Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1778-12T4
01-21-2015
VINCENT ESPOSITO, Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent.
Samuel J. Halpern, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Tattory, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Nugent and Manahan. On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System, Docket No. PERS-2-10-252050. Samuel J. Halpern, attorney for appellant. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Retirement System (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Tattory, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Vincent Esposito, appeals from a final determination of the Board of Trustees (Board), of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) finding that he was not eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits. We affirm.
The facts are essentially undisputed. Esposito was employed by the Department of Corrections as a Senior Corrections Officer assigned to Northern State Prison. On January 6, 2009, at approximately 5:45 a.m., Esposito parked his truck in the employee parking lot as was his daily custom while commuting to the prison for his 6 a.m. shift. Esposito parked in an area that he selected in order to protect his vehicle from becoming damaged. The parking space was approximately 100 to 150 yards from the entrance of the prison and located outside the prison walls. After Esposito exited his vehicle, he tripped in a pothole in the pavement. Although he felt some immediate pain, he proceeded through the entrance of the prison to attend roll call. He reported the incident to his superior officer. Thereafter, he was examined by a nurse who advised him to seek medical attention. Esposito was taken to a local hospital. Esposito eventually underwent surgery for a torn labrum. The injury left him unable to perform his duties as a corrections officer.
Esposito filed an application for accidental disability retirement benefits. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Esposito completed his commute at the time he entered the prison parking lot, parked his vehicle and secured it. The court found that as a matter of law that once Esposito started walking toward the employee entrance, he was performing "preliminary but necessary" duties. Kasper v. Board of Trustees, Teachers Pension and Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564 (2000). The ALJ recommended that the Board grant Esposito's application for accidental disability retirement.
In exceptions filed to the initial decision, the Board maintained Esposito was still in the process of commuting at the time of his accident. The Board rejected the ALJ's decision. The Board, citing Kasper, determined that Esposito was not injured during and as a result of his regular and assigned duties. The Board further determined that Esposito had not demonstrated that his "injury [was] causally connected, as a matter of common sense, to the work the employer has commissioned." This appeal followed.
The standard of review that applies in an appeal from a state agency decision is well established. "Judicial review of an agency's final decision is generally limited to a determination of whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable or lacks fair support in the record." Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009)). In reviewing an administrative decision, we ordinarily recognize the agency's expertise in its particular field. Ibid.
Our public pension systems are "bound up in the public interest and provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of conscientious protection." Zigmont v. Bd. of Trs., 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983). Because pension statutes are remedial in character, they are liberally construed and administered in favor of the person intended to be benefited thereby. Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High School Dist., Monmouth Cnty., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43, a member of the PERS may be retired on an accidental disability pension if the member is "permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties[.]" In Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 192 N.J. 189, 212-13 (2007), the court held that in order to qualify for accidental disability retirement benefits, a member of the retirement system must establish:
1. that he is permanently and totally disabled;
2. as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a. identifiable as to time and place,
b. undersigned and unexpected, and
c. caused by a circumstance external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the
work);
3. that the traumatic event occurred during and as a result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
4. that the disability was not the result of the member's willful negligence; and
5. that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated from performing his usual or any other duty.
Esposito argues that the Board erred in disqualifying him on the sole basis that the event that resulted in his injuries did not occur as a result of his regular or assigned duties. We disagree.
In Kasper, the court explained the meaning of the "during and as a result" provision of the statute:
The organizing principle is that one who is at the employer's premises solely to do his or her duty, and who, while doing what he or she is expected to do, is disabled by a traumatic accident, will qualify for inclusion in the class of those injured "during and as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties."
. . . .
That interpretation is faithful to the Legislature's restorative vision in amending N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c). As we previously noted, the amendment was not transformative. It was not intended to limit the accidental disability pension solely to an injury sustained while a teacher is writing on the blackboard in her classroom or a policeman is actually engaged in an arrest. On the contrary, it was meant to restore the
integrity of the premises rule; to reinvigorate the going and coming rule; and to qualify for an accidental disability pension an employee who is on premises controlled by the employer and whose injury is causally connected, as a matter of common sense, to the work the employer has commissioned.
[164 N.J. at 587].
Saliently, the Court found that to qualify for the benefits, an employee cannot be merely "coming or going" to work. Rather, the employee must be engaged in his or her employment duties on property owned or controlled by the employer in order to qualify for an accidental disability pension. Id. at 581. The Court held the statute excludes "employees who arrive at work long before the required hour for a card game in the teachers' lounge, to avoid traffic, read the paper, pay bills or socialize, as well as employees who return to work after hours to retrieve a left-behind wallet or date book." Id. at 587. Thus, in order to qualify for accidental disability benefits, the employee must satisfy the statutory criteria that they were on the work premises and performing a function causally connected to their work.
In Kasper, the claimant, an education media specialist, arrived at work forty-five minutes prior to school opening. While on the steps entering the front door of the school, Ms. Kasper was accosted by a male who stole her purse. During the incident she was pulled to the ground and injured. The court found that since Ms. Kasper had "parked her car, crossed the street to the school, and was negotiating the stairs" of the school when the incident occurred, she was in the performance of her duties and that her commute was completed. The court also considered that Ms. Kasper was required by her principal to arrive early to distribute media materials.
In reaching its decision, the Court noted the amendments to the accidental disability statutes requiring that the traumatic event occur "during or as a result of the performance of his regular or assigned duties," was "intended to reestablish the integrity of the premises rule and eliminate the judicially created exceptions to the going and coming rule." Kasper, supra, 164 N.J. at 580.
We find, as did the Board, that Esposito's disabling incident in the parking lot did not occur on the premises of the prison. The parking lot was neither owned nor controlled by his employer. At the time of his unfortunate injury, Esposito was not performing any function connected to his work assignment. Thus the injury was not causally connected to his work.
The Board found Esposito's injury was directly caused by the incident. That finding alone, however, does not satisfy the statutory requirement that the injury be the result of the performance of an employee's regular or assigned duties. N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43. Since the statute requires that the disability be the direct result of a traumatic event that occurred during the performance of regular or assigned duties, Esposito was required to satisfy the criteria to be eligible for the accidental disability benefits.
Predicated upon the factual scenario presented here, when considered with controlling law, we are in accord with the Board that Esposito's claim does not satisfy the criteria for eligibility for accidental benefits. As such, we conclude from our review of the record that the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and was supported by sufficient credible evidence. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Accordingly, there is no basis to alter the Board's decision. In Re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 70 (2010).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION