Opinion
No. 10-05-00145-CR
Opinion delivered and filed March 22, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal fromthe 272nd District Court, Brazos County, Texas, Trial Court No. 03-01921-Crf-272. Affirmed.
Before Cheif Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and, Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Espinoza appeals his conviction for possession of a prohibited short-barrel firearm, namely a rifle. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). We affirm. In four issues, Espinoza contends that the evidence was insufficient. In Espinoza's first two issues, he contends that the evidence that his possession of the prohibited weapon was intentional or knowing was insufficient. In Espinoza's third and fourth issues, he contends that the evidence that he possessed the weapon was insufficient. "When we conduct a legal sufficiency-of-the-evidence review . . ., we do not weigh the evidence tending to establish guilt against the evidence tending to establish innocence." Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). "In deciding whether evidence is legally sufficient, 'the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1974))). "In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, both for and against the finding, and set aside the verdict if 'proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.'" Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)). The term "short-barrel firearm" includes "a rifle with a barrel length of less than 16 inches . . ., or any weapon made from a . . . rifle if, as altered, it has an overall length of less than 26 inches," and certain shotguns. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.01(10) (Vernon 2003). A police detective testified that she found the rifle, with a barrel length of 8 inches and an overall length of 14½ inches, in Espinoza's bedroom closet. Espinoza admitted that the rifle and another firearm in the closet "belonged to him, and that they were his guns," that he kept the guns in the closet, and that he had bought ammunition to "test . . . out with the gun." Espinoza's former wife, Hortencia Espinoza, testified that he had had the gun for several months before the detective found it. In Espinoza's first two issues, he contends that the evidence that his possession of the prohibited rifle was intentional or knowing was insufficient. In Espinoza's first issue, he contends that the evidence was legally insufficient. In Espinoza's second issue, he contends that the evidence was factually insufficient. "A required culpable mental state is an essential element of the offense" of possession of a prohibited weapon. Doyle v. State, 631 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (op. on orig. submission); accord id. at 735 (1982) (op. on reh'g) (en banc). "Mental states are almost always inferred from acts and words. 'Mental culpability is of such a nature that it generally must be inferred from the circumstances under which a prohibited act or omission occurs.'" Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)); accord Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The gist of Espinoza's argument is:
The evidence before the court was that Appellant got the weapons from a stranger, broken down on the road, in return for money Appellant loaned him. Appellant did not own the weapons. There was no evidence that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed an illegal weapon. The testimony was that he intended to bring the weapons to the police station if the true owner did not come forward. The State failed to introduce any evidence that Appellant intentionally possessed an illegal instrument.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Espinoza knowingly or intentionally possessed a prohibited weapon. The evidence was thus legally sufficient. We overrule Espinoza's first issue. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, the evidence that Espinoza knowingly or intentionally possessed a prohibited weapon is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination that he did so, nor is the proof of his guilt outweighed by contrary proof. The evidence was thus factually sufficient. We overrule Espinoza's second issue. In Espinoza's third and fourth issues, he contends that the evidence that he possessed the rifle was insufficient. In Espinoza's third issue, he contends that the evidence was legally insufficient. In Espinoza's fourth issue, he contends that the evidence was factually insufficient. "'Possession' means actual care, custody, control, or management." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Espinoza points primarily to the credibility of one of the State's witnesses. The gist of Espinoza's argument is:
The evidence before the jury was that a weapon with an eight inch barrel was found in the home of the Appellant. However, the weapon was reported to the police by Appellant's wife, from whom he had recently been divorced. This testimony should be considered somewhat suspect considering the acrimony between the parties. Further, he shared a home with Hortencia Espinoza, who was home alone with the weapons when the police arrived. Mrs. Espinoza was in actual possession of the weapons when the police arrived. Prior to the arrival of the police, Mrs. Espinoza could have been in possession of the weapons, rather than Appellant."When we conduct a legal sufficiency-of-the-evidence review," we do not "assess the credibility of witnesses on each side." Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 205. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Espinoza possessed a prohibited weapon. The evidence was thus legally sufficient. We overrule Espinoza's third issue. In a factual sufficiency review, "a reviewing court must give due deference to the fact finder's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence and will reverse the fact finder's determination only to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice." Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, the evidence that Espinoza possessed a prohibited weapon is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination that he did so, nor is the proof of his guilt outweighed by contrary proof. The evidence was thus factually sufficient. We overrule Espinoza's fourth issue. Having overruled Espinoza's issues, we affirm.