Opinion
B157611
7-31-2003
Estate of IRMA GENE BAILEY, Deceased. KASHIF A. RAHEEM, Petitioner and Appellant, v. RUTH SMITH WALTON, et al., Contestants and Respondents.
Lakeshore Law Center and Jeffrey Wilens for Petitioner and Appellant. Law Offices of Larry D. Lewellyn and Larry D. Lewellyn for Contestants and Respondents.
SUMMARY
This is an appeal from a judgment and order granting a will contest and revoking an earlier order admitting the will of Irma Gene Bailey to probate. The only issue is whether substantial evidence supported the trial courts finding that the decedent lacked the mental capacity to make a will. The trial court credited the evidence of two doctors, including the decedents attending physician, who testified the decedent suffered from dementia syndrome and it was highly unlikely she would be able to understand the ramifications of the will she signed. This testimony and accompanying medical records constitute substantial evidence of lack of testamentary capacity, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Irma Gene Bailey, a resident in a convalescent home, signed a will on October 29, 1998, leaving her entire estate to her distant cousin, Kashif Raheem. Raheem met Bailey when he was a child, and when he moved to California in 1985 at the age of 20, he saw her more frequently. He and another cousin helped Mrs. Bailey with shopping, medical appointments, and so on, and Raheem moved into Baileys house when Baileys husband had his leg amputated. Shortly thereafter, Baileys husband, who died in 1996, moved into a convalescent home, and a few months later Bailey followed. Raheem visited her regularly, and continued to live in her house.
According to Raheem, in 1998 Bailey asked Raheem to make arrangements to have a will drawn for her, leaving everything to Raheem. Raheem consulted a self-help legal organization called "We the People." Charles Pickle, a paralegal, prepared the will after speaking with Raheem. Pickle brought the will to the convalescent home and Raheem arranged for witnesses-Raheems wife Renee King and a friend, Eddie Scott-to be present. Raheem later testified Bailey read the will silently to herself and complimented him on a job well done; Raheem read the will aloud to Bailey again, "to make sure this is definitely what she really wanted to do," and Bailey responded affirmatively when Pickle asked her if she understood what was read to her. King, Scott and Pickle all testified that Bailey was alert, was focused, knew who was present in the room with her, and was aware she was signing a will. Specifically:
The will provided that Raheems son would receive Baileys estate should Raheem predecease Bailey. According to Raheems testimony at trial, the estate consisted of Baileys home. At some point, Raheem was made attorney in fact and the beneficiary of Baileys bank account. Raheem could not recall how much money was in the account when Bailey died; he could not recall whether it was more than $ 10,000 or whether it was less than $ 50,000.
. King testified Bailey was sitting up in bed, knew who King was, read the will to herself, conversed with King and others on general subjects, including complimenting Raheem on doing a good job with the will, and was alert and focused.
. Scott testified he exchanged greetings with Bailey, who recognized him, appeared to be alert, looked fine, talked normally, and seemed the same as she was when he did yard work for her before she moved into the convalescent home.
. Pickle stated Bailey appeared to read the will silently to herself; Raheem read it to her before it was signed and witnessed; Pickle asked her if she understood the documents she was signing and she said she did; he asked her questions-where she was, who was president-and she answered them correctly; and he believed she had her thinking ability. Bailey was alert, good-humored and joking with Raheem, and there was nothing to indicate she may have been confused or disoriented.
Pickle also testified that had he known the opinion of Baileys attending physician, he probably would not have allowed Bailey to sign the will and would have suggested Raheem contact a medical ombudsman.
