"The fact that some or all of the components of the trade secret are well-known does not preclude protection for a secret combination, compilation, or integration of the individual elements." Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553, 501 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1998) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39(f) (1995)). Hence, even if all of the information is publicly available, a unique combination of that information, which adds value to the information, also may qualify as a trade secret.

Id. This is particularly true where acquisition of the information through independent research would be difficult, costly, or time consuming. Essex Group, Inc. v. SouthwireCo., 501 S.E.2d 501, 504 (Ga. 1998). In Hickory Specialties, the Court observed, "[t]he potential to develop the process by independent technology, affords the [former employee] no excuse to obtain the process through a confidential employer-employee relationship and then compete with the developer [of the process.]."

See, e.g., Barry L. Cohen, The Current Status of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 3 No. 2 Landslide 40 (2010); Jessica Lee, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Safeguarding the Privacy of Trade Secrets, 33 Colo. Law. 17 (Oct.2004); Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual States' Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. Rev. 621 (2002); Wiesner, A State–by–State Analysis, 16 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. at 216, 228.In support of its conclusion that Holton “would inevitably disclose the confidential information and trade secrets” of Vantage, the trial court cited without discussion the Georgia Trade Secrets Act and Essex Group v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553(1), 501 S.E.2d 501 (1998). In Essex v. Southwire, we held that Southwire's logistics system as a whole was a trade secret under the Georgia Trade Secrets Act and upheld the trial court's injunction prohibiting the employee who headed the three-year, $2 million development project from working in Essex's logistics department for up to five years.

(Punctuation omitted.) Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553, 557 (2) ( 501 S.E.2d 501) (1998). (a) Based on the jury's verdict that Trotman violated the UDTPA, the trial court granted an injunction against Trotman that (1) prohibited him from using a specified trial exhibit containing Velociteach course materials, (2) required him to return all Velociteach property and course materials, (3) forbade him from using Velociteach's customer lists, and (4) required disclosure of each person to whom he had shown the enjoined materials.

The party asserting the existence of a trade secret has the burden of proving that the information so qualifies and that the accused party violated the Act. Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553, 557 (1998); Salisbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 908 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1990). The Act defines a "trade secret" as

Despite Aliengena's testimony that there was "probably nothing" Insight had which derived its competitive value from not being generally known and not being readily ascertainable by proper means, there was evidence from which a jury could find that the FactorPlus software Brewer developed for Insight satisfied the definition of a trade secret under the Act. Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553, 554-557 (1) ( 501 SE2d 501) (1998); Tronitec, Inc. v. Shealy, 249 Ga. App. 442, 449-450 (7) (a), (b), (c) ( 547 SE2d 749) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 279 Ga. 428, 431 ( 614 SE2d 758) (2005); Camp Creek Hospitality Inns v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F3d at 1410-1412 (IV). Furthermore, there is evidence from which the jury could find that Brewer disclosed the trade secret in violation of the Act, and that Hull, GetLoaded, and FreightCheck knowingly acquired the trade secret through improper means. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees on Count 2 of the complaint.

Equitable relief generally is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court sustains the trial court's action where such discretion has not been abused. Essex Group v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553(2), 501 S.E.2d 501 (1998). There being no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in resolving the equitable features of the jury's verdict, we sustain the trial court's action.

2. Appellants contend that the GTSA was appellee's exclusive remedy and that the trial court erred when it granted SES general equitable relief in spite of the GTSA's preemption provision (OCGA § 10–1–767(a) ). Equitable relief is at the trial court's discretion and will not be overturned on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553(2), 501 S.E.2d 501 (1998); Slautterback v. Intech Management Svcs., 247 Ga. 762, 766, 279 S.E.2d 701 (1981) (“injunctions will not be interfered with in the absence of manifest abuse”). For reasons set forth herein, we find the trial court manifestly abused its discretion when it granted equitable relief to SES.

Instead, the trial court's order allows MLI's trespass and nuisance to continue and burdens the Goodes' property and their pocketbook by requiring them to abate a nuisance created by another. Compare Essex Group v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553(2) ( 501 S.E.2d 501) (1998). Because a review of the facts of this case demands the conclusion that the trial court's order constitutes clear error and a manifest abuse of discretion by that court, I dissent to the majority's opinion.

What is more, the interlocutory injunction is tailored to prohibit defendants from taking action on the property only with regard to the physical construction of the facility in question, and therefore, is not subject to the charge of being overbroad. See Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga. 553, 557 (2) ( 501 S.E.2d 501) (1998). There is no bar to other dealings involving the property.