Opinion
11396 Index 22761/14E
07-16-2020
Angel ESPINOSA, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant–Appellant.
Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy & Bach, LLP, New York (Daniel S. Ratner of counsel), for appellant. Calano & Culhane, LLP, New York (Michael A. Calano of counsel), for respondent.
Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy & Bach, LLP, New York (Daniel S. Ratner of counsel), for appellant.
Calano & Culhane, LLP, New York (Michael A. Calano of counsel), for respondent.
Friedman, J.P., Oing, Singh, Moulton, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (George J. Silver, J.), entered on or about July 17, 2019, which denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff suffered a severe hand injury at work, requiring admission to defendant Montefiore Medical Center (Montefiore) to receive care that included surgery. After discharge, plaintiff was prescribed physical and occupational therapy for his hand, to be performed at Montefiore. The therapy was not commenced on the original date scheduled, however, due to a delay in plaintiff's medical insurer authorizing treatment. The complaint, which alleges that Montefiore was negligent in failing to timely commence outpatient hand therapy, fails to state a cause of action, as a medical provider generally has no duty at common law to accept any particular patient for treatment generally, or where there is no payment specifically (see Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App.Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 [4th Dept. 1924], affd 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 [1925] ; see also Palmieri v. Cuomo, 170 A.D.2d 283, 284, 566 N.Y.S.2d 14 [1st Dept. 1991], lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 852, 573 N.Y.S.2d 465, 577 N.E.2d 1057 [1991] ).
Nor has plaintiff stated a cause of action pursuant to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA) ( 42 USC § 1395dd ). The treatment that Montefiore refused to begin was not for an emergent condition requiring admission, and its duty to plaintiff under EMTALA ended when his condition stabilized during the original admission (see Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349, 352 [4th Cir.1996] ; Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1134 [6th Cir.1990] ). EMTALA was designed to prevent hospitals from either turning down or "dumping" indigent patients, and is not a measure intended to require hospitals to provide long-term, non-emergency care for uninsured patients (id. ).
As for plaintiff's argument that he stated a claim pursuant to Public Health Law § 2805–b, that statute does not provide a private right of recovery for monetary damages (see Cygan v. Kaleida Health, 51 A.D.3d 1373, 857 N.Y.S.2d 869 [4th Dept. 2008] ; Quijije v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 92 A.D.2d 935, 460 N.Y.S.2d 600 [2d Dept. 1983], appeal dismissed 59 N.Y.2d 1025, 466 N.Y.S.2d 966, 453 N.E.2d 1255 [1983] ; Yates v. Cohoes Mem. Hosp., 64 A.D.2d 726, 406 N.Y.S.2d 893 [3d Dept. 1978], appeal dismissed 45 N.Y.2d 838 [1978] ). In any event, even if the statute were to permit such a private right, plaintiff's condition, which did not require immediate need of hospitalization, would not trigger the provision's application.