Bailey died in February 2000, at the age of 86, and on March 31, 2000, Raheem filed a petition for probate of her will. In May, the court issued letters testamentary appointing Raheem executor. Meanwhile, Ruth Smith Walton, one of Baileys first cousins, also commenced a probate proceeding in another branch of the superior court and was appointed administrator of Baileys estate. The court later vacated that order and allowed the order appointing Raheem as estate representative to remain in effect. In October 2001, Walton and six other cousins filed a will contest seeking to revoke the probate of the will. The contest papers claimed Walton received no notice of Raheems petition to admit the will to probate and that this constituted extrinsic fraud; Bailey lacked testamentary capacity; the signature on the will was not Baileys; the will was executed as a result of undue influence by Raheem; and the will provided for an unnatural disposition of the estate unduly benefiting Raheem.
The contestants are all first cousins of Bailey who live in other states.
At a bench trial, the contestants presented testimony from Baileys primary care physician, Dr. Phyllis Hayes-Reams. Dr. Reams treated Bailey from late September 1997-13 months before she signed the will-until Bailey was transferred from her nursing facility to a hospital shortly before her death in February 2000. Her testimony included the following:
. Bailey had a "history of psychotic behavioral agitation," and as of late December 1997, Reams "felt that she had dementia syndrome." In 1995, a right frontal lobe meningioma in Baileys brain had been resected; post-surgery she had a history of seizures and treatment with medication to prevent seizures. Dr. Reams "found her to be confused"; she "probably could recognize familiar people" and was "cooperative on very basic instructions." However, "even as early as 97 I would state that I would question her ability for higher level functioning in terms of decision making. So it was at that point that I felt that there was a dementia syndrome."
. Reams distinguished Baileys "dementia syndrome" from that of someone who had suffered multiple strokes or who had Alzheimers disease, "which is more of a progressively deteriorating status in cognition." She found Bailey "untestable at that time" in terms of a formal mental status examination. "She had been pretty much that way since I took over her care at the end of September, so I called it a dementia syndrome." Reams thought this was a residual from her surgery. The surgery would "definitely" have affected Baileys cognitive abilities. Baileys medical records also showed psychotic behavior. Reams testified that abnormalities in the frontal lobe of the brain, the site of Baileys 1995 surgery, can result in potentially destructive behavior and severe agitation, and Bailey was thus treated with psychotropic drugs on an ongoing basis.
. A "restraint review assessment summary" for Bailey for October 20, 1998, reflected Bailey "remains confused and disoriented" and continued to require safety restraints in bed due to poor safety awareness and poor judgment.
. Medical records showed that Dr. Reamss assistant visited Bailey on October 30, 1998, the day after the will was executed, and completed a one-page periodic assessment form indicating that Baileys rehabilitation potential was poor, and that she "does not have the capacity to understand and make decisions." Reams testified that the information reflected on that form "had been well documented concerning Miss Bailey even months prior" concerning her condition.
The assessment form offered three choices; the other two were "has the capacity to understand and make decisions" and "has fluctuating capacity."
An assessment dated October 19, 1999, a year after the will was executed, stated that Bailey was "unable to provide care for herself appropriately due to severe cognitive deficits, complicated by physical functional status and behavioral symptoms requiring staffs [sic] assistance in most aspects of ADL [active daily living]s."
. Counsel showed Baileys will to Dr. Reams, and asked Reams if Bailey "would not have been able to understand or comprehend a document such as" the will. Reams answered: "In my general opinion, I would really question if she would have the ability for this level of processing."
On cross-examination, Dr. Reams testified:
C She had seen Bailey disoriented "many times."
Dr. Reams explained: "As I stated, on what I would consider good days, when she was cooperative with examination, she would talk about things that happened in the past. I, from my recollection, dont remember her talking current things going on. [P] At her worst agitated state, she was very disoriented, not recognizing the nurses taking care of her, not wanting to take medication at times. So wed do go away or reapproach her to take her routine medications. So those are some examples of her disorientation."
. Referring to Dr. Reamss general opinion questioning Baileys mental ability, counsel asked, "Are you saying that she did not have the ability?" Dr. Reams responded, "No. Im not saying that I think from my experience with Miss Bailey, which although it was bimonthly, I think I have a very good assessment of her abilities. I think to be able to say without a doubt I would have had to be part of that discussion to know. But I think I could say without reservation that I doubt her abilities to be able to process and understand the ramifications of her decisions."
