Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP072138
John Reid, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas J. Jeffers, Jr., Eva Jeffers, Elaine B. Fischel for Contestant and Appellant.
Silver & Freedman, Bess Blank for Objector and Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
Appellant James Warner was previously the petitioner in a will contest, which was fully litigated, adversely decided against him, and unsuccessfully appealed by him. (See Estate of Bussard (Nov. 30, 2004, B169944) [nonpub. opn.]; hereinafter, Bussard I.) Thereafter, Warner filed new petitions in the trial court, arguing principally that an exhibit previously denied admission to probate (exhibit 2) was falsely interpreted, and seeking the same relief he unsuccessfully sought in Bussard I.
We find, inter alia, that (1) the prior rejection of an alleged will by the court is conclusive of its invalidity and deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain a belated new theory, and (2) even though Warner raises a new legal theory (i.e., integration of documents) relitigation of the same underlying claim is barred by res judicata. Thus, the trial court properly granted the demurrer by respondent James Bussard (hereinafter, Bussard).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Warner’s first petition, filed in April of 2002, sought admission to probate of two documents (and later a third) as holographic wills written by decedent Lucille Bussard (hereinafter, decedent), who died at the age of 101 without any spouse, siblings or children. The administrator, Bussard, filed a will contest to Warner’s original petition. A trial ensued, and the court denied admission to probate of two of the documents presented by Warner (exhibits 2 and 3), but admitted to probate another document (exhibit 3).
In Bussard I, we held, in pertinent part, that the trial court correctly determined that exhibits 1 and 2 (two letters from the decedent) did not qualify as holographic wills because those handwritten documents lacked sufficient testamentary intent. Rather, in Bussard I we found that the language in those two letters merely reflected that decedent planned in the future to leave her estate to certain religious organizations (“The Christian Defense League” and “Truth at Last”), and that exhibits 1 and 2 indicated “‘that some other writing yet to be made would be [decedent’s] will.’ (Estate of Moore [(1951)] 102 Cal.App.2d [672, ] 675.” We also held as follows: exhibits 2 and 3 were not codicils to exhibit 1, because exhibit 1 was not a will; exhibit 3 was properly admitted to probate and did not “republish” exhibits 1 and 2; and exhibit 3 did not incorporate any other document by reference.
Exhibit 3, the handwritten document which was properly admitted to probate as decedent’s will, provided as follows: “Except for Darlene Horstmeier, in case she serves as executrix, no relative or descendant [sic] of my grandmother, Mary Knight Ghering, a.k.a. Mrs. Wm. Ghering Sr. is to receive any part of my estate. [¶] If any such person makes any claim they are to receive one dollar. [¶] Lucille Alva Bussard [¶] 10-22-93.”
In Bussard I, we held that, “By its terms, this will disinherits all the descendents of decedent’s maternal grandmother . . . . Although the will is silent as to the specific intended beneficiaries, by the logical process of elimination the intended beneficiaries are all of decedent’s other descendents. Warner’s unexplained assertion, that exhibit 3 disinherits all of decedent’s heirs because they are purportedly all related to Mary Ghering by blood or marriage, is without foundation.”
Thereafter, Warner petitioned this court for a rehearing, which we denied. He then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, which was denied. On March 8, 2005, this court issued the remittitur and indicated that the “decision has now become final.”
On May 2, 2005, however, Warner petitioned the trial court again to admit to probate exhibit 2 and sought other relief which was denied by the trial court and by this court in Bussard I. Warner argued that exhibit 2 had been falsely interpreted and urged the new theory that exhibit 2 should have been admitted to probate with exhibit 3 as an integrated document because both were written on the same date and were in the same envelope. On May 4, 2005, Warner filed two additional petitions, one to determine that Bussard and all named heirs were disinherited, and the other to cancel the letters of administration issued to Bussard.
Bussard demurred and requested that the trial court dismiss the petitions with prejudice on the grounds, inter alia, of res judicata and law of the case. On September 27, 2005, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the petitions.
DISCUSSION
I. The standard of review following a successful demurrer.
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1497.) On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, our standard of review is de novo; i.e., we exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125; Traders Sports, Inc. et al. v. City of San Leandro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 37, 43.)
We deem true all material facts properly pled (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591), as well as those facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403) or facts subject to judicial notice (Lincoln Property Co., N.C., Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 905, 911). A reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 799, 807.) However, we will not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law and may disregard allegations that are contrary to law, or are contrary to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken or to an unambiguous instrument incorporated by reference. (Moore v. Regents of University of California, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 125; Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 951, 955.)
While a decision to sustain or overrule a demurrer is subject to de novo review on appeal, a grant or denial of leave to amend calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742; Hernandez v. City of Pomona, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The trial court abuses its discretion in denying leave to amend only if the plaintiff shows a reasonable possibility of curing any defect by amendment. (Ibid.)
Guided by these principles, as discussed below, we find the trial court properly sustained the demurrer.
II. This appeal is barred by Bussard I because (1) the prior litigation conclusively ended the matter and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain a belated new theory, and (2) the claims herein are barred by res judicata.
Following the conclusion of Bussard I, the trial court had no jurisdiction to act on any substantive matter.
It is well settled that the rejection by the probate court of a document purporting to be a will is “conclusive” of the invalidity of that purported will. (Castro v. Richardson (1861) 18 Cal. 478, 480; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1908, subd. (a)(1).) This notion is even more compelling after a matter has been reviewed on appeal. “‘The order of the appellate court as stated in the remittitur, “is decisive . . . . The lower court cannot reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings, nor retry the case, and if it should do so, the judgment rendered thereon would be void.”’” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.) “A general or unqualified affirmance ordinarily sustains the judgment and ends the litigation. The respondent can then enforce the judgment, the trial court cannot modify it, and further proceedings are improper.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1997 4th ed.) Appeal, § 742, p. 772.)
