Essex v. Lukas

8 Citing cases

  1. Hurley v. Schmidt

    C.A. No. PC 06-3722 (R.I. Super. May. 21, 2012)

    Before a court may identify the boundary, however, it first must determine "whether there has been the required acquiescence." Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 469, 159 A.2d 612, 613 (1960). Further, the existence of acquiesence is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the case.

  2. Norton v. Courtemanche

    798 A.2d 925 (R.I. 2002)   Cited 16 times
    Noting that the trial justice's determination that declarant lacked good faith based on facts of the particular case should receive discretion and not be disturbed on appeal unless clear error

    Rosa v. Oliveira, 115 R.I. 277, 279, 342 A.2d 601, 602 (1975) (citing Waldman v. Town of Barrington, 102 R.I. 14, 227 A.2d 592 (1967)). See also Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 459, 159 A.2d 612, 613 (1960). We therefore review plaintiffs' claim of error de novo.

  3. Brooks v. Atkins

    C.A. No. WC 2009-0810 (R.I. Super. Nov. 27, 2013)

    However, before this Court may identify the boundary, it must first determine "whether there has been the required acquiescence." Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 469, 159 A.2d 612, 613 (1960). This requires a showing that the party charged with acquiescence had actual notice of the conditions to which it is claimed they have acquiesced.

  4. Gifford v. Racine, 95-5936 (1998)

    C.A. No. 95-5936 (R.I. Super. Nov. 27, 1998)

    "The acquiescence is also an issue of fact depending upon the evidence in each case." Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 459-460, 159 A.2d 612, 613 (1960) (citing DiMaio v. Ranaldi, 49 R.I. 204, 206, 142 A. 145, ___, (1928); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 426, 27 A.2d 826, 829, (1942)). This doctrine is usually invoked when determining whether boundaries marked by physical objects, such as by a fence or stone monument, will be given preference over boundary lines described in recorded title.

  5. Paquin v. Guiorguiev

    117 R.I. 239 (R.I. 1976)   Cited 9 times
    In Paquin v. Guiorguiev, 117 R.I. 239, 366 A.2d 169 (1976), another acquiescence case, this Court upheld the trial justice's determination that a boundary line had been established by acquiescence.

    As to the first contention, it is a well-settled principle that acquiescence in a boundary line assumed or established for a period of time equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a re-entry is conclusive evidence of an agreement to establish such a line and the parties will be precluded from claiming that the line so acquiesced in is not the true boundary. Rosa v. Oliveira, 115 R.I. 277, 342 A.2d 601 (1975); Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 159 A.2d 612 (1960); Malone v. O'Connell, 86 R.I. 167, 133 A.2d 756 (1957); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 27 A.2d 826 (1942); O'Donnell v. Penney, 17 R.I. 164, 20 A. 305 (1890). As to defendants' second argument, it is clear that where a person through mistake as to the boundary line takes possession of land belonging to another, believing it to be his own, the holding is adverse, and if continued for the requisite period, will give title by adverse possession.

  6. Rosa v. Oliveira

    115 R.I. 277 (R.I. 1975)   Cited 21 times
    Concluding that a landowner may cut tree limbs extending onto his or her property

    [1, 2] Before turning to the evidence as it relates to the boundary line, we would repeat the well-settled principle that acquiescence in a boundary line assumed or established for a period of time equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry is conclusive evidence of an agreement to establish such a line and the parties will be precluded from claiming that the line so acquiesced in is not the true boundary. Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 159 A.2d 612 (1960); Malone v. O'Connell, 86 R.I. 167, 133 A.2d 756 (1957); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 27 A.2d 826 (1942); Mari v. Lankowicz, 61 R.I. 296, 200 A. 953 (1938); Di Santo v. De Bellis, 55 R.I. 433, 182 A. 488 (1935); Di Maio v. Ranaldi, 49 R.I. 204, 142 A. 145 (1928); Doyle v. Ralph, 49 R.I. 155, 141 A. 180 (1928); O'Donnell v. Penney, 17 R.I. 164, 20 A. 305 (1890). It is equally well settled that although the issue of what constitute the boundaries of a parcel of land is a question of law, the determination of where such boundaries are is a question of fact.

  7. Riverside Burial Society of Pawtucket v. Chitwood, 99-2713 (2003)

    C.A. No. P.C. 99-2713 (R.I. Super. Jan. 10, 2003)   Cited 1 times

    Significantly, there is no reference to the hemlock trees as a boundary in the March 19, 1983 deed conveying Lot 857 to plaintiff. See Essex v. Lukas, 90 R.I. 457, 464, 159 A.2d 612, 615 (1960) (wherein the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a trial justice's determination that there was no "mutual acquiescence" where the trial justice relied to a "great extent on the absence in the 1948 Essex deed of any reference to the hedge in question and also on the fact the premises were conveyed on measurements which did not include the strip of land in dispute"). Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the plaintiff's predecessors in title planted the trees to form a boundary with the agreement of the neighboring Nickerson family at the time.

  8. Church of God in Christ Jesus v. Griffin, 95-5806 (1998)

    C.A. No. 95-5806 (R.I. Super. Dec. 7, 1998)

    The facts in the instant case support no conclusion other than that the corporation did so acquiesce. See Essex v. Lukas, 159 A.2d 612, 613 (R.I. 1960) (In a property boundary dispute, acquiescence is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis). Directors Thomas and Lawrence, neither of whom were credible, apparently abandoned the Church for almost a decade.