After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted the motion. Although the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law in traveling the wrong way on 80th Street (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1234[a] ; see also Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1127[a] ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ), there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and the proponent of a motion for summary judgment has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative fault as a matter of law (see Cattan v. Sutton, 120 A.D.3d 537, 538, 990 N.Y.S.2d 848 ; Sirlin v. Schreib, 117 A.D.3d 819, 985 N.Y.S.2d 688 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d at 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ; Burnett v. Reisenauer, 107 A.D.3d 656, 967 N.Y.S.2d 105 ). Here, the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that she was free from comparative fault in the happening of the accident (see Cattan v. Sutton, 120 A.D.3d at 538, 990 N.Y.S.2d 848 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d at 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ; Allen v. Echols, 88 A.D.3d 926, 926–927, 931 N.Y.S.2d 402 ).

The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the defendant appeals. The defendant failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint on the ground of no liability. Although Sanchez was negligent as a matter of law in traveling the wrong way on Irving Avenue (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1234[a] ; see also Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ), the transcript of the defendant's deposition testimony, submitted in support of his motion, presented a triable issue of fact as to whether he failed to see what was there to be seen through the proper use of his senses (see Nunez v. Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., 138 A.D.3d 807, 29 N.Y.S.3d 546 ; Palmeri v. Erricola, 122 A.D.3d 697, 698, 996 N.Y.S.2d 193 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d at 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ; Lu Yuan Yang v. Howsal Cab Corp., 106 A.D.3d 1055, 1056, 966 N.Y.S.2d 167 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint on the ground of no liability.

A defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing freedom from fault in the happening of the accident (see Gezelter v. Pecora, 129 A.D.3d 1021, 1021–1022, 13 N.Y.S.3d 141 ). Thus, the fact that the plaintiff was riding his bicycle in the wrong direction on a one-way street would not preclude a finding that negligence by the defendant's employee contributed to the accident (see Palmeri v. Erricola, 122 A.D.3d 697, 996 N.Y.S.2d 193 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ).

"A driver is negligent where he or she failed to see that which, through proper use of his or her senses, the driver should have seen" (Mehta v Keaveney, 216 A.D.3d 635, 635 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "An accident can have more than one proximate cause, and although it is generally for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause, it may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts" (Fox v Murgolo, 191 A.D.3d 765, 766 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the evidence the defendants submitted in support of their motion, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant driver was free from fault in the happening of the accident (see Mehta v Keaveney, 216 A.D.3d at 635; Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789). Since the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court should have denied their motion, without regard to the sufficiency of

"Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, a person riding a bicycle upon a roadway shall be granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle. A bicyclist is required to use reasonable care for his or her own safety, to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for vehicles, and to avoid placing himself or herself into a dangerous position" ( Sturm v. Chaudhary, 210 A.D.3d 927, 927, 176 N.Y.S.3d 798 ; seePalma v. Sherman, 55 A.D.3d 891, 891, 867 N.Y.S.2d 111 ). Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a), motorists must "exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, pedestrian, or domestic animal" on the roadway and to "give warning by sounding the horn when necessary" (seeBallentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ). A motorist also has a "common-law duty to see that which he [or she] should have seen through the proper use of his [or her] senses" ( Lieb v. Jacobson, 202 A.D.3d 1072, 1073, 163 N.Y.S.3d 586 ; seeKruter v. United Parcel Serv. Gen. Servs. Co., 210 A.D.3d 671, 672, 177 N.Y.S.3d 692 ). Here, the defendant, who submitted the transcripts of his and the plaintiff's deposition testimony, failed to establish, prima facie, that his conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident.

In this case, the evidence submitted in support of the defendant's motion, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Boulos v Lerner-Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709), failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendant was free from fault in the happening of the accident. The defendant's submissions did not eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether she was negligent in failing to see that which through the proper use of her senses she should have seen and whether she used reasonable care to avoid colliding with the plaintiff (see Fried v Misser, 115 A.D.3d 910, 911; Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789).

The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.The defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they were free from fault in the happening of the accident, because their submissions in support of the motion contained conflicting accounts of how the accident happened and raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant driver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 by failing to exercise due care to avoid the collision with the plaintiff (seeRodriguez v. Areloina , 137 A.D.3d 892, 893, 26 N.Y.S.3d 598 ; Ortiz v. AGL Trucking Corp. , 130 A.D.3d 592, 10 N.Y.S.3d 897 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc. , 115 A.D.3d 787, 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ; see alsoColpan v. Allied Cent. Ambulette, Inc. , 97 A.D.3d 776, 777, 949 N.Y.S.2d 124 ). The defendants' failure to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law required denial of their motion regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers (seeWinegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr. , 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ).

Defendant testified that he saw decedent in the bicycle lane a mile before the intersection where the collision occurred. Even if we credit defendant's further testimony that he did not see decedent immediately before the accident, we conclude that triable issues of fact remain whether defendant "failed to see what was there to be seen through the proper use of his senses" (Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 AD3d 787, 789). In addition, it is undisputed that there was a bicycle lane to defendant's right as he drove on Walden Avenue toward the intersection, and a jury should determine whether, in the exercise of due care, defendant should have anticipated that a bicyclist would be in the bicycle lane (see Colpan v Allied Cent. Ambulette, Inc., 97 AD3d 776, 777-778).

Since there may be more than one proximate cause of a motor vehicle accident, Ms. Adkins' failure to yield does not preclude as a matter of law a finding that negligence on Ms. Moran's part also contributed to the accident See, Romano v. 202 Corp., 305 A.D.2d 576, 577 (2d Dept. 2003). See also, Gezelterv. Pecora, 129 A.D.3d 1021, 1023 (2d Dept. 2015); Arias v. Tiao, 123 A.D.3d 857, 859 (2d Dept. 2014); Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789 (2d Dept. 2014). Although a driver with the right of way is entitled to anticipate that the other vehicle will obey the traffic laws requiring it to yield, she may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident.

See, Romano v. 202 Corp., 305 A.D.2d 576, 577 (2d Dept. 2003). See also, Gezelter v. Pecora, 129 A.D.3d 1021,1023 (2d Dept. 2015); Arias v. Tiao, 123 A.D.3d 857, 859 (2d Dept. 2014); Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787,789 (2d Dept. 2014). Although a driver with the right of way