Here, the prior appeal did not result in a remand for any further proceedings in the trial court. At some point, litigation must come to an end. After we affirmed the judgment of trial court in Bussard I and the remittitur issued advising the trial court that its judgment had been affirmed (see Code Civ. Proc., § 43), the case was over as to all substantive issues regarding the exhibits in the prior litigation. Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to make any determinations regarding exhibit 2, and it properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petitions.
Warner’s claims as to two of his petitions are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Apart from the lack of jurisdiction, the claims raised in the petitions are also barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “‘Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) It promotes judicial economy by ensuring that “all claims based on the same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date.” (Id. at p. 897.)
Once a party has had the opportunity “‘in a court of competent jurisdiction [to litigate its claim, the party] should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent.’” (Pollock v. University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1427.) In fact, even though a cause of action is titled differently or a new “theory” is raised, the doctrine of res judicata prevents a party from relitigating the same “issue” or “primary right” raised in prior litigation. (Ibid.; see also Lincoln Property Co., N.C., Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 912-913 .) One cannot “split” a primary right into different legal theories or different causes of action. When there is only one primary right, an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar, even though the second suit is based on a different theory or seeks a different remedy. (Lincoln Property, supra, at p. 913.)
Here, two of the three petitions in the present case seek to establish the same primary rights that were previously resolved adversely to Warner. Warner’s first petition raises the new theory of the integration of documents in an effort once again to admit exhibit 2 to probate. However, we clearly held in Bussard I that exhibit 2 had no testamentary effect. Warner’s second petition also seeks a “do-over” and attempts to establish the notion that Bussard and all named heirs were disinherited, an interpretation we conclusively rejected in Bussard I as “without foundation.”
We note that although Warner alleges exhibits 2 and 3 were written on the same date and placed in the same mailing envelope, the doctrine of integration does not necessarily apply to permit admission to probate of exhibit 2. More than similar dates and physical propinquity are required to establish the doctrine of integration. The documents must “‘by their internal sense’” demonstrate their coherence (Estate of Plumer (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 760, 763), to the extent that they “are integrated by their context [and] are congruous, continuous, and make a consistent whole.” (Estate of Moody (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 300, 312.) Here, however, the trial court aptly questioned why the decedent would bother to disinherit her maternal grandmother’s side of the family (exhibit 3), if she had left all of her estate to the religious organizations represented by Warner (exhibit 2). Given such incongruity between exhibits 2 and 3, the doctrine of integration is of doubtful application.
If this interpretation were adopted, none of decedent’s relatives would be entitled to receive any of the estate, and the entire estate would escheat to the State. If that was decedent’s intent, she would not have made the distinction of disinheriting only the Ghering side (decedent’s mother’s side) of her family in exhibit 3.
Even though the probate matter under review apparently remains open for purposes such as settling the executor’s account, the issues raised herein have been conclusively adjudicated on the merits. The doctrine of res judicata applies in various contexts to probate matters (see, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 813; Estate of Gray (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 478, 486) and is a bar to two of Warner’s new petitions.
Warner’s claim as to his third petition is also without merit.
Warner’s third petition in the present case seeks to strike and cancel the letters of administration issued to James Bussard, who was appointed after trial as the personal representative of the estate. Warner acknowledges on appeal that he seeks this relief only to the extent he is successful in the present appeal which, of course, is not the case. The issue is thus moot.
Moreover, the order complained of by Warner--which removes Norman Kuch as special administrator and requires him to turn over records and assets of the estate to Bussard--occurred after the petitions were dismissed and judgment entered. Warner cites no authority for the ability of an appellate court to review such matters that occurred after the judgment. In any event, once letters of administration are issued to a general personal representative, the powers of a special administrator automatically cease by operation of law, and the administrator must “promptly deliver” to the personal representative all records of property and assets of the estate. (Prob. Code, § 8546, subd. (b).)
Accordingly, the trial court properly removed Kuch as special administrator and appointed Bussard as the personal representative. Warner’s third petition is without merit.
III. Sanctions.
Bussard requests the imposition of sanctions upon Warner and his attorney, Thomas J. Jeffers, Jr., for a frivolous appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; see In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650; Young v. Rosenthal (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 131.) Indeed, this appeal is frivolous because it indisputably has no merit. It is well settled that issues barred by res judicata or amounting to spurious circumvention of a prior decision can support the imposition of sanctions on appeal. (See Beckstead v. International Industries, Inc. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 927, 934-935; Nelson v. Crocker Nat. Bank (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 536, 541.) However, because we have been advised that Attorney Thomas J. Jeffers, Jr., has recently died, we, of course, decline to entertain the request for sanctions.
Warner also seeks the imposition of sanctions. Warner asserts that “throughout most of the proceedings in this matter” one of the counsel for Bussard (Attorney Bess Blank) engaged in a “personal vendetta” against attorney Thomas Jeffers. Specifically, Warner complains of allegedly irrelevant facts and misrepresentations in the demurrer before the trial court. However, any complaints about conduct before the trial court regarding documents and arguments in the demurrer should be addressed to the trial court. Our authority to levy sanctions is limited to appellate matters. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(e).) Warner’s request for sanctions is therefore denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DOI TODD, J., CHAVEZ, J.