commenting on an Idaho statute similar to that of California and quoted in Estate of Edwardson (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 122, 131 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 889] is here applicable: "`This statute authorizing the proof of the contents of a lost will is intentionally strict and prescribes definite and certain proof that must be produced; the statute is clear, plain, unambiguous, and mandatory. . . . "`We are unable to hold that any substitution of circumstantial evidence, hearsay, . . . can be accepted in lieu of one of the required "two credible witnesses" in proof of the provisions of a lost will. . . . The difficulty of making the proofs required by the statute can not obviate the necessity of doing so.'"

Conversely, our examination of the cases cited by Jack in his brief to support the adoption of a strict compliance standard has revealed cases that primarily concern the subscription requirement (codified in Guam law as subsections 201 (a) and (b)). See Appellant's Br. at 10 (Dec. 18, 2006), citing: In re Estate of Howell, 50 Cal. 2d 211, 324 P.2d 578, 582 (Cal. 1958); In re Estate of Edwardson, 186 Cal. App. 2d 122, 8 Cal. Rptr. 889 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); In re Chase's Estate, 51 Cal. App. 2d 353, 124 P.2d 895, 897 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942); In re Seaman's Estate, 146 Cal. 455, 80 P. 700 (Cal. 1905); In re Moore's Estate, 92 Cal. App. 2d 120, 206 P.2d 413 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (stating "[t]he sole question presented is whether or not the typed name of the testator at the end of the document constitutes his signature, there being no evidence that same was affixed by decedent himself, and no acknowledgment by him that the typed name was his signature."). One case cited in this section of Appellant's Opening Brief, In re Krause's Estate, 18 Cal. 2d 623, 117 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1941), found a failure to meet the required formalities and to satisfy the statutory requirements where a subscribing witness gave clear, uncontradicted testimony that showed the testatrix did not sign the purported will in the presence of the attesting witnesses, and that she neither declared nor acknowledged to them that it was her will or that she had subscribed