¶24 While this court has not directly addressed the statutory insurable interest requirement for life insurance contracts, Division One of the Court of Appeals has concluded that an insurable interest is necessary to form such a contract. In re Est. of D'Agosto , 134 Wash. App. 390, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006). In D'Agosto , the Court of Appeals considered whether intervening actions of an insured after the insurance contract was formed could terminate an insurable interest that existed at inception.
Another interpretation of § 27–14–3(f), however, is that the statute merely allows a person who has taken out an insurance policy on the life of another while he or she had an insurable interest in the insured, to still receive benefits from that policy if, at the time the loss occurs, he or she no longer has an insurable interest in the insured. Liberty National cites In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wash.App. 390, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006), and In re Marriage of Bratton, 28 Cal.App.4th 791, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 86 (1994), in support of its proposition that the former interpretation is that intended by the Alabama Legislature. In each of those cases, however, the latter interpretation finds support.
See, e.g., In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wash.App. 390, 395, 139 P.3d 1125, 1128 (2006), in which the Court of Appeals of Washington was called upon to interpret a Washington statute containing language essentially identical to § 27–14–3(g) :"This common law rule that an insurable interest is required at the making of a policy was codified by the Washington legislature in 1947.
The statute allows a court considering a fee award to consider any relevant factor, including whether a case presents novel or unique issues. In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wash.App. 390, 402, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006); In re Estate of Burks, 124 Wash.App. 327, 333, 100 P.3d 328 (2004). We affirm the Court of Appeals denial of the Hardmans' attorney fee request under RCW 11.96A.150.
The statute allows a court considering a fee award to consider any relevant factor, including whether a case presents novel or unique issues. In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wn. App. 390, 402, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006); In re Estate of Burks, 124 Wn. App. 327, 333, 100 P.3d 328 (2004). We affirm the Court of Appeals denial of the Hardmans' attorney fee request under RCW 11.96A.150.
June 6, 2007. Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, No. 55578-2-I, August 7, 2006, 134 Wn. App. 390. Denied.
And contrary to Christianson's contention, this appeal does not involve a unique issue; it is merely a common breach of fiduciary duty claim. Cf., Bale v. Allison, 173 Wn. App. 435, 461, 294 P.3d 789 (2013) (holding that the issue of whether a quitclaim deed "must recite consideration" was a unique issue and "an award of fees to either party [was] unwarranted"); In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wn. App. 390, 402, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006) (holding that in "novel issues of statutory construction[, a]n award of fees to either party is unwarranted"). And here, Christianson's bad faith litigation practices throughout the proceedings below, including alleging that Hansen committed manslaughter and other conduct the trial court considered sanctionable, entitles Hansen to her fees and costs on appeal subject to her compliance with RAP 18.1.
Cf., Bale v. Allison, 173 Wn.App. 435, 461, 294 P.3d 789 (2013) (holding that the issue of whether a quitclaim deed "must recite consideration" was a unique issue and "an award of fees to either party [was] unwarranted"); In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wn.App. 390, 402, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006) (holding that in "novel issues of statutory construction[, a]n award of fees to either party is unwarranted"). And here, Christianson's bad faith litigation practices throughout the proceedings below, including alleging that Hansen committed manslaughter and
The statute allows a court considering a fee award to consider any relevant factor. In re Estate of D’Agosto , 134 Wash. App. 390, 401-02, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006) ; In re Estate of Burks , 124 Wash. App. 327, 333, 100 P.3d 328 (2004). The ability to pay does not provide an equitable basis for the award.
The statute allows a court considering a fee award to consider any relevant factor. In re Estate of D'Agosto, 134 Wn.App. 390, 401-02, 139 P.3d 1125 (2006); In re Estate of Burks, 124 Wn.App. 327, 333, 100 P.3d 328 (2004). The ability to pay does not provide an equitable basis for the award.