On re-direct examination:
. Counsel referred to Dr. Reamss statement on cross-examination that she could not say "without a doubt" that Bailey did not have the mental capacity to execute the will, and asked: "Am I correct that you are saying it is more unlikely or more probable than not that she was able to comprehend and understand those documents?" Reams responded, "I would say in my opinion that I would think that it would be highly unlikely that she would be able to understand the ratification [sic] of her decision under the document."
. When asked if Baileys dementia syndrome became progressively worse or was something that could improve, Reams said, "Its still always possible that a patient with Mrs. Baileys history could have developed also some superimposed Alzheimers disease on top of it. But, again, at the point that I evaluated her, I felt there were signs and symptoms of a dementia syndrome, but I did not diagnose it as a Alzheimers." Reams responded affirmatively to the question whether Baileys dementia syndrome and psychotic behavior caused Bailey to have a cognitive impairment.
Other witnesses for the contestants included Walton and Dr. Bambi Nickelberry, who testified as follows:
. Walton last saw Bailey in 1984; spoke to her in 1993 on the telephone; and spoke with her again on October 27 or 28, 1998, shortly before the will was executed. Walton testified Bailey did not know who Walton was, and when Walton mentioned her sister Jennie, Bailey thought she was talking about her grandmother, who died in 1947. Walton had been told by a family member that Bailey had "lost her mind," and after their conversation Walton was convinced this was so and that Bailey had senile dementia.
. Dr. Nickelberry, a family practice specialist, testified as a medical expert after reviewing Baileys medical records. She testified the records showed Baileys brain surgery in 1995 left her with cognitive dysfunction and behavioral problems; she was continually confused; there were episodes of severe agitation; a significant percentage of the frontal lobe had been removed and "they do not recover from that." She stated that elderly patients who are schizophrenic or delusional might have lucid moments, "but they have all of their gray matter. They have all of their brain function. Miss Bailey did not have that. So I cant imagine what could have transpired on a brain level that could have-that she could have regained that function." She observed the records showed a diagnosis of senile dementia, but not Alzheimers disease. Nickelberry testified it was unlikely Bailey would know who her caregivers were; would probably not recognize Raheem when he came to visit her; from 1995 forward would not have been able to recognize any of her family members; and would not have known who the President was. Baileys "judgment function was absolutely diminished because she had no right frontal lobe function. Thats the part [of] the brain that governs judgment." With respect to Baileys ability to recall the extent of any property she may have owned, Nickelberry said she would not be able to remember anything recent. She testified Bailey could not have "true lucid moments," where one is able to integrate ideas and functions, but instead would "confabulate," that is, give an answer that may sound right, but is not right. Bailey did not have cognitive function or judgment and would not be able to integrate or understand the information in her will.
Nickelberry explained senile dementia as a condition affecting the elderly. "It has to do with what we theorize or micro infarction to the brain where part of the brain just arent getting the blood supply that it needs to function. And you develop — theres degrees of senile dementia and different presentations of senile dementia depending on what part of the brain is affected. If the blood flow is more affected. You may have more cognitive dysfunction. The other part you may have relative to memory, but its usually related to elderly and infarction, poor blood supply to the brain." She also stated Alzheimers disease is different because it is presenile, and could happen to someone of a younger age.
Raheem presented testimony from those present at the time the will was signed, as described above. In addition, he presented testimony from John Ali and Enid Reed, as follows:
. Ali, also a distant cousin of Baileys, had assisted Bailey and her late husband since the 1980s, knew Raheem all his life, and visited Bailey regularly after she moved to the convalescent home. Bailey had conversations with Ali about a will, and told Ali she did not want the state to take over her property and did not want certain members of her family, referring to Walton, to take it over either. She was "adamant about that" and said she preferred for Raheem "to be in this property ... " Bailey expressed "more than once" that she wanted Raheem to have her entire estate. She told Ali there was a rift between her and Walton. Ali said that he saw Bailey around the time she executed her will. He testified, "Some days Miss Bailey just seemed she didnt want to be bothered. Some days she was alert. But if you ask me did she recognize me, did we communicate, yes." When asked if he thought she was capable of understanding her will at that time, he said, "Im not a doctor. To the best of my ability, Im sure she understood. It was brought up to me while she was there in the nursing home. So I would have to say Im pretty sure if she didnt, she wouldnt have dealt with us, knowing Miss Bailey, you know."
. Reed, a clinical neuropsychologist with two doctorates, testified as an expert witness, based on Baileys medical records, and disagreed with Dr. Nickelberrys assessment that Bailey would not be capable of understanding a last will and testament. Reed testified that the side effects of any brain surgery include confusion and disorientation, but that gradually and with therapy, "about the end of the first six months you have physically most of the corrections. But the brain itself can take up to three years to function correctly, the cognitive part." Baileys medical records showed "she was doing fine by 98. Shes participating in the activities." Reed testified the records did not specify what kind of dementia was diagnosed in Bailey. "She was confused at periods and alert at periods. There was no attempt to define it, which they could have done." Dementia "is a whole category of diseases of the central nervous system in which brain itself is affected," and there are many types. Reed said she thought the surgery resulted in Baileys dementia; when asked if the dementia "could have resolved itself," she said, "Depends on what causes it." Reed opined that on a good day, Bailey was capable of understanding to whom she would want her estate to go and what it consisted of, and that she could have understood the nature of the documents.
Dr. Reed stated: "The physical part would resolve itself more readily than the cognitive functioning. By 18 months most of the connections in place. The next 12 months or so are getting your sense of apportion back, ability to refine things."
Reed said Baileys cousin-presumably Raheem or Ali-informed her "that she had a television set in her room, was watching news, soap operas, different events. She was going to the activity room playing checkers and engaging in other activities." Reed frequently relied on information from Baileys cousin, about the fact that Bailey read magazines, watched news programs, could bring up ideas and talk about anything, and several times mentioned she wanted to have a will drawn.
. In addition to his testimony about the execution of the will, Raheem testified about his familial relationship to Bailey, his close contact with and assistance to Bailey through the years, her request to him to have the will drawn, and his arrangements to do so. He testified she had limited mobility at the time the will was executed, but otherwise no medical problems. She was not able to walk without assistance, and had a tendency to fall out of bed if not restrained by a safety vest. Her mental condition, however, was "vibrant, focused, alerted"; they talked of many things, such as Baileys teaching career and travels and articles in newspapers; she was able to read magazines and do crossword puzzles. He disagreed with the assessment form stating that Bailey did not have the capacity to understand and make decisions, testifying that he knew that she did.
The trial concluded on March 7, 2002. On March 13, the court rejected the contestants claims of a forged signature and undue influence in the execution of the will. However, the court revoked the probate of the will on the ground of lack of capacity, relying on the testimony of Doctors Reams and Nickelberry, and reinstated Walton as administrator of the estate. The courts judgment stated that "the expert testimony of Dr. Bambi Nickelberry, and Dr. [Phyllis] Reams as the decedents treating physician, was more probative than that of Dr. Enid Reed, and therefore this Court finds in favor of the Contestants on this issue [lack of capacity] ..." Raheem filed a timely appeal.
The court stated: "The court listened very carefully to the evidence on [Raheems] side, but the court does not feel that it can ignore and does not that by a preponderance of the evidence ... that based on the expert testimony of the two doctors ... from the courts perspective, Miss Nickelberry-was that her name?. . . Miss Nickelberrys testimony was instructive—Dr., not Miss—Dr. Nickelberrys and the doctor, the psychologist ... Dr. Reed. I found her testimony to be somewhat confusing, less probative than Dr. Nickelberrys. And it was Dr. - the treating physician? ... Dr. Reams was, I think, probably the most probative of all as far as the court is concerned. The court feels that her-she was in actual contact with Mrs. Bailey. Her opinion was that it was highly unlikely that-perhaps I shouldnt use highly, I dont remember if she used the word highly unlikely or that it was just unlikely, but the court takes it that based on not only her records but her memory of Miss Bailey that she would have been able to be in a position to have had capacity to make a will."
DISCUSSION
We note preliminarily the legal principles against which we measure a claim of lack of testamentary capacity.
First, mental derangement sufficient to invalidate a will may take one of two forms: "insanity of such broad character as to establish mental incompetency generally," or some "specific and narrower form of insanity under which the testator is the victim of some hallucination or delusion." (Goodman v. Zimmerman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1677, quoting Estate of Perkins (1925) 195 Cal. 699, 703-704, 235 P. 45.) This case involves the former type, mental incompetency generally.
Second, in a case alleging general mental incompetence, testamentary capacity exists when the testator understands the nature of the act he is doing, and "understands the nature and situation of his property; [and] recalls and understands his relation to the persons who have claims upon his bounty and whose interests are affected by the provisions of the will." (Estate of Schwartz (1945) 67 Cal. App. 2d 512, 520, 155 P.2d 76; see Prob. Code, § 6100.5.)
This common law standard was codified in Probate Code section 6100.5, which provides than an individual is not competent to make a will if he or she "does not have sufficient mental capacity to be able to (A) understand the nature of the testamentary act, (B) understand and recollect the nature and situation of the individuals property, or (C) remember and understand the individuals relations to living descendants, spouse, and parents, and those whose interests are affected by the will." (Prob. Code, § 6100.5, subd. (a)(1).)
Third, testamentary capacity is presumed to exist until the contrary is shown. A person contesting a will has the burden to show that the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of unsound mind and that such unsoundness "actually affected or controlled testamentary capacity. The question is not what may have been the testators mental state at the time of the testamentary act, but what it actually was." (Estate of Schwartz, supra , 67 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 519, 520 .) Evidence of the condition of the testators mind before and after the date the will was signed is admissible, "but it assumes importance only insofar as it bears upon that condition at the very time of the execution of the will." (Id . at p. 520.)
Fourth, "once it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable ... that the incompetency continues to exist." (Estate of Fosselman (1957) 48 Cal.2d 179, 186, 308 P.2d 336 ["such an inference is particularly strong in a case ... in which the decedent was suffering from senile dementia, a mental disorder that becomes progressively worse"].) But, the "difficulty lies in determining the point at which in its progress [senile dementia] has so impaired the faculties that they fall below the mark of legal capacity." (Ibid. , quoting Byrne v. Fulkerson (1914) 254 Mo. 97, 121, 162 S.W. 171.)
Finally, on review the court determines whether substantial evidence was presented showing lack of testamentary capacity at the time of execution of the will. (Estate of Schwartz, supra, 67 Cal. App. 2d at p. 520.) In this courts review for substantial evidence, "we look at the evidence in support of the successful party, disregarding the contrary showing. [Citation.] All conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the respondent. All legitimate and reasonable inferences are indulged in order to uphold the verdict if possible." (Goodman v. Zimmerman, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1678.)
Raheem contends the record described above fails to show substantial evidence of testamentary incapacity. He argues the contestants failed to show by substantial evidence that the will was not executed during a period of lucidity. He points out that the evidence of Baileys mental state at the time of execution was entirely one-sided. All four witnesses agreed Bailey appeared to understand she was executing her will and leaving her property to Raheem, and Bailey passed the notarys rudimentary test. She knew where she was and who was then President. Moreover, evidence of her condition before and after execution of the will was mixed. The persons who saw her on a regular basis, Ali and Raheem, described an enfeebled but still mentally alert woman; the contestants produced no evidence from other residents of the convalescent home to contradict that assessment; and Bailey was never given a definitive neurological test to assess her mental condition.
The argument fails, because it rests on nothing more than conflicts in the evidence. The contestants were required to prove Baileys general testamentary incompetency, and "incompetency on a given day ... may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to and after the day in question." (Estate of Fosselman, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 185.) Thus, Raheem misconstrues the rule when he asserts the contestants must establish a negative proposition, namely, that Bailey did not execute the will during a period of lucidity. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion that the contestants must provide evidence of incapacity on the precise date of execution of a will. The "absence of evidence showing lack of capacity on the [precise] date of execution [does] not require that the finding [of lack of testamentary capacity] be upset." (Estate of Callahan (1967) 67 Cal.2d 609, 616, 63 Cal. Rptr. 277, 432 P.2d 965, citing Estate of Fosselman, supra, at pp. 185-186.)
Estate of Callahan is particularly instructive. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court order granting the motion of will proponents for a nonsuit. The Court held that evidence introduced by contestants on the issue of testamentary capacity was sufficient to require submission of the issue to a jury. (Estate of Callahan, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 617.) The contestants evidence included a treating doctors testimony that decedent suffered from "generalized arteriosclerosis with senility" and it was "unlikely" that she knew the nature and extent of her property or understood her relationship with persons with claims upon her bounty; the doctor also testified on cross-examination that she might have had lucid moments during the relevant period. (Id. at pp. 613-614.) Another treating doctor testified decedent was suffering from "moderate" senile dementia, and could have had lucid periods, but the occurrence of such periods was unlikely. (Id. at p. 615.) The Court found the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of lack of testamentary capacity, so that the matter should have been submitted to the trier of fact. (Ibid.)
Raheem points to testimony that Bailey had good days and bad days, in an effort to show there was no evidence the will was not executed on a good day. However, Dr. Reams did not testify that Bailey was mentally competent on her good days; she said, "On what I would consider good days, when she was cooperative with examination, she would talk about things that happened in the past."
Thus, the rule is that the contestants must show "affirmatively [* 24] and by a preponderance of the evidence" that Bailey was not mentally competent to make a will on the date it was executed. (Estate of Schwartz, supra , 67 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 519-520.) This they did, with testimony from Reams and Nickelberry, which the trial court believed. Evidence showing lack of capacity on the precise date of execution was not required; as stated ante, once it is shown that incompetency exists and is caused by a mental disorder of a general and continuous nature, it is reasonable to infer that the incompetency continues to exist. (Estate of Fosselman, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 186.)
Those present at the signing of the will thought Bailey was alert and knew she was signing a will and leaving her property to Raheem. However, except for the notary, who testified he would have called for an ombudsman had he known Dr. Reamss opinion of Baileys condition, those present were Raheem, his wife and his friend. Moreover, their testimony does not show Bailey remembered the nature and situation of her property, or her relationship to others besides Raheem. (See Prob. Code, § 6100.5.) More importantly, this is merely conflicting evidence. The trial court was not required to ignore the evidence given by Baileys attending physician, Dr. Reams, or Dr. Nickelberrys testimony based on Baileys medical records, or the periodic assessment form completed by Reamss assistant the day after the will was executed, indicating that Bailey "does not have the capacity to understand and make decisions." And finally, so far as this courts review is concerned, the evidence cannot be re-weighed. (Estate of Mann (1986) 184 Cal. App. 3d 593, 602-603, 229 Cal. Rptr. 225 [province of a reviewing court is the same in a will contest as in any other civil case; the evidence must be examined but not weighed; when two or more inferences may reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court].)
Raheem points to several cases he contends support his position. We cannot agree with his assessment. For example:
. Raheem cites Estate of Goetz (1967) 253 Cal. App. 2d 107, 61 Cal. Rptr. 181, in which the court observed, "When one has a mental disorder in which there are lucid periods, it is presumed that his will has been made during a time of lucidity." (Id. at p. 114.) However, it is up to the trier of fact to decide whether there were lucid periods. Estate of Goetz merely upholds a jury finding rejecting contestants claim of lack of testamentary capacity, finding "no difficulty" sustaining the verdict. (Id. at p. 113.) There was evidence decedent suffered from "chronic brain syndrome caused by senile dementia," and the jury was instructed that proof of unsound mind from a progressive mental disease such as senile dementia is presumed to continue in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (Id. at pp. 113-114.) However, "the jury was free to find against the medical testimony and against the presumption, if one existed, of an asserted continuing mental condition," and medical testimony is not conclusive on the issue. (Id. at p. 114.) Moreover, there was also testimony from those same physicians about the existence of lucid periods, as well as letters written by the decedent demonstrating her competency. In addition, there was testimony from the attorney who drew the will-and discussed with decedent the terms of the will, the details of her property and her reasons for excluding the contestant from her will-as well as testimony from six other witnesses about decedents soundness of mind. (Id. at pp. 114-115.)
. Raheem says Estate of Sanderson (1959) 171 Cal. App. 2d 651, 341 P.2d 358 is "illuminating." In that case, the court found a "complete absence of any evidence that the deceased at the time of making the will, or at any other time immediately preceding or succeeding its execution," lacked testamentary capacity, and reversed a jury verdict finding decedent incompetent. (Id. at p. 657.) The court reviewed numerous cases and pointed out that California courts have repeatedly held that " old age, feebleness, forgetfulness, filthy personal habits, personal eccentricities, failure to recognize old friends or relatives, physical disability, absent-mindedness and mental confusion do not furnish grounds for holding that a testator lacked testamentary capacity." (Id. at p. 660, quoting Estate of Selb (1948) 84 Cal. App. 2d 46, 49, 190 P.2d 277.) However, none of the witnesses for the contestant in Estate of Sanderson all residents with decedent at a rest home - testified as to events or the testators mental condition at the time the will was executed. (Estate of Sanderson, supra, at pp. 655, 660.) They testified decedent was emotional, moody, unreasonably angry at times, could not carry on a continuous coherent conversation, lacked gratitude, was irrational, and so on. (Id. at p. 656.) However, there was no evidence of "settled insanity, hallucinations or delusions." (Id. at p. 658.) The court pointed out that the opinions of witnesses on mental soundness "are of no greater value than the reasons given in support" of the opinions. (Id. at p. 660, quoting Estate of Selb, supra, at p. 52.) The court concluded none of these witnesses related any events having any tendency to show testator did not have a complete understanding of his property and his relatives at the time he made his will. (Estate of Sanderson, supra, at pp. 660-661.) Moreover, the attorney who drew the will testified he discussed with the decedent his relatives, his property, and his reasons for not leaving anything to his brother, and wrote the will in longhand at the direction of the decedent; decedents attending physician also testified that the decedent was mentally competent, as did several other witnesses. (Id. at pp. 654-655, 661.)
. In Estate of Wynne (1966) 239 Cal. App. 2d 369, 374-375, 48 Cal. Rptr. 656, the court upheld the trial courts conclusion that decedent, although at times the victim of hallucinations, was mentally competent to execute a contested codicil, and her hallucinations had no bearing on her decision to make the codicil. Moreover, there was a conflict in the medical testimony as to whether the decedent had ever suffered a mental disorder of a general and continuous nature. One expert, testifying hypothetically from medical records, opined decedent could not have been in a mental condition to execute the codicil; decedents local doctor, who was intimately familiar with her medical condition, as well as the subscribing witnesses to the codicil, including the attorney/executor, testified otherwise. (Id. at pp. 371, 376-377.)
In sum, there was evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that from 1997 forward, Bailey suffered from dementia syndrome and could not understand the nature and extent of her property or her relation to those whose interests were affected by her will. While there may have been evidence to the contrary, it was the province of the trial court as trier of fact to resolve the conflicts in the evidence, and we cannot say as a matter of law the courts finding was unreasonable. (Estate of Fosselman, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 186.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Contestants are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: COOPER, P.J. RUBIN